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Synopsis
The incorporation of small, privately owned generation operating in parallel with, and 
supplying power to, the distribution network is becoming more widespread. This method 
of operation does however have problems associated with it. In particular, a loss of the 
connection to the main utility supply which leaves a portion of the utility load connected 
to the embedded generator will result in a power island. This situation presents possible 
dangers to utility personnel and the public, complications for smooth system operation and 
probable plant damage should the two systems be reconnected out-of-synchronism.
Loss of Grid (or Islanding), as this situation is known, is the subject of this thesis. The 
work begins by detailing the requirements for operation of generation embedded in the 
utility supply with particular attention drawn to the requirements for a loss of grid 
protection scheme. The mathematical basis for a new loss of grid protection algorithm is 
developed and the inclusion of the algorithm in an integrated generator protection scheme 
described. A detailed description is given on the implementation of the new algorithm in 
a microprocessor based relay hardware to allow practical tests on small embedded 
generation facilities, including an in-house multiple generator test facility. The results 
obtained from the practical tests are compared with those obtained from simulation studies 
carried out in previous work and the differences are discussed.
The performance of the algorithm is enhanced from the theoretical algorithm developed 
using the simulation results with simple filtering together with pattern recognition 
techniques. This provides stability during severe load fluctuations under parallel operation 
and system fault conditions and improved performance under normal operating conditions 
and for loss of grid detection.
In addition to operating for a loss of grid connection, the algorithm will respond to load 
fluctuations which occur within a power island should the embedded generator be left 
connected to part of the utility load following an undetected loss of grid. Finally, if the 
loss of grid still remains undetected, a subsequent out-of-step reclosure will be detected 
leading to removal of the generator from the system before serious damage can occur.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background to Embedded Generation.
Over the past two decades there have been increased economic, political and 
environmental pressures on the production of electricity that have greatly increased 
interest in incorporating embedded generation into public utility networks.
Moves towards the more efficient use of primary fuels and changes in the electricity 
market have encouraged the use of Combined Heat and Power (C.H.P.) plants which 
recover what would otherwise be waste heat. This requires that the power stations are 
situated near to industry or areas of dense population which can utilise the heat generated. 
Public pressure and the cost of fuel transportation means that these stations are in general 
smaller than current power stations.
For years the trend was towards increasingly large generation plants and centralised 
electricity generation, particularly in the U.K. under the C.E.G.B. This was justified by 
the economies of scale, and the cost of transmission of electricity (especially at E.H.V.) 
compared to the cost of fuel transportation. This lead to centralisation of generation plant 
near coal fields, oil refineries and deep water berths.
However, centralisation is only competitive for a reasonably high load factor such as base 
load power stations. For low load factors the cost of electrical transmission outweighs that 
of fuel transportation, leading to increased numbers of small electricity generating units 
being employed close to the load.
The following factors are also hastening the move towards increased numbers of small 
and medium sized embedded generation units:
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- Large power stations employing condensing turbines result in only 35% of the fuel's 
calorific value being converted into electrical energy. With C.H.P. units, overall 
efficiencies of 90% are possible.
- The uncertain future for conventional coal, oil and nuclear power stations due to 
increased pressure to reduce emissions, erratic oil prices and high decommissioning 
costs.
- The availability of natural gas and the efficiency and cleanliness of gas turbines. 
With the lifting of the moratorium in the U.K. on the use of natural gas for large 
scale generation, there has been a big 'dash for gas' and licences have been granted 
for the building of over 950MW of Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (C.C.G.T.) 
stations.
- Increased awareness of environmental issues and energy savings has lead to 
encouragement of generation from renewable sources.
Small scale generation includes alternative energy sources such as landfill gas, waste 
incineration and especially renewables like wind, tidal, solar, mini-hydro and bio-fuel 
schemes. The Non Fossil Fuel Obligation (N.F.F.O.) entitles alternative energy schemes 
to receive premium price for their electricity.
Alternative energy sources are by their very nature dispersed over large areas and the cost 
of building a transmission system just to collect and manage this power is not 
economically practical. The only feasible method of exploiting this power is by embedded 
connection of the separate schemes directly into the local utility's distribution network.
In the U.S.A. and the U.K., interest in embedded generation has been further encouraged 
by government legislation, the P.U.R.P.A. (1978) in the U.S.A., the 1983 U.K. Energy 
Act and the 1989 U.K. Electricity Act which have allowed these local systems to operate 
in parallel with the utility networks and export power. This new legislation makes it more 
attractive for consumers and private investors to purchase their own generation devices 
and sell their power to electric utilities.
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1.2 What is Embedded Generation?
Embedded generation (or Dispersed Storage and Generation, D.S.G.) is the operation of 
generation connected to and often supplying power in parallel with a utility’s distribution 
network. This is in contrast to the conventional tiered system of electricity supply where 
generation is connected to a transmission network and through that to the distribution 
system. Embedded generation encompasses the increasingly popular use of small power 
producing facilities in addition to the well developed industrial practice of cogeneration.
Cogeneration has been used in certain industrial sectors for many years as an economical 
means of producing electrical power in parallel with the heat or pressurised steam used 
by the industrial process. However, the recent changes in legislation have granted 
permission for local embedded generation to supply surplus power to the utility's 
distribution network.
Electricity utilities have long operated small scale generation, such as small gas turbine 
stations and internal combustion engines, embedded into their distribution networks to 
either reduce overall demand or support weak parts of their system during maximum 
loading (Peak lopping). Localised generation can be used to prevent large power flows 
and the associated system losses.
1.3 Problems Associated with Embedded Generation.
Unfortunately, when an embedded generator is connected to the utility network 
distribution system, difficulties arise with both the operation and the protection of the 
power system. The parallel operation of an embedded generator creates difficulties for 
reliable and safe operation which arise from the embedded generator’s capacity to supply 
power to the network from a source which is not under the utility's direct control. Special 
precautions are therefore required to prevent the embedded generator supplying low 
quality electricity to other utility customers and to ensure that it is disconnected from the 
network whenever there are faults on either system.
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Generally, because of the lack of control, utilities have resisted the introduction of 
privately owned generation connected to their systems. Several large utilities have 
produced guidelines defining their technical requirements before they will agree to allow 
an embedded generator to operate in parallel with their networks.11'71 In addition, the 
regulating authorities require the utilities to ensure that the embedded generators will not 
detract from the quality of supply to other customers and these guidelines define the 
general protection requirements for protection against all types of faults and abnormal 
operating conditions.
A major consideration in these guidelines is to provide equipment that will detect a loss 
of grid (or islanding) condition. This is when an embedded generator is disconnected from 
the main source of power due to a random opening of a utility circuit breaker. Depending 
on the amount of connected load, a synchronous generator, or an induction generator with 
sufficient capacitance connected to it for self-excitation, can continue to supply the local 
load and some utility load when the connection to the main source of supply is broken. 
The loss of the utility grid supply may cause dramatic changes in the electrical operation 
of the power island, particularly if there is a mis-match in the available generation and 
connected load. Excess generation in the power island will cause an increase in system 
frequency and voltage leading to over-excitation of the transformers. Insufficient 
generation, however, will drag the generator's voltage and frequency down affecting 
industrial process loads and possibly leading to a complete system outage. With closely 
matched generation and load the disconnection may cause insufficient system disturbance 
to operate the over/under voltage or over/under frequency protection resulting in the 
independent power island continuing to operate undetected. A schematic representation 
of the loss of grid situation can be seen in figure 1.1. This shows the embedded generator 
supplying some of the utility load following the loss of connection to the grid when the 
'loss of grid' circuit breaker is opened. The loss of grid' circuit breaker could potentially 
be any circuit breaker, switch or isolator in the main utility system which connects the 
main source of supply to the embedded generator.
Protection against loss of grid is therefore essential to protect both the embedded 
generator and the utility system against accidental isolation of the two systems. Isolated 
operation is not a problem in itself provided that the voltage and frequency remain within
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statutory limits. The main concerns are for safety of utility personnel and the potentially 
disastrous scenario of restoration of the utility supply when the two systems are out of 
synchronism. The loss of grid protection must therefore immediately detect the isolation 
of the two systems and disconnect the utility part of the power island by tripping the 
intertie breaker between the embedded generation busbar and the utility system before an 
auto-recloser can reconnect the two systems.
It is the responsibility of the operator of the embedded generator to supply the necessary 
level of protection and control equipment for the embedded generator scheme, however 
the economics of small embedded generation is such that once the desired level of 
protection is defined, the costs to protect the interconnection do not vary with generation 
capacity.181 There is a widespread complaint from potential operators of embedded 
generation that the utility grade relays are too expensive. For a small scheme, the 
protection costs can be comparable to that of the generator itself. To make any relatively 
small generation scheme economically viable there is obviously a need for low cost, high 
quality protection packages for the protection of the embedded generator system. The use 
of a single microprocessor based protection relay with multiple functions is one solution 
to this requirement.18'111
1.4 Objectives and Previous Work.
Quoting from a recent I.E.E.E. paper on the subject of embedded generation1121, 
"Providing protection against islanding probably is the single most challenging aspect of 
designing the electrical power system involving cogeneration."
The work detailed in this thesis is concerned with the detection of a loss of grid (or 
islanding) situation, leading to a subsequent isolation of the embedded generator from the 
remaining utility system. The proposed technique is based upon a measurement of the 
power at the terminals of the generator. This can be carried out using a microprocessor 
based relay system which will also allow a number of other protection functions for 
embedded generation to be implemented in a single piece of hardware.19,101
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The main objective of the research was the modification of the theoretical change in 
power loss of grid algorithm, which was conceived in previous work1, to operate in the 
'real world' environment. This involves implementing the theoretical algorithm in a digital 
environment and determining the refinements required to allow the algorithm to correctly 
operate in the practical system. The final aim of the research project is for a field tested 
algorithm to be included in a microprocessor based protection relay along with the other 
protection functions to provide complete protection for an embedded generation scheme.
1.5 Scope of this Thesis.
A brief summary of the information provided in each chapter of this thesis is given 
below:
Chapter 2: The thesis begins by detailing the requirements for an embedded generation 
scheme and highlights areas of concern and interest. This includes information on the 
legal, technical and operational requirements of an embedded generation scheme along 
with the required protection equipment and system configuration.
Chapter 3: The current methods employed to detect a loss of grid situation are the 
subject of the first part of this chapter. Information about the various techniques and their 
method of operation is given, but above all this section shows the limitations of the 
present protection techniques in detecting the occurrence of a loss of grid. After reviewing 
these methods, the chapter details the mathematical basis for a new method of detecting 
the loss of grid condition and gives the theory behind its operation. The algorithm is then 
developed and the process of its implementation in a digital environment outlined.
Chapter 4: In order to test the basic operation of the new algorithm, simulation studies 
were carried out using a simulation program written specifically for this purpose. Details 
of the simulation package and its method of operation are given in the first part of the 
chapter. Further to the simulation tests, practical real-time laboratory studies were carried
1 Work undertaken by Dr Omer Usta
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out using a laboratory research system which includes a microprocessor relay and a 
personal computer. The construction and operation of this research bench along with the 
software required to carry out the tests is fully documented in this chapter. The final part 
of the chapter outlines the setup required for the field trials of the algorithm using the 
microprocessor relay. These tests were carried out on a diesel driven embedded generator 
operating on an industrial site.
Chapter 5: The results of the practical tests highlight the challenges of implementation 
of the theoretical algorithm in a practical environment. The presence of distortions in the 
measured practical data from the laboratory system requires refinements to the basic 
operation of the theoretical algorithm. The differences between the simulated system 
results and the laboratory results are presented and the reasons for the refinements 
demonstrated. The work is presented in a progressive manner which takes the algorithm 
from its basic theoretical form to the final practical implementation of the algorithm in 
a digital environment. Test results obtained from the field trials are also included in this 
chapter.
Chapter 6: Once the final form of the practical algorithm has been developed its 
operation for all the system studies is demonstrated with further test results. These results 
show the final practical response of the algorithm to a number of different system 
conditions as well as its operating limitations.
Chapter 7: This chapter contains the final conclusions and discussions about the work 
undertaken in the project and presented in this thesis. Areas of further interest for the 
















Generator SitePotential Power 
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Figure 1.1: Schematic Diagram Showing Loss of Grid Situation.
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Chapter 2
Requirements for Embedded Generation
There are four main reasons for employing electricity generation close to the loadl131:
- Energy conservation using C.H.P. units to recover waste heat.
- Where a renewable source of energy can be harnessed and controlled economically.
- ’Peak lopping' such that the peak demand on the supplier's network is restrained by 
encouraging consumers to supply load from their own generation at times defined as 
'contracted consumer load periods'.
- Improvement in supply security and minimisation of electricity supply interruptions 
particularly where industrial process plant loads are concerned.
However, before achieving the advantages offered by including embedded generation into
a system, there are a number of requirements that must be satisfied.
2.1 Legislative Requirements.
2.1.1 The Energy Act.1141
The Energy Act 1983, section 5(2), states: 'Where a private generator or supplier requests
an Electricity Board
a) to give and continue to give a supply of electricity to premises where he generates 
electricity, or from which he supplies electricity to others, or
b) to purchase electricity generated by him, or
c) to permit him to use the Board's transmission and distribution system for the purpose 
of giving a supply of electricity to any premises.
the board shall offer to comply with the request unless on technical grounds it would not
be reasonably practical to do so.’
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This obliges any Regional Electricity Company (R.E.C.) to buy or transport energy from 
any generator who wishes to be connected to the R.E.C.'s distribution network. It is, 
however, standard practice for the R.E.C. to charge the private generator for any 
alterations to their system required to safely connect the plant.
In addition, Section 19(1) requires that I t  shall be the duty of every Electricity Board to 
adopt and support schemes-
a) for the combined production of heat and electricity, and
b) for the use of heat produced in combination with electricity, or incidental from its 
generation, for the heating of buildings or for other useful purposes.’
This is intended to increase the use of C.H.P. units to improve overall efficiencies.
2.1.2 Health and Safety.
Every private generator has a duty under section 3 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974 1151 'to conduct his undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as is reasonably 
practicable, that persons not in his employment are not exposed to risks to their health or 
safety.' This obligation covers members of the public and includes any regional electricity 
company employees working on the company network to which the private generator is 
connected. This is particularly true when the network is supposedly isolated from all 
electrical supply points to allow for work on the system.
2.1.3 Safety and Quality of Supplies.
Electricity companies have a statutory obligation under The Electricity Supply Regulations 
19371161 to ensure the safety and quality of the electricity supplies. This means that a 
private generator must not operate his plant in such a way that the electricity utility is 
unable to fulfil these obligations. The R.E.C.’s are only compelled to supply premises 
which they are reasonably satisfied that all equipment is in good condition. They are also 
able to disconnect supplies if the operation of any plant interferes with the efficient 
supply of electricity to any other user. These regulations apply equally to load or generation.
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2.1.4 The Electricity Council Recommendations, G59.[11
In the U.K., the technical requirements for connection of an embedded generator to a 
R.E.C.’s system are defined in the electricity council's engineering recommendations 
(G59). It is intended to provide guidelines for utilities where the connection is to be made 
at, or below 20kV and where the generator's output does not exceed 5MW.
The document applies to systems where the private generating plant may be paralleled 
with the Board’s distribution system and where the private generating plant or the 
Electricity Board's system may be used to supply the same electrical load.
2.2 Connection and Operational Requirements.11,5,6,171
2.2.1 System Earthing.11*18'19'201
For high voltage (h.v.) systems, the Electricity Board may use direct, resistor, reactor or 
arc suppression coil methods for system neutral earthing. Where the Board's system is 
designed for single point earthing, no star point or earthing transformer should be 
connected by the private generator during parallel operation. However precautions must 
be taken to ensure that the private generator's h.v. system is earthed during isolated 
operation. Where the Board's system is designed for multiple earthing, during parallel 
operation, earthing may be achieved by the use of a busbar earthing transformer or the 
star point of the generator.
For low voltage (l.v.) systems, the Electricity Board's l.v. systems are directly earthed and 
the majority may now be multiple earthed. The neutral point of the embedded generator 
may therefore be connected directly to earth.
All customer generators should be isolated from utility-owned equipment by a power 
transformer connected so as to isolate the Zero Phase Sequence (Z.P.S.) circuit of the 
customer's generator from the Z.P.S. circuit of the utility.
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2.2.2 Fault Infeed and Fuse Coordination.*1,171
When proposing to install private generating plant, consideration must be given to the 
contribution of the private plant to the fault level on the Electricity Board's system. The 
extra fault current produced by connecting local generation can require the uprating of the 
existing network. Embedded generation can disrupt the expected pattern of currents 
flowing around a system under fault conditions and changes in the levels of fault currents, 
or fault currents flowing in the opposite direction to that predicted, will prevent fuses and 
protection relays from coordinating correctly.
The owner of the embedded generation system must provide, at his expense, whatever 
equipment is required to meet the functional requirements of the utility. The cost of any 
changes caused by increased fault current levels due to the customer's generation should 
also be considered as part of the parallel installation.
2.2.3 Synchronizing.111
In order to operate private generating plant, other than mains excited asynchronous 
machines, in parallel with a Regional Electricity Board's (R.E.C.) system it is necessary 
to synchronize the private generating plant with that of the R.E.C.'s system prior to 
making the parallel connection. To ensure that the machine is smoothly locked to the 
R.E.C. energy source, four conditions must be met*1,131:
- The generator must be driven at a speed such that its frequency is acceptably close to 
50Hz, and its phase sequence corresponds to that of the grid voltage.
- The generator voltage phasors must be matched in magnitude with the grid.
- The generator and grid voltage must be within 10* of equal phase.
- The voltage fluctuation on the Board's system during synchronizing should not exceed 
3% at the point of common coupling.
Most utilities forbid manual synchronizing1121 because any difference between the 
instantaneous angle of the generator voltage and that of the utility will produce a 
momentary power swing (called a "bump”) on the system. The utility is concerned that
12
the bump created will cause a voltage disturbance that will be experienced by other 
customers on their system. This bump can have a range of consequences from a 
momentary flicker of a light to a loss of production due to motor contactors dropping out 
unexpectedly.
To the embedded generator, the consequences of a bump may be more severe. Every time 
a transient torque is imposed on a generator shaft its life is reduced, leading to eventual 
premature failure. As a minimum, the embedded generator should have some relay 
supervision of manual synchronization where a protective relay is connected to prevent 
non-exact synchronization attempts. Ideally, the cogenerator would be equipped with 
automatic synchronizing.
For reasons of safety an embedded generator must not be permitted to pick up a dead 
utility circuit. Should a dead line be re-energised from the embedded generator end, there 
may be no way for the circuit breaker at the remote terminal to be synchronously closed.
2.2.4 Distortion and Interference.111
Where the generating plant input motive power may vary rapidly, causing corresponding 
changes in the output power, the voltage fluctuations at the common coupling point 
should not exceed 1%.
Harmonic voltages and currents produced within the private generator's system must not 
cause excessive harmonic voltage distortion on the Board's system.
The level of negative phase sequence voltage at the point of common coupling should not 
exceed 1.3% of the positive phase sequence voltage, assuming an initially symmetrical 
system. The utility should warn customers that certain conditions may cause Negative 
Phase Sequence (N.P.S.) currents to flow in the customer's generator and that it is the 
customer's responsibility to protect against N.P.S.
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2.2.5 Engineering Planning.
To ensure that an embedded generation or cogeneration plant will operate safely, reliably 
and economically, power system studies are required during the planning and conceptual 
design stages of a project as well as periodically throughout the operating life of the 
plant.121'241
Areas that should be explored in discussions between cogenerators and utilities include1121:
- Primary and back-up system protection practices,
- Automatic reclosing practices,
- Characteristics of major utility system loads,
- Transmission line surge protection practices,
- Transmission line routings near the embedded generation facility, 
and associated outage rates,
- Maintenance scheduling.
Every installation with private generating plant must be designed to be compatible with 
the Electricity Board's network to which it is to be connected. The utility may require that 
the details of the proposed protection scheme be submitted for approval and testing prior 
to commissioning. The utility may also require a lockable disconnect between the utility 
and the embedded generator which is accessible to utility personnel. The paralleling of 
customer generation with an electric utility requires that the customer and utility 
communicate and co-operate on the operating and protective relaying problems associated 
with the interconnection.1251 A utility point of view on the operating and protective 
relaying problems, together with some of the different interface schemes which a utility 
might provide for parallel operation with customer generation, can be found in references 
12 and 25. In addition, the utility protection requirements for small wind turbine 
interconnection can be seen in reference 26.
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2.3 General Protection Requirements.*27,283
There are three main areas of concern:
1 The presence of embedded generation on a utility distribution system may contribute 
significant short-circuit current to faults and destroy the overcurrent protection 
coordination of reclosers and fuses.
2 Resonant conditions can develop on a section of distribution feeder with embedded 
generation that is isolated during single phase-to-ground faults resulting in an 
overvoltage condition on the unfaulted phases that can damage the embedded 
generator and feeder line equipment.
3 The operation of an embedded generator continuing to operate on a feeder that has 
been isolated from the substation by a recloser or other protection device 
("Islanding"). The embedded generator can continue to supply power to the loads on 
the isolated feeder and become a safety hazard to repair personnel.
Reference 29 details the results of a simulation undertaken to highlight the problems
associated with the interconnection of embedded generation.
2.3.1 Protective Equipment.111
The protection requirements of embedded generation depends on several factors:
- Generator capacity,
- Type of generator set,
- System voltage level,
- Method of system earthing,
- Point of connection,
- Mode of operation (i.e. parallel or independent).
The Electricity Council Recommendations G59 for the connection of embedded
generation to a R.E.C.'s system requires that in addition to any generating plant protection
installed by the private generator for his own purposes, the Board requires protective 
equipment to be provided to achieve the following objectives:
- To inhibit connection of the generating equipment to the Board's supply unless all 
phases of the Board's supply are energised and operating within the protection 
settings.
- To disconnect the generator from the system when a system abnormality occurs that 
results in an unacceptable deviation of the voltage or frequency at the point of 
supply.
- To disconnect the generator from the Electricity Board's system in the event of loss 
of the Board's supply to the installation.





- Loss of Grid.
Other protection could be required and may include the detection of:




- Stator Earth Fault,
- Rotor Earth Fault,
- Negative Phase Sequence,
- Loss of Excitation.
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2.3.2 The Embedded Generator Protection Scheme.
The complete protection scheme for an embedded generator which could be incorporated 
in a digital multifunction protection relay is shown in figure 2.1. The individual relay 
elements are described below16,811,271:
- Over/Under Frequency (810/U).17,81
Islanding is one of the major conditions for which protection is required. Should the 
cogenerator-utility intertie be opened, the generator will be expected to either accelerate 
or decelerate quickly, depending on the relative local load and generation conditions. 
Except for the case of an exact match of load and generation, the frequency will shift 
from 50Hz (60Hz in U.S.A.). The usual settings for these elements are 50.5Hz and 
49.5Hz. The effectiveness of this technique for detecting loss of grid will be discussed 
in the next chapter. Over/Under frequency also provides a means of detecting abnormal 
frequency under normal conditions and removing the embedded generator.
- Over Voltage (59).181
Sensing the voltage is commonly suggested, along with frequency sensing, to protect 
against loss of grid. It is recommended that one overvoltage relay is connected between 
106% and 110% voltage with a short time delay to prevent nuisance tripping. This 
protects the generator from a failure of the voltage regulator resulting in an increase in 
generator terminal voltage or an undesirable overvoltage condition on the utility system.
A second overvoltage protection function may be required which responds to the 
instantaneous value of the voltage under conditions of ferroresonance. Ferroresonance 
occurs when an embedded generator (synchronous or induction) becomes self-excited 
following separation from the utility source.1301 The high overvoltages and distorted 
waveshapes which occur means that the peak of the non-sinusoidal wave may be 
dangerously high while the R.M.S. value remains within an acceptable range. The second 
overvoltage function should therefore be set at 1.2 to 1.5 per unit with a minimum time 
delay.
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The best solution to the ferroresonance problem is to remove the embedded generator 
itself from the island as soon as the isolation occurs and a study of the ability of certain 
relays to detect this condition is presented in reference 31.
- Under Voltage (27).[8]
The undervoltage element should be set at about 90% with a time delay of up to 60 
cycles to prevent nuisance trips due to momentary dips in system voltage. This provides 
protection against closing the oncoming generator to a de-energised utility line. Under 
parallel operation the relay detects a reduction in system voltage due to a fault and 
removes the embedded generator from the system.
- Synchronizer (25).1321
Check-Sync (25): Verifies proper frequency, voltage and phase relation between the 
oncoming generator and the utility system and provides permissive control for manual 
reclosure.
Automatic Synchronizer (25A): Monitors the phase relationships between the oncoming 
generator and utility bus and predicts the correct time to close the intertie breaker. The 
device provides speed and voltage correction signals for the generator. The conditions for 
paralleling are (deviation from nominal):
Frequency < 0.2 Hz, Voltage <0.1 p.u, Phase difference < 5*
- Negative Sequence Overcurrent (46N).
Protects the generator against damage caused by unbalanced currents resulting from a 
prolonged fault condition or abnormal load imbalance. The negative phase sequence 
currents induce eddy currents in the rotor at twice system frequency leading to severe 
rotor heating.
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- Overcurrent (51)[321 and Stator Earth Fault (5 IN )I9,101.
Overcurrent relays provide three phase protection and disconnect on overcurrent and fault 
current flow in either direction. Their settings are coordinated with other elements in the 
power distribution circuit and their function is to achieve a cascaded circuit isolating 
system to isolate a faulted circuit as close to the fault location as possible.
The stator earth fault function is current operated and can be typically set to cover up to 
95% of the stator windings. It is generally used for generators that are resistance earthed, 
but can be used to respond to current in the secondary circuit of an earthing transformer 
loaded with a resistor.
- Voltage Controlled/Restrained Overcurrent (51V).
There are two types of 51V relays. The voltage restrained relay is an overcurrent device 
in which the magnitude of the pick up current and operating time characteristics change 
as a function of system voltage.112,271 With the voltage controlled overcurrent, the relay 
operates as an overcurrent relay only if the voltage on the system falls below a chosen 
minimum value. While the voltage is above this minimum the relay is disabled. In many 
applications, the choice between voltage restrained or voltage controlled overcurrent is 
a commercial decision, however there are significant application differences and these are 
discussed in reference 12.
- Field Failure (Loss-of-Excitation) Protection (40).1331
When field failure occurs the generator will accelerate to a higher speed and operate as 
an induction generator at 40-60 percent of rated power with resultant high amortisseur 
currents in the rotor. In addition, exciting current (reactive power) will flow into the 
generator from the system. A generator is unlikely to be damaged by field failure 
provided the situation does not persist for more than 5-10 seconds. However, the heavy 
reactive load on the system can seriously reduce voltages, possibly causing collapse, 
instability, loss of load, tie tripping and related problems. Traditional field failure 
protection uses a distance type relay and operates from the apparent impedance viewed 
from the generator terminals.
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- Directional Power (32R)[321 and Low Forward Power (32L).[9,101
Directional power (Reverse power) relays protect against the generator motoring due to 
a loss of prime mover torque. The reverse power direction is power flow into the 
generator. The function should be time delayed since circulating (synchronising) power 
flow will occur upon initial connection of the generator to the bus.
Low forward power protection is sometimes applied to steam turbine generators where 
sequential shutdown is preferable under less urgent operation to avoid overspeeding.
- Generator Differential (87G).
Protects the generator against internal faults of the generator windings which can result 
in costly damage to the insulation, windings and core of the machine. This type of 
protection is not normally applied to machines below 1MVA.
- Directional Earth Fault (67N).I8,9]
When two or more generators are connected in parallel directly to a busbar, the 
directional earth fault function is used in conjunction with either stator earth fault or 
neutral displacement to discriminate between internal and external earth faults.
- Ground Fault Overvoltage or Neutral Displacement (59N).
This sensitive overvoltage device provides generator protection for ground faults where 
the generator neutral is grounded through a grounding transformer.
Additional protection functions which are not shown in figure 2.1 include:
- Temperature (49).
Protects against generator winding or bearing overheating.
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- Phase Sequence Voltage Relay (47).1321
This high speed relay separates the two power sources on undervoltage and excessive 
phase voltage unbalance. It also prevents synchronism of the generator with the utility 
until the utility is at nominal voltage on all phases and has the proper phase sequence.
- Directional Overcurrent (67).[321
This is a high speed relay (3 cycles) which separates the local generator bus from the 
utility grid when the current flowing into the grid exceeds the full load current of the 
embedded generation plant.
- Out-of-Step Protection (78).[33]
Generators on distribution systems can be exposed to fault clearing times of 0.5-1 second 
or more and this can cause instability resulting in large power swings in generator power 
and potentially damaging shaft torque excursions. Generator currents during pole-slipping 
can be well above the current that the generator would deliver to a three phase fault and 
machine failure may occur after just a few events. Out-of-step relays respond to changes 
in ’apparent impedance' at the terminals of the generator as pole slipping occurs and limits 
exposure to one cycle of a pole-slip power swing.
2.3.3 Islanding of Embedded Generation.
A number of papers17,8,12,13,17,26’29,31,33,34,351 have highlighted the problem that when an 
embedded generator is disconnected from the main source of power, a power island can 
result with a portion of the utility's network being isolated from the utility’s supply, but 
still connected to the embedded generator. When considering the design of a protection 
system for embedded generation the most important design criterion is that The on-site 
generator(s) must be separated from the utility service grid immediately upon the 
occurrence of a power system disturbance that results in an unsafe, undesirable or 
objectionable operation.' For a system fitted with 12-cycle automatic reclosers, this means 
that the generator must be disconnected within eight or nine cycles maximum.1321
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The possible causes of isolated operation are[26]:
- Clearing of transient faults,
- Load shedding,
- Lines open for maintenance reasons,
- Possible equipment failures.
In a loss of grid' situation the voltage may collapse if the load is greater than the 
generation available, or the isolated system can continue to operate independently if the 
load on the isolated section of feeder closely matches the power output of the embedded 
generator connected to the feeder. The isolated operation of induction generators and line- 
commutated inverters is also possible with the proper combination of load and capacitor 
compensation.1291
Analysis has suggested that if the ratio of local load to generator capacity is less than 3:1 
then there is a significant possibility of a power island being formed.1311 This is dangerous 
for maintenance personnel because they may assume that the line has been de-energized 
since the substation breaker has been opened. In general, utility substations were designed 
to be the sole source of power on distribution networks so they may not be equipped with 
check synchronism relays. If a generator is left isolated from the main network, its speed 
and therefore frequency will be controlled independently by its own regulator and it is 
unlikely to stay in synchronism with the utility supply. There is therefore the danger that 
the two networks could be connected together out of phase, resulting in power surges and 
possible equipment damage particularly to the generator.
In general, if the rotating-type embedded generator output does not match the load exactly 
at the instant of isolation, there should be sufficient change in the generator speed for 
voltage and frequency relays to detect the islanding condition quickly enough to prevent 
damage to distribution equipment. However, there may be some cases where the load and 
generator capacity may be matched well enough where neither frequency nor voltage vary 
quickly enough for detection and therefore specific loss of grid protection will be 
required. It is recommended that utilities examine the possibility of isolated operation and 
satisfy themselves that it is adequately dealt with by the customer's protection.
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Recloser settings should also be examined to determine if customer damage may result 
from high-speed reclosing. Winding and shaft damage can result from the currents and 
shaft torques caused by radial reclosing1331 and the potential for serious generator damage 
is so high that major investment to avoid it is warranted. Loss of grid protection is the 
subject of this thesis and a study into the effectiveness of current detection techniques 
















52a Utility Circuit Breaker.
52b Intertie Circuit Breaker.
52c Generator Circuit Breaker.
810 Over Frequency Relay.
81U Under Frequency Relay.
59 Over Voltage Relay.
27 Under Voltage Relay.
25 Check Sync Relay.
8 1 U H 8 1 0 H  27 H  59
46N N.P.S. Overcurrent.
51V Voltage Dependent Overcurrent. 
40 Field Failure (Loss o f Excitation). 
32R Reverse Power.
32L Low Forward Power.
59N Neutral Displacement.
87G Differential Relay.
5 IN  Stator Earth Fault.
67N Directional Earth Fault.
LOG Loss o f Grid Protection.
Figure 2.1 : Typical Protection Scheme Required for an Embedded Generator 
Operating in Parallel with the Utility Grid Network.
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Chapter 3
Loss of Grid Protection
For a number of legal and technical reasons islanding is undesirable to the embedded 
generator because it is quite possible that the utility system load remaining in the island 
would be greater than the capability of the embedded generator with the result that it 
would be dragged down and carry with it the industrial process load, leading to a 
complete outage. The effect of an interruption to the utility supply depends on the power 
flow across the inter-tie just prior to the interruption.1341
If power is being imported, then the industrial load exceeds the industrial generation. 
When the tie opens, the excess load is placed on the in-plant generation causing it to slow 
down. The rate of decay of generator speed (and hence frequency) is determined by the 
amount of overload and by the inertia of the generators.
If power is being exported, then the industrial generation exceeds the industrial load. 
When the tie opens, the excess generation will contribute to a rise in the industrial bus 
voltage leading to possible over-excitation of transformers and an increase in speed 
(frequency).
The principal objective for loss of grid protection is therefore to detect the condition 
where the embedded generation unit is left connected to a portion of the utility's load 
network, but disconnected from the main source of utility power following a switching 
operation. Typical requirements are that it should operate before the fastest automatic 
reclosure time of around twelve cycles. Fast detection of the loss of grid is also necessary 
to disconnect the two systems before the Automatic Voltage Regulator (A.V.R.) and 
Speed Governor can respond to try to restore a new power balance. Unfortunately, the 
loss of grid situation is further complicated since the circuit breaker that causes the loss 
of grid need not be a specific breaker in the system, but could be any breaker, switch or 
isolator which connects the main source of supply to the generator’s site.
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3.1 Present Techniques for Detecting Loss of Grid.
Difficulties arise because loss of grid is not a clearly defined fault condition, but is an 
undesirable and unsafe operating state. Several protection schemes have been developed 
to detect loss of grid and these can be split into two fundamental groups, passive or 
active. Passive techniques monitor system behaviour with no interaction with the power 
system and active techniques directly interact with the operation of the power system.
3.1.1 Transfer Trip from the Utility Substation.15,6,12,17,331
The most direct and effective method to detect a loss of grid connection is to take 
advantage of a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System (S.C. A.D.A.) to monitor 
the auxiliary contacts on all the circuit breakers, switches and isolators in the system 
between the embedded generator and the main utility supply. A transfer trip signal could 
then be provided to open the intertie circuit breaker. However most distribution systems, 
and the circuit breakers they employ, have not been fitted with a suitable supervisory 
system and the expense involved with a retro-fit is generally difficult to justify.
3.1.2 Over/Under Frequency and Over/Under Voltage.1121
As previously mentioned, this is a widely accepted passive technique for detecting a loss 
of grid situation which monitors the variations in the system's frequency and voltage.18,111 
Any dramatic change in load on the embedded generator at the time of disconnection 
results in changes in the voltage and/or frequency of the system until a new energy 
balance is found. Over/Under frequency and Over/Under voltage relays are therefore able 
to provide a reasonable degree of protection. There are however, three considerations that 
may limit the effectiveness of these schemes:
1 If the load remaining in the island is close to the capability of the generator the 
voltage will neither increase nor decrease. Instead, a state of equilibrium will exist 
between load power and generated power and the island will continue to operate 
independently. Furthermore, large generators fitted with high speed automatic voltage 
regulators (A.V.R.s) may be able to match the subsequent island load after a short
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time and it is therefore possible that the voltage and frequency can be maintained 
within prescribed limits and detection of the condition becomes more complex.
2 If separation leaves the island with an excess of generation, the theoretical response 
would be for voltage and frequency to rise. Most interconnected systems include 
many transformers and as voltage increases above normal the magnetic cores of these 
devices are over-excited. Over-excitation is essentially self limiting (i.e. over-exciting 
the core will cause an increase in excitation current drawn by the transformer which 
in turn limits the degree of overvoltage supplied to the transformer). When a core is 
over-excited, a significant degree of waveform distortion is imposed on the power 
system and many overvoltage and overfrequency relays commonly used to protect 
against islanding cannot properly respond in the presence of this distortion caused 
by the overvoltage.
3 Problems occur when the generation is far less than the total industrial plant demand, 
leading to very rapid frequency decay. Underfrequency relays must often shed the 
excess load in less than one second after the tie is opened. When relays are made 
faster, security may be sacrificed. Any disturbance which gives a change in system 
voltage also causes a transient disturbance in system frequency. Thus, if the 
frequency relays are set too high with very short time delays, they may mal-operate 
due to transient oscillations in frequency that follow the clearing of a fault within the 
industrial plant.
Under and over frequency relays will therefore do the job providing there is a measurable 
frequency excursion upon trip of the utility line but the frequency excursion is clearly 
difficult to predict and frequency based schemes cannot be 100 percent reliable. Voltage 
relays are similar to frequency relays in that it is difficult to ensure that reasonable 
voltage settings will reliably detect the loss of grid condition.
3.1.2 Rate of Change of Frequency (R.O.C.O.F.).113,361
This passive type of loss of grid relay can be used because for all practical purposes some 
difference between load and generating capacity will occur in the event of the ’islanding'
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condition. The immediate effect of any change in the power being supplied by the 
generator is to change the kinetic energy of the machine and hence its speed. It can be 
shown from the swing equation that the initial rate of change of frequency is given by:
—  = AP F  (3.1)
dT 2HS
Where: AP is the change in power output,
F is the power system frequency,
H is the inertia constant of the machine and 
S is the rated capacity of generation.1131
The rate of change of frequency relay monitors the voltage waveform and trips if the rate 
of change of frequency exceeds the setting for longer than a set time delay. For small and 
medium sized embedded generation, an optimum operating time of 0.3 to 0.7 seconds is 
possible with a trip setting of 0.3 Hz/sec. The frequency is measured using a technique 
based upon zero crossings, using a high sampling rate and input signal filtering. A 
number of alternative methods are available for the calculation of the power system 
frequency.137"401
The biggest complaint about the R.O.C.O.F. relay is that it is difficult to determine the 
setting and as a consequence, mal-operation has occurred on a few occasions.
3.1.3 Phase Displacement Monitor.135,411
This passive relay detects phase displacements in the voltage waveform which are a result 
of changes in the loading of the embedded generator. Operating times of about 50 msec 
are possible for a loss of grid situation which results in a load change of greater than 5% 
of the generator rating. However, since sudden phase displacements occur mainly due to 
the changes in reactive power, the relay is less sensitive to the changes in real power due 
to a loss of grid.
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3.1.4 Reactive Export Error Detector (R.E.E.D.).1361
This is an active technique which involves exciting the generator so that it produces a 
level of reactive current at the relaying point which cannot occur if the protected 
generator is the only source of power to the system. The relay detects the loss of grid 
condition when the level of reactive current is not maintained at the setting value for 
longer than a preset time period. This time delay is chosen to be greater than the duration 
of any possible supply fluctuations.
Unfortunately, this technique requires direct control of the embedded generator as well 
as monitoring system operation. In addition, when a generator is operating in parallel it 
is usual for the excitation to be adjusted in order to minimise the MVAr demand charge 
by supplying the MVAr requirements of the local load. This is no longer possible when 
using this technique. Another possible drawback occurs if power factor correction 
capacitors remain connected in the power island and allow the reactive current level to 
be maintained at near the pre-loss value.
However, the technique is very effective, if somewhat slow (2 to 5 seconds), since it can 
detect a loss of grid when there is no load change due to the switching and it is often 
used as a back up to faster protection techniques.
3.1.5 System Fault Level Monitor.1421
This is also an active technique which depends upon the measurement of the power 
system's source impedance close to the intertie. This is done by monitoring the magnitude 
of a short current pulse and voltage change which occurs when the current flow through 
a shunt inductor is controlled by a point-on-wave switch comprising anti-parallel thyristor 
pairs. By controlling the firing angle in order to keep the current pulse of constant 
magnitude the system fault level can be determined. The trip decision depends on a 
comparison of the measured system fault level with that corresponding to a network fed 
from utility generation.
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Since there is a large difference between the fault levels of the utility's generation and that 
of the embedded generator the system need not be highly accurate. Fast operating times 
are also possible with a theoretical minimum of half a cycle. At present, there are no 
relays that adopt this technique, despite a similar technique being used to improve the 
performance of static voltage compensators.
3.1.6 Summary.
A comparative study of the effectiveness and speed of some of the above passive 
techniques in detecting a loss of grid can be seen in reference 43. These studies were 
carried out using a simulation that was developed specifically for loss of grid studies. The 
conclusions drawn in this paper show that a variety of different techniques are available 
for loss of grid protection. Active systems are usually more effective, but have the 
disadvantage of requiring a direct influence on system operation. Passive techniques 
however, cannot be guaranteed to operate under all conditions.
At present the only method of loss of grid protection that suffers no deficiencies is to 
monitor the auxiliary contacts on the utility circuit breakers and provide an intertrip 
signal, but for most power systems, this method is costly and unmanageable.1121
3.2 The Change in Power Loss of Grid Algorithm.
The aim of this new algorithm is to provide a trip signal to open the intertie breaker 
between the embedded generation and the mains utility in the event of a loss of grid 
condition. The algorithm uses passive techniques to monitor the power measured at the 
terminals of the embedded generator. The development of the theoretical algorithm was 
based upon the following criteria:
- Loss of the main utility supply is a balanced three phase switching condition. Loss 
of only one or two phases is not considered to be a loss of grid since synchronism 
between the two systems is not lost, which allows subsequent unsupervised 
reconnection.
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- Should a loss of grid occur undetected, any subsequent load change during isolated 
operation should produce a trip signal to open the intertie breaker and remove the 
'islanded' utility load.
- If the loss of grid has not been detected before the utility supply is reconnected then 
the algorithm must produce a trip signal to remove the embedded generation from 
the system before serious damage can occur as a result of the unsupervised reclosure.
- The algorithm must remain stable for all load fluctuations during parallel operation.
- The operation of the algorithm must not be impaired or false operation occur due to 
the presence of unbalance or noise on the system.
- The algorithm must also remain stable and not mal-operate under local and remote 
power system fault conditions.
- The trip time should be fast enough to isolate the two systems before the A. V.R. and 
Speed Governor can correct the imbalance between available generation and 
connected load.
- The proposed technique must be fully compatible with the other protection functions 
associated with the embedded generator and be suitable for inclusion in a 
microprocessor based integrated generator protection package.
The key requirement for the Loss of Grid algorithm is to be able to detect whether the 
embedded generator is connected to the mains system. This is achieved by monitoring the 
response of the system to disturbances. The proposed algorithm uses changes in the power 
output from the generator to gain insight into the transfer function of the connected 
system. Under normal parallel operating conditions the characteristics are of both the 
mains supply and the embedded generator. However, following a loss of connection, the 
characteristics are of the embedded generator alone. There is sufficient difference between 
the relative capacities and inertia's of the two systems to provide for a method of 
immediate detection.
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3.2.1 Mathematical Basis for Algorithm.
Consider a power system comprising n machines. An arbitrary load impact ±APL on the 
system will cause each machine to accelerate/decelerate relative to its capacity and inertia 
constant. This occurs after an initial transient period detailed in appendix A.3. Under these 
conditions, the i* machine will share the load impact according to:
machine’s rotating part per unit VA. In general it has units of MW.sec/MVA or seconds 
at unity power factor.
The mathematical theory behind the response of a synchronous generator to random 
power impacts, given by equation 3.2, is presented in Appendix A. In this appendix, the 
swing equation which governs the response of the generator is developed then a simple 
model of a single machine on an infinite busbar is produced. This model is then used to 
show the distribution of power impacts in a multi-machine network.
Equation 3.2, however, assumes a common base for H. Replacing Hj by Hj(S/SB) and Hj 
by Hj(S/SB) leads to the more general equation:
Where Sj and Sj are the rated capacities in MVA.
When the generator is operating in parallel with the mains and both systems are modelled 
by idealised generators, as was shown in figure 1.1, the general equation (3.3) can be 
simplified to show the effect of the load impact ±APL on the power output of the 
embedded generator:
A P, = ±A PL
(3.2)
Where H is the inertia constant of the machine and is defined as the stored energy in the
A P, = ±A  PL
(3.3)
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A P. = ±A Pri  L
H, s,
H  S  + H Sg g m "ft
(3.4)
Where Hg and H,,, are the inertia constants of the embedded generator and the 
utility supply respectively, 
and Sg and Sm are the capacities of the embedded generator and utility supply.
Equation 3.4 therefore shows the response to a load change on the power system with the 
embedded generator operating in parallel with the main utility supply. It can be seen from 
this result that the effect of the load impact on the generator is greatly reduced by the 
presence of the product HmSm in the denominator of the fraction. Typical values for H,,, 
and Sm are 10 MW.sec/MVA and 250 MVA respectively, compared to around 1 
MW.sec/MVA and 5 MVA for a typical embedded generator. After a loss of grid has 
occurred the effect of the main supply (i.e. I^Sm) is removed and equation 3.4 becomes:
A Pg = ±A PL (3.5)
Under these circumstances it is the change in the load ±APL, the embedded generator and 
the local network inertia constant that defines the system behaviour after the loss of grid. 
Since a loss of grid generally produces a change in the loading of the generator, 
monitoring the changes in the power output provides a method for detecting loss of grid.
It should be noted that following the loss of grid connection, the characteristics of the 
local generator determines the response to any changes in load. This may be the case 
when the local system is operating independently from the utility following an unseen loss 
of grid connection. In this situation the basis on which the new algorithm is proposed also 
provides a secondary means for detection should the first method fail due to insufficient 
change in generator loading. Thus a loss of grid connection can be detected due to a 
subsequent change in local load in the independent power island.
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3.2.2 Structure of the Digital Protection Algorithm.
The theoretical algorithm consists of four main steps:
- The instantaneous power is calculated from the input data,
- The rate of change of power (i.e. derivative) is produced,
- The derivative signal is amplitude limited,
- The moving average of the clipped derivative is taken 
and compared with the trip setting.
Calculation of the Instantaneous Three Phase Power.
The input data required for this initial step of the algorithm consists of the instantaneous 
sampled values of the three line currents and the corresponding phase to ground voltages. 
Using these values, the instantaneous power can be calculated according to the formula:
P = v i + v J t  + v i (3-6)g ra a rb b c c v '
Where v„ vb and vc are the sampled phase voltages, 
and ia, ib and ic are the sampled line currents.
It is shown in appendix B that equation 3.6 for the instantaneous power measured on a 
three phase system, under balanced conditions, is equivalent to:
Pg = 3 K /  cos <1> (3.7)
Where V is the RMS line voltage, I is the RMS line current and cos<|> is the power factor.
Equation 3.7 shows that for a balanced system there are no sinusoidal components in the 
instantaneous power signal and it is therefore a 'd.c.’ term. Unbalance present in the 
system produces a twice power system frequency term (i.e. 100Hz) in the power signal 
and the effect on the algorithm of any unbalance is shown in a later chapter.
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The Rate of Change of Power.
The rate of change, or derivative, of a signal in a discrete environment can be found using 
the equation:
( 3 - 8 )
For this application, the equation becomes:
P „ „ -  P „ l
(3.9)APg <H) _ t Pg (M)
Af, A t ,
Where At, is the sampling interval.
Providing the sampling interval is constant, the division by At, is not required in the 
algorithm and can be included in a constant term in the trip setting. Equation 3.9 therefore 
reduces to:
AP,  <M> = (3 1 °)
By reducing the calculation of the derivative to this simple subtraction, the required 
processing time in the microprocessor relay is greatly reduced.
Amplitude Limitation of the Rate of Change of Power Signal.
Mathematical analysis and simulation studies143-451 have shown that at the instant of loss 
of grid, the instantaneous power changes very rapidly due to the stored electrical energy 
in the windings of the rotating machine. This is explained in greater detail in Appendix 
A as the response immediately following the load impact at time t=0+. This fast change 
in turn produces a very large spike in the derivative term which leads to an almost 
instantaneous trip from the algorithm. To improve the stability of the algorithm by 
reducing the effect of this sub-transient response, it is necessary to limit the maximum 
value of the derivative spike to allow a minimum trip time to be set. This process of 
amplitude limiting the derivative is therefore included as a step in the algorithm to 
desensitize the algorithm to very fast initial changes in power which are due to stored 
electrical energy rather than stored inertial energy. In addition, clipping the signal
35
improves the stability of the algorithm under extremes of load imbalance and load 
fluctuations. The level to which the amplitude is clipped is shown in section 3.2.3.
The Moving Average of the Clipped Rate of Change of Power Signal.
The moving average filter is a technique used to smooth a signal and remove high 
frequency oscillations. Each smoothed value is calculated as the sum of the present value 
and each of the previous values in a predefined window size. The process can be 
mathematically expressed as:
y »  - j j  E Vd (311)
Where: y(n) and x(n) are the present output and input respectively, 
and N is the size of the moving average window.
The calculation speed of this equation can be greatly increased by maintaining a running 
total term throughout the calculation and simply subtracting from it the ’oldest’ value and 
adding the ’latest' value. Equation 3.11 therefore becomes:
1 - ’ (3.12)y^ -t)+ j j  i  *(«) *(»-«) i
Application of this moving average filter to the amplitude limited derivative signal results 
in an integration of the signal and provides a more stable algorithm output on which to 
base the trip decision. A trip occurs if the output of the moving average filter is greater 
than the predetermined trip level such that:
£  I * (313>
n-0
Where K, is the trip setting, APg is the rate of change of generator output power, 
and N is the moving average window size which can be chosen to allow the 
maximum trip time to be set.
The final flow chart of the algorithm can be seen in figure 3.1.
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3.2.3 Calculation of the Theoretical Trip Setting.1451
When a loss of grid occurs it results in a load impact on the embedded generator. The 
acceleration or deceleration of the generator due to this load impact can be found using 
the machine's swing equation (Ignoring losses and the effect of damper windings).
a = I se c)  (3.14)
dt2 2 S H
Where: a is the acceleration or deceleration of the generator in p.u./sec,
S is the embedded generator rated capacity, 
and H is the inertia constant of the generator in MW.sec/MVA.
The earlier analysis on the distribution of power impacts within a multi-machine network 
produced equation 3.3 which demonstrated the proportion of the load impact picked up 
by each machine. Equation 3.14 however shows the response of the individual machine 
following this load impact. The transient response of the generator and the subsequent 
changes in output power level are calculated using the machine's swing equation.
It can be shown[46] that the power of inertia of a rotating machine that is released at any 
speed variation is proportional to the acceleration/deceleration. The rate of change of 
power, from equation 3.14 is therefore:
A P
= K  * — ^ {p.u. / s e c )  (3-15)
S H
Where K is a constant coefficient.
This equation shows that the rate of change of power is proportional to the load impact 
and inversely proportional to the generator's rating and inertia constant. The trip setting 
of the algorithm is therefore dependent on the generator's capacity and inertia constant for 
a specified load change. The effect of the moving average window size and the sampling 
frequency are also included in the setting, but these are constant for all generator sizes.
Thus, if the algorithm is required to trip for a APS percentage change in the generators 
real power ( APL = S.APs), the trip value in MW/sec will be:
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K  = ± K S  s- N
a H
( MW I sec ) (3.16)
Where: is the trip setting in MW/sec at unity power factor for a generator which has
inertia constant H and rated capacity S, 
and N is the size of the moving average window.
( N = T /^tg with Tw = window size in msec and ts = sampling interval in msec).
The level of the amplitude limitation of the derivative signal can be found for a minimum 
trip time of t,,^ as:
C = h h  (3.17)
U .
3.2.4 Required Operation of the Power Based Loss of Grid Algorithm.
The development of the new loss of grid algorithm was based upon the criteria specified 
at the beginning of this section. Using the proposed algorithm specified above, the new 
loss of grid protection should therefore be able to:
- Detect a loss of grid connection resulting in an isolated power island being formed,
- Detect a subsequent change in loading within the power island whilst operating 
disconnected from the utility,
- Remain stable under severe system imbalance and in the presence of harmonics,
- Remain stable during large local load changes whilst operating in parallel with the 
main utility,
- Remain stable during local system and utility fault conditions,
- Operate before any subsequent auto-recloser action can re-connect the two separate 
power systems.
The ability of the new algorithm to provide this level of operation requires extensive 
testing and the systems used to carry out these performance assessment studies are 
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In order to test and develop the operation of the new loss of grid algorithm, a number of 
studies were required. This chapter explains the models used to evaluate the performance 
of the power based loss of grid algorithm. These are split into computer based simulation 
studies and practical real time system tests carried out in the laboratory and in the field.
The simulation studies were carried out using an in-house developed software simulation 
program which modelled the power system and allowed various system configurations and 
circuit breaker operations to simulate the event of a loss of grid connection along with 
certain other system events.
The practical laboratory tests required the construction of a suitable test facility147,481 which 
consists of two small synchronous machines, a model power system for interconnection 
and a laboratory research bench. The research bench is made up of two main elements, 
a microprocessor based protection relay (M.P.R.) and a desktop personal computer (P.C.) 
with interface circuitry. These can both be used simultaneously to monitor the output of 
the synchronous machine using up to eight primary current transformers and three primary 
voltage transformers. A schematic diagram of the laboratory research bench and its 
interconnection to the model power system can be seen in figure 4.1.
The field trials were carried out on a diesel driven generator set which is one of three on 
an industrial site used for peak lopping and stand alone operation. The M.P.R. was 
attached via primary transducers to the terminals of this industrial generator and tests 
were carried out with an external load bank attached to the system. The resulting data 
files were downloaded following the test to the supervisory P.C.
The research facility can also be used as a teaching aid for undergraduates. In particular, 
it has been designed to provide a laboratory facility for the teaching of microprocessor 
based implementation of the biased differential technique for protecting the windings of
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a synchronous machine. It has also provided the basis of a number of undergraduate 
research projects into microprocessor based protection of small synchronous generators.
4.1 Theoretical Simulation Studies.
Extensive simulation studies1 have been carried out to determine the response of the 
proposed algorithm to a number of different disturbances including loss of grid. In 
addition, the performance of some of the present techniques for detecting loss of grid are 
tested for comparison.
A convenient model of the synchronous machine was selected and simulation software 
based on this model was written in FORTRAN to analyze the behaviour of the local 
generation unit for the following conditions:
- Loss of utility grid supply,
- Independent generator operation,
- Parallel operation with the utility,
- Out of step reconnection to the utility supply,
- System fault conditions.
The synchronous machine model was based upon the equations derived by R.H.Park 
which transforms the stator quantities (currents, fluxes and voltages) to a new 
synchronously rotating frame of reference. For the state space model of the synchronous 
machine, the machine currents were chosen as the state variables and the model used is 
therefore called "the current state space model." In the modelling of the utility power 
system, rather than using an infinite bus with infinite current capability at constant voltage 
and frequency, a synchronous generator model is used which represents the utility as a 
large synchronous generator with a reasonable inertia constant and rating.
The machine simulated is a 3.75 MVA salient pole synchronous generator with an inertia
1 Work undertaken by Dr Omer Usta.
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constant of 0.91 MW.sec/MVA, connected to an 1 lkV network of capacity 250 MVA and 
inertia constant 10 MW.sec/MVA. The generator's control functions (i.e. A.V.R. and 
Speed Governor) were not included in the study since their response times were deemed 
too slow for the time frame under consideration.
The simulation software was designed according to the flow chart in figure 4.2. The 
operation can be considered in two parts:
- Calculation of the initial operating conditions using load flow analysis,
- Transient analysis of the proposed system under applied power system disturbances.
The test period generally used is one second of analysis with the required event occurring 
after 100 milliseconds of steady state. Using the simulation test system described, four 
out of the five modes of operation can be simulated (system fault conditions are 
considered separately). By adjusting the relative power levels of the generator and 
attached load, different conditions can be analysed to show the effect on the algorithm. 
(A complete description of the simulation studies can be found in reference 45).
The simulation system can also be used to evaluate the performance of the currently 
available loss of grid protection algorithms to allow for comparison. The trip levels used 
for these conventional passive relays are:
Under/over voltage - ± 6% of nominal
Under/over frequency - ± 1% of nominal
R.O.C.O.F. - 0.3 Hz/sec
(Values taken from G59[1] and ET113121)
The under/over voltage relay bases its trip decision on the effective value of the voltage 
calculated from the digital samples of instantaneous phase voltage at the generator's 
terminals with no time delay included. The power system frequency and rate of change 
of frequency is normally calculated from the digital samples of voltage or current. 
However for these performance studies the frequency is derived from the generator's 
speed, without the signal processing normally required to calculate the frequency.
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The proposed loss of grid algorithm is set to just trip for a loss of grid resulting in a 1% 
change in generator loading with a six cycle moving average window resulting in a 
maximum trip time of 120 msec. The amplitude limiting function is set to give a 
minimum operating time of 20 msec (i.e. one cycle). This leads to a trip setting of ± 5 
units on the scales shown in the results.
Since the loss of grid algorithm is designed to only operate for loss of grid and 
independent load change, its immunity to power system fault conditions requires analysis. 
To allow for the unbalanced fault conditions, the model used for the fault analysis 
combines both the direct phase quantities and the dqO axes variables used for the previous 
analyses. The external system equations are solved in direct phase quantities and the 
results are then converted into dqO axes variables to solve the equations representing the 
synchronous generator. Further details on the fault analysis can be found in reference 45.
As previously stated, a large number of tests were carried out using the simulation 
software, but only a select few of the results have been included in this thesis to allow 
for comparison with the actual real system results presented in chapter 5. The full results 
and analysis of this work can again be found in reference 45.
4.2 The P.C. Based Laboratory System - Hardware.
Following the software investigation into the loss of grid protection undertaken by Dr 
Usta, it was considered essential to investigate the performance of the algorithm using 
practical power systems.
In order to simplify the development of the loss of grid algorithm, a desktop personal 
computer (P.C.) was used which contains an analog to digital (A to D) converter board 
connected through transducers to the terminals of the synchronous machine. This allows 
the monitoring of the generator output terminal quantities and the use of signal processing 
software to develop the algorithm in a ’user-friendly' environment. Once the final 
algorithm has been developed, the code can be adapted and transferred to the 
microprocessor protection relay (M.P.R.) for additional testing and field trials.
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To enable the monitoring of the generator output using a P.C. it was necessary to build 
an interface system. This consists of secondary transducer modules, anti-aliasing filters, 
sample and hold circuits, a phase locked loop frequency multiplier and a power supply. 
The resulting monitoring system closely resembles the M.P.R. system except for the 
obvious inherent advantages of using a P.C. (i.e. the Visual Display Unit and the 
Keyboard). The elements which make up the P.C. based scheme are detailed below and 
can be seen in figure 4.1.
4.2.1 The Analog to Digital Converter Board.
The analog to digital conversion board used for this work is a Data Translation DT2821 
high speed analog and digital I/O board. It is designed to plug into one of the fully bussed 
expansion slots available in the backplane of an I.B.M. compatible computer. The board 
can then be programmed to perform A to D conversions, D to A conversions and digital 
input or output transfers. The programming can be done either directly by using assembly 
code, or in a high level language with the assistance of the support software ’ATLAB1. 
Further information about the operation and usage of the DT2821 board can be found in 
references 49 and 50.
4.2.2 The System Transducers.
The primary system transducers on the research bench provide the input signals for both 
the P.C. based system and the M.P.R. based system. They consist of seven primary 
current transformers (C.T.s) and three isolating voltage transformers (V.T.s). The 
connection diagram for the primary transducers can be seen in figure 4.3.
The C.T.s are class ’X' type with a turns ratio of 14.4 : 1 which provides a 1 amp. 
nominal current corresponding to the generator rated output current of 14.4 amps. The 
C.T.s are connected two per phase on the output terminal side of the generator and on the 
star point side. The seventh C.T. is connected on the star point itself. The three V.T.s 
have a turns ratio of 1:1 and are connected phase to ground to provide the generator 
terminal phase voltage. The outputs from these primary transducers are then fed directly 
into the corresponding secondary transducer module.
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To reduce the levels of current and voltage to a level suitable for conversion into a digital 
signal by the A to D converter board, secondary transducers connected to the secondary 
circuits of the primary transducers were required. Two modules each containing four 
secondary current transformers (C.T.s) were constructed with the current output of each 
of the C.T.s being converted to a proportional voltage using burden resistors. To 
overcome the foreseen dynamic range problems, the value of the burden resistor was 
made switch selectable. This ensures that when high current levels are predicted, the 
resistance can be switched so that the output voltage does not exceed the maximum input 
voltage of ± 10 volts to prevent saturation of the A to D converter. The switched levels 
available give the full scale voltage (±10 volts) for multiples of two, five and ten times 
the nominal current of the generator (which is 14.4 Amps).
One module containing three secondary V.T.s each connected to the secondary winding 
of a primary voltage transformer was also constructed. These secondary V.T.s are 
required to further reduce the power system voltage from the primary level of 115 volts 
phase to neutral (200 volts phase to phase) to a level suitable for the A to D converter. 
To provide for the measurement of overvoltages above the nominal value, the voltage 
transducers were designed to give a maximum of ± 10 volts at the A to D converter input 
for a system voltage of two times nominal voltage (i.e. 230 volts). The connection 
diagram for the secondary transducers can be seen in figure 4.4. In order to accommodate 
the different algorithms implemented on the research bench, the input transducers are 
switched into the filtering system in the configuration required.
4.2.3 Anti-aliasing Filters.
To prevent the problems of aliasing associated with analog to digital conversion it was 
necessary to design and build a set of anti-aliasing filters with the required cut-off 
frequency as defined by Nyquist's sampling theory. Each input to the A to D converter 
board requires pre-filtering to attenuate any frequency levels that may cause aliasing. The 
type of filter chosen for this application is a fourth order Bessel filter (also known as a 
Thomson filter). The full design of the anti-aliasing filter including the resulting circuit 
parameters can be seen in appendix C. Before the anti-aliasing filters were constructed, 
the frequency response of the design was predicted using the 'SPICEAGE' analysis
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package. A total of eight anti-aliasing filters were constructed on a single printed circuit 
board (P.C.B). The schematic layout of this P.C.B can be seen in figure 4.5 together with 
the circuit diagrams of the anti-aliasing filter and sample and hold elements.
4.2.4 Sample and Hold Circuit.
A set of eight sample and hold circuits are included in the interface circuitry to allow for 
simultaneous sampling of up to eight channels. This is carried out by triggering each 
sample and hold circuit to ’hold' using a single trigger signal which is produced by a 
phase locked loop frequency multiplier circuit. This is of particular benefit when the 
inputs to a particular algorithm are required to be sampled at the same instant in time, 
(e.g. for biased differential protection algorithm1471). The circuit diagram for the sample 
and hold circuit is included in figure 4.5.
4.2.5 Phase Locked Loop Frequency Multiplier Circuit.
The phase locked loop (P.L.L.) frequency multiplier produces an output frequency which 
is an integer multiple of the input frequency. The input to the circuit is taken from one 
of the input signals to the A to D board (i.e. one of the secondary transducer outputs). 
The output of the circuit is used to trigger both the sample and hold circuits to 'hold' and 
the A to D converter to start the conversion process. The A to D converter is triggered 
with a short low pulse which is generated from the output of the frequency multiplier 
using a glitch generator.
The phase locked loop frequency multiplier circuit consists of a single P.L.L. integrated 
circuit with two series connected 'Divide-by-N1 counters connected into its feedback path 
(see figure 4.6). The output frequency is made switch selectable to allow multiple output 
frequencies to be generated. A schematic diagram of the circuit can be seen in figure 4.6, 
and the complete design can be found in reference 48. A slight variation from the design 
shown in the reference includes the need for the additional triggering signal to trigger the 
sample and hold circuit prior to the A to D conversion. This is obtained using two hex 
inverting buffer chips shown in the diagram.
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Since the proposed loss of grid algorithm is dealing with instantaneous power, the P.C. 
data recording system is programmed to carry out simultaneous A to D data conversion 
on the six transducer inputs (i.e. three voltages and three currents) at a rate determined 
by the setting of the frequency multiplier. The frequency multiplier trigger firstly sets all 
the sample and hold circuits on the interface board to ’hold’, the A to D board is then 
externally triggered to begin conversion of the first channel and then as rapidly as the 
software speed allows, the other channels are converted using software triggered 
conversions. This allows the simultaneous sampling of the six channels.
4.2.6 Bench Control Circuitry.
The trip outputs from both the P.C. and the M.P.R. provide a closing contact which 
results in tripping the main circuit breaker, disconnecting the synchronous machine 
terminals from the model power system. In order to provide for a delay in this tripping 
for laboratory experiment measurement purposes, a timer relay is included. The control 
circuitry for the protection scheme on the laboratory bench is shown in figure 4.7. This 
shows the indication lamps and relay interconnection required to carry out the generator 
protection undergraduate laboratory experiment using the microprocessor based system.
4.3 The P.C. Based Laboratory System - Software.
In the early stages of the loss of grid algorithm development it was considered an 
advantage to operate the P.C. system as a data recorder which could store the results of 
tests to file allowing post-processing using a signal processing package. This allows the 
algorithm to be developed with total flexibility and free from the constraints of real time 
operation using the signal processing package to test the effects on the various stages of 
the algorithm for a library of test data obtained from the laboratory. The 'DADiSP* signal 
processing package used for this work allows a number of data files to be imported into 
independent windows and mathematical operations carried out. Using this package, the 
basic power based algorithm can be fully implemented. In addition to the data recording 
function, the basic theoretical algorithm was also implemented in the P.C. to provide an 
indication of how the algorithm reacts to the situations tested.
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The software written for the P.C. system consists of four parts (see figure 4.8):
- Assembly coded instructions operate the A to D conversion board to sample the 
required channel at the required time and store the result in a data register on the A 
to D board. The instant of conversion is determined by either an externally generated 
trigger signal or an internally generated software trigger. In these tests, the first 
channel is sampled on receipt of an external trigger signal, which allows system 
synchronization, and the subsequent five channels making up the sample data set are 
sampled using an internally generated software trigger which occurs at a rate 
determined by the on-board timer.
- Assembly coded instructions input the stored data sample values from the on-board 
data register into the computer's R.A.M. and applies the required mathematical 
operations to calculate the power which is stored in memory awaiting the next stage. 
Once the power is calculated the basic algorithm calculations can be applied if 
required and the intermediate results stored in memory for later extraction. The basic 
operation of the assembly coded modules is shown in the flow chart of figure 4.9.
- A 'C' coded data extraction module reads in the memory resident data arrays stored 
by the assembly code and writes them to file for post-test analysis.
- A B.A.S.I.C. program provides the overall system management and user interface 
functions and allows the operator to decide prior to the test what information is to 
be calculated and stored by the relevant assembly coded function. This program also 
sets up the number of data points to be stored which determines the duration of the 
test window. This information along with the file identification information is passed 
to the data extraction program after the completion of the test.
Using this package of software modules the user can complete real time tests in the 
laboratory at a rapid rate without the need for lengthy command line interaction.
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4.4 The M.P.R. Based Laboratory System - Hardware.
Following completion of the preliminary tests using the P.C. based research system, 
development could move to the M.P.R. system. The microprocessor protection relay used 
in the laboratory facility and the field trials is a GEC Alsthom Protection and Control 
LZPK101 multi-module standard hardware microprocessor relay. This contains an Intel 
80186 microprocessor, together with the input circuits required to monitor current and 
voltage transducer secondary signals and output circuits containing trip and alarm relays. 
There is also an RS232 serial communications channel for communication between the 
M.P.R. and a P.C.
The term 'standard hardware' signifies that this type of relay can be used for many 
different protection functions with the actual protection algorithm being encoded in 
software depending on the required application. The M.P.R. hardware and its operation 
in the laboratory research bench is described in this section.
4.4.1 The System Transducers.
The electrical inputs to the M.P.R. system from the generator originate from the same 
primary transducers used by the P.C. based system as described in section 4.2.2 and seen 
in figure 4.3. The secondary connections from these transducers are then screwed into the 
terminals on the back-plane of the M.P.R. The secondary transducer modules for the 
M.P.R. slot into the relay housing and the connections to the terminals on the backplane 
are made automatically. The secondary transducer module in the M.P.R. contains three 
C.T.s and three V.T.s, the analog anti-aliasing filters for each channel, a 12 bit A to D 
converter and six opto-isolated digital status inputs.
4.4.2 The Standard Hardware Microprocessor Relay.
In addition to the secondary transducer module described above, the standard hardware 
relay also contains a microprocessor module, an output module, a power supply module 
and an operator interface. Each of these modules fits into the relay housing giving the 
complete M.P.R. system shown in figure 4.10.
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The microprocessor module contains the Intel 80186 processor together with the necessary 
auxiliary circuitry and system memory. The memory area of the board allows standard 
28 pin memory integrated circuits to be plugged into sockets to provide up to 256kByte 
of memory. The configuration of this memory depends upon the application and for the 
research bench the top two memory sockets consist of E.P.R.O.M. programmed with the 
relay operating system software and the remaining 6 sockets are filled with 32kByte 
blocks of R.A.M. The use of R.A.M. in the usable areas of system memory means that 
the encoded algorithm must be downloaded into memory on power-up and is lost once 
the relay is powered-down. This situation is acceptable and actually desirable in the 
algorithm development stage, but the R.A.M. would be replaced by E.P.R.O.M. and 
E2P.R.O.M. in the final system to allow automatic algorithm restart after a power-down.
The output module contains eight P.C.B. mounted miniature hinged armature relays which 
provide the outputs from the relay to circuit breakers and alarms.
The operator interface system for the standard hardware relay is mounted in the hinged 
front panel. It consists of a 2-row x 16-character alpha numeric liquid crystal display 
(L.C.D.) and a 7-key keypad. Also included in the front panel are four indication L.E.D.s 
and two 25-pin D-type sockets. One of these D-type sockets is for RS232 serial 
communications with the relay which is used to download the application software and 
transfer the results back to the supervisory computer.
4.4.3 The Supervisory Personal Computer.
The personal computer which forms part of the test facility is a COMPAQ 286 which is 
also used in the P.C. based system. In its supervisory capacity it performs two additional 
functions, it provides the user interface for programming the M.P.R. by offering a full 'C' 
compiler and communications software for algorithm development and downloading. It 
also allows receipt of the temporarily stored test data from the M.P.R. and writes these 
values to file for post-test analysis. The bi-directional transfer of information is carried 
out over the serial link already described.
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4.5 The M.P.R. Based Laboratory System - Software.
4.5.1 The Basic Input/Output System (B.I.O.S.).
The M.P.R. has a number of input/output (i/o) devices which it is not possible to directly 
control using the 'C' programming language since it doesn’t support i/o facilities. The 
purpose of the Basic Input/Output System (B.I.O.S.) is to isolate the application program 
from the system hardware that it operates. It consists of a series of macros which can be 
incorporated into the application software to provide a hardware/software interface that 
can control the i/o devices and peripherals of the multi-module standard hardware. The
B.I.O.S. therefore handles the following four categories of commands:
- Input and Output: low level i/o for status inputs, output L.E.D.s and parallel port,
- Communications: string and single character operations for the serial port, parallel
port, L.C.D. and keypad,
- Analog Input: data acquisition for analog channels,
- Timer: setting and reading the system timer and timer related commands.
The B.I.O.S. also returns information about the execution of a command to provide for 
detection and handling of errors. Complete details about the B.I.O.S., including a listing 
of the available commands, can be found in the reference manual written by the 
manufacturers of the multi module standard hardware relay.1511
4.5.2 The Multi-Tasking Executive (M.T.E.).
A major difficulty encountered when writing embedded real-time software is to manage 
concurrency and any single program that attempts to process multiple, concurrent, 
asynchronous events is bound to be complex. Multi-tasking is a technique that reduces 
complexity by allowing a single piece of software to separate into several, individual 
processes called 'tasks' which are independent programs that can run either alone or in 
conjunction with other tasks. However, this independence does not exclude coordination 
among tasks or the sharing of resources. The M.T.E. is a collection of functions that 
provides an environment to support execution of several tasks concurrently.
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At the centre of the executive is the scheduler which arbitrates the control of the central 
processing unit (C.P.U.) among tasks according to the priority level of an individual task. 
This ensures that more urgent tasks are run before less urgent tasks. Since only one task 
can be run at one time, the other ready tasks are held in the C.P.U. queue until they are 
the highest priority task not being executed. This situation will occur when all higher 
priority tasks are in a state where they are either waiting for data to be updated or waiting 
for the completion of another task. The executive supports 'O' to '255' levels of C.P.U. 
priority with ’O' being the highest level.
The tasks that exist within the multi-tasking environment will, at any given instant, be in 
one of the following states:
Dormant - task was never activated or has been deactivated because its operation is 
complete.
Waiting - task has been temporarily suspended and is waiting for a change in system 
status or new sets of data before it can recommence. A waiting task will be 
reactivated on occurrence of an event by a signal called a 'semaphore'. 
Running - task is currently using the C.P.U..
Ready - task is in C.P.U. queue and is waiting to become the highest priority task.
If a task is being executed by the C.P.U., its execution will halt as soon as a task of 
higher priority moves from either the dormant or waiting state to a ready state. The halted 
task will return to the C.P.U. queue and wait to become the highest priority task again. 
This method allows the system to respond quickly to external events.
It is common in multi-tasking environments for tasks to communicate with each other or 
mutually exclude each other when accessing a common resource. This interaction is 
resolved using exchanges and the M.T.E. supports two types of exchange: semaphore and 
mailbox. Semaphores allow the synchronizing of task events by suspending operations 
until a particular semaphore is received, and mailboxes allow passage of messages 
between tasks. The full multi-tasking environment is explained in the M.T.E. version 2 
manual written by the manufacturers.1521
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4.5.3 The Supervisory Computer Software.
As mentioned earlier, the role of the supervisory P.C. is twofold. For algorithm 
development, it provides the tools necessary to write and encode the source file to a 
hexadecimal file ready for downloading into the M.P.R. The original source code is 
written partly in the 'C* language and partly in assembly, which both require compiling 
and linking. For this work, the Microsoft C6 Compiler and Linker is used with the 
MASM 6 assembler. The resulting hexadecimal application code block must then be 
located at a specific memory location within the memory map of the M.P.R. processor. 
This process is carried out using the Paradigm Locater package which allows specific 
regions of memory to be reserved for specific applications in order to keep the application 
workspace separate from the M.T.E./B.I.O.S. workspace.
Once the application software has been compiled, linked and located, it is necessary to 
download the hexadecimal file into the M.P.R. memory. This is carried out using a 
communications package called Procomm and by making use of the off-line monitor 
facility which is part of the user interface of the M.P.R. The off-line monitor is an 
E.P.R.O.M. resident program which facilitates debugging of user programs. Once invoked, 
the user can communicate directly with the microprocessor via the RS232 data terminal 
(using Procomm) which allows the downloading of programs in hexadecimal format, the 
execution of programs and the examination of system registers and memory contents.
The second role for the supervisory computer system is to receive and decode the sample 
data values sent via the serial link from the M.P.R. This is achieved using a ’C' coded 
communication program which waits for a synchronizing character at the start of the data 
blocks and then stores the data following it in temporary arrays. These arrays are then 
written to file for post-processing. In this way, following each laboratory test, the stored 
data can be extracted from the M.P.R. memory leaving it ready to carry out another test.
4.5.4 The Application Software.
As with the P.C. based system, two test programs are written for the M.P.R. based 
system. The first, a data recording function, simply stores a predetermined time window
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of data to memory and then transfers the data via the serial link to the supervisory P.C. 
The basic flow diagram for this mode of operation using the M.T.E. is shown in figure 
4.11.
With reference to this diagram, in the multi-tasking environment, each semaphore and 
task must be initialized and activated before it can be used. This occurs in the background 
task along with the serial link and A to D converter initialization. The background task 
has the lowest priority and is first to be executed. Once the other tasks have been 
activated, control switches according to the relative task priorities and the background task 
only provides an infinite 'do nothing' loop to prevent the M.T.E. from crashing during 
periods where no other task is running..
TaskC, the error handling task, is activated first and it immediately suspends waiting for 
an error semaphore which will be signalled should any system error occur during program 
execution. Following a key press, the main data recording task (TaskA) is activated and 
this also suspends and waits for a Got_Data semaphore which is signalled by the A to D 
converter system when a set of sample data has been captured. The final task to be 
activated is TaskB, the data export task, and this suspends waiting for a Trip semaphore 
which is signalled by TaskA once the data recording cycle has been completed and the 
data is ready for export to the supervisory P.C..
With each of the three primary tasks suspended waiting for semaphores, control returns 
to the background task which continues by initializing the A to D converter system. As 
soon as a data set is sampled, the Got_Data semaphore is signalled and TaskA regains
C.P.U. control. Once the data recording loop is complete, TaskB is triggered via the Trip 
semaphore and it proceeds to export the sampled values down the serial link. During this 
export procedure the A to D converter continues to produce Got__Data semaphores which 
require action and these are serviced by TaskA with no further action. Once the export 
is complete the system is reset and the next test initialized by a 'SET button press.
The timer for the A to D converter system is set to provide 12 samples per cycle and the 
sampling frequency therefore must be adjusted to allow for variations in the power system 
frequency. This is done using a frequency tracking algorithm, called from TaskA, which
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calculates the system frequency from the phase angle of one of the signals and adjusts the 
timer circuit to maintain 12 samples per cycle. The phase angle is calculated using the 
data obtained by full cycle Fourier filtering the raw sample values.
Once the raw sample values have been stored in the M.P.R. memory for a particular test, 
the values are downloaded to the P.C. for post-processing. All the data manipulation and 
algorithm calculation can therefore be carried out on the P.C., following the test, to 
determine the response of the algorithm.
One major difference between the M.P.R. based system and the P.C. based system is that 
sampling in the P.C. based laboratory system occurs effectively simultaneously for each 
of the six channels. This is achieved using the sample and hold circuitry previously 
explained. In the M.P.R. system, the samples are taken in succession which means that 
there will be an error introduced into the instantaneous power calculation which assumes 
simultaneous sample values. This error is reduced by time alignment of the data samples 
such that it appears that all the channels have been sampled simultaneously. The time 
alignment process makes use of the Fourier filtered sample values to generate the phasor 
representation of the input waveform. These phasors can then all be time aligned by 
rotating them backwards through an angle determined by the time delay between their 
respective sample instances. In addition to time alignment by phasor rotation, the errors 
due to the data acquisition system can also be reduced by including a scaling term for 
each channel which compensates for the errors associated with that channel. The software 
for implementing the phasor compensation process is also written for operation on the 
P.C. to provide greater accuracy during the post-test analysis procedure.
The second test program written for the M.P.R. system implements the full loss of grid 
algorithm with the intermediate calculated data values stored in memory on the 
occurrence of a trip decision. This allows the algorithm to be tested under various system 
conditions and once a trip decision occurs, the disturbance which caused the trip can be 
observed using the exported data files. The final form of the power based loss of grid 
algorithm is explained in the next chapter along with the reasons for certain refinements 
to the theoretical algorithm but the structure of the algorithm encoded in the M.P.R. is 
very similar to that of the data recording function already described. One key difference
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is the need to include the phasor rotation function for time aligning the sample values and 
the phasor compensation function to reduce data acquisition errors, within the body of the 
main task. This is carried out in TaskA prior to the calculation of the instantaneous power 
for the algorithm. The loss of grid algorithm is implemented in TaskA with TaskB only 
triggered to export the results once TaskA has made a decision to trip. The flow diagram 
for this mode of operation is shown in figure 4.12.
4.6 Laboratory Test System Configuration.
The laboratory research facility uses a 5KVA, 2 pole synchronous machine which is 
driven by an 8 H.P. d.c. motor. The synchronous machine is connected to a model power 
system which contains a similar machine set and interties into a 200 volt three phase 
system. The synchronous generator may be synchronized with the 200 volt system 
allowing bidirectional power flow across the intertie. In addition to this, local loads can 
be connected to the system and wattmeters placed at various points. The schematic 
diagram for this model power system can be seen in figure 4.13. The system contains a 
double bus arrangement similar to that found in a medium range generating station. The 
model power system fDANE' panel) is fed via a 500kVA three phase transformer which 
is situated about 100 metres from the laboratory.
4.6.1 System Setup for Biased Differential Scheme.
In order to test the full operation of the laboratory bench test facility, a second year 
undergraduate experiment into biased differential protection of synchronous generators 
was setup. The laboratory experiment is designed to teach undergraduates about the 
technique of biased differential protection as well as introduce them to the new 
microprocessor technology being used in relay protection schemes. The complete 
laboratory was therefore implemented using the P.C. system, with an application program 
written to guide the operator through the laboratory and then subsequently implemented 
in the M.P.R with the P.C. providing the user interface requirements for the laboratory. 
Faults are placed on the generator via taps along the stator windings and the M.P.R. 
exports results allowing the relay characteristics to be determined.
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4.6.2 System Setup for Loss of Grid and Load Change Tests.
Using the various isolators and circuit breakers in the model power system shown in 
figure 4.13, it is possible to obtain the required test system configuration. In addition to 
the elements shown in this diagram, some load is required which can be connected into 
the system at convenient points. This load consists of a bank of six double bar electric 
fires rated at 240 volts and 1 kilowatt per bar and a set of three large variable resistors. 
The amount of load is made variable by means of three phase variacs connected before 
the load bank. The configuration of the system used for the loss of grid and load change 
tests can be seen in figure 4.14 along with a simplified line diagram.
With the bus section circuit breaker closed (C.B.5) the two generators can be connected 
together on a local busbar with local load attached at the bus coupling point. The second 
load bank acts as a grid load and is connected between the intertie breaker and the 'loss 
of grid' breaker. To assist in the setting of the required power flows from the generator 
and the mains supply, three pairs of wattmeters were used to measure the power into the 
load, from the generator and from or to the mains.
Since a purely resistive load was used, the output from the generator was maintained at 
around unity power factor by controlling both the power input and the generator 
excitation controls. This means that the reactive power in the intertie between the 
generator/local load busbar and the mains was kept to a minimum.
During the loss of grid and load change tests, the local load can be connected to either 
the generator, the mains or both together by means of the isolators and circuit breakers. 
A synchroscope can be used on any circuit breaker to synchronize the two systems 
together. With reference to figure 4.14, the circuit breakers C.B.6 or C.B.8 can be used 
to cause a loss of grid event.
The loss of grid tests were carried out at a number of generator output power levels with 
different combinations of local and grid load determining the load change that occurs at 
the instant of the loss of connection.
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The independent load change tests use a similar setup, apart from the grid supply remains 
unconnected and so the generator output before the load change was set to match the site 
load to maintain the correct voltage and frequency levels. A load increase or decrease was 
then applied to the local busbar using the load banks.
The parallel load change tests required the mains supply to be synchronized to the local 
busbar and a change in the level of local or grid loading applied. The change was either 
a sudden step increase or decrease, or a variation induced by increasing the variac setting 
manually.
It is also possible to synchronize the unprotected machine (Generator 1) into the system 
to test the effects of multiple generator sites on the operation of the algorithm. The 
measurements for these tests were still taken from the terminals of the protected generator 
(Generator 2).
4.6.3 System Setup for Fault Tests.
To test the response of the loss of grid algorithm to faults on the system, it was necessary 
to apply faults involving any phase and earth to the laboratory system. This was carried 
out using a remote circuit breaker as a switch to apply a low resistance connection 
between whichever phases and earth as required. This fault switch was connected as 
shown in figure 4.14. The connection configuration was set using links in positions 'a' to 
'd' as required.
During earth fault conditions, the connection of the generator star point has a significant 
effect on the fault test results. The star point is made available in the test generator to 
allow for either direct, resistive or isolated connection of the star point. The whole 
laboratory test system can be connected to a common neutral which is then connected to 
the incoming three phase mains neutral taken from the star point of the main supply 
transformer.
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4.7 Field Trials on a Diesel Generator Set.
A second source of real time test data was used to verify the security and operation of 
the loss of grid algorithm. The M.P.R. was again used in data recording operation with 
the input to the relay coming from the terminals of a 625 kVA diesel driven generator set. 
The diesel generator is one of three which are used for peak-lopping on an industrial site. 
The generator can be connected to the utility grid supply operating in parallel and local 
changes in site configuration can be performed to test the effect on the algorithm.
For these tests, the M.P.R. was connected into a system used for testing a multifunctional 
generator protection relay.18 91 The connection diagram for this relay on the local industrial 
site is shown in figure 4.15. The load requirements for the various tests was satisfied by 
attaching a load bank to the busbars of the protected diesel generator set. Multiple 
generator tests were also possible using the other generators which make up the industrial 
site generation.
The tests carried out in the laboratory and in the field trials provided results from 
practical systems with all the challenges that real systems introduce, along with the 
limitations imposed by having to operate in real-time using sampled input data. The 
theoretical algorithm was developed using a simulation test system which was free from 
many of the practical challenges and as a result, high levels of sensitivity and accuracy 
were demonstrated. The test system described in this chapter has been used to verify and 
refine the basic theoretical algorithm to allow it to operate in a real system. The results 
of the tests undertaken are the subject of the next chapter, together with the refinements 
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Figure 4.7 : Laboratory Research Bench Trip Circuitry.
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Figure 4.15 : Connection Diagram of M.P.R. System for Field Trials.
74
Chapter 5
Refinements to Theoretical Algorithm
This chapter presents results obtained from tests undertaken in the laboratory using the 
system described in chapter 4 as well as some of those taken from the preliminary field 
trials. The format of the chapter is based around the sequential order of events carried out 
during the testing process. The work is therefore presented in a progressive manner which 
shows the challenges encountered and the methods used to overcome them.
Before proceeding to the results a brief review of the basic algorithm implementation will 
be of benefit. The algorithm in its basic form consists of four distinct operations or 
calculations:
- Calculation of the Instantaneous Power. The phase voltages and currents are 
sampled at the same instant and the instantaneous power is calculated using:
- Calculation of the Rate of Change of Power. Using the present instantaneous 
power value from equation 5.1 and the power value calculated at the previous sample 
instant, the rate of change of power is calculated using:
- Amplitude Limiting the Rate of Change of Power. For the reasons specified in
rate of change signal exceeds this limit in either the positive or negative sign. 
Otherwise the value is left unchanged.
(5.1)
(5.2)
chapter 3, the rate of change of power signal requires amplitude limiting. This is 
carried out by simply setting the output variable from this stage to the limit if the
^U n ite d  ~ ] (5.3)
-Limit
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- Moving Average to Produce Trip Calculation. The final stage of the algorithm 
is to calculate the moving average of the signal from equation 5.3 over a pre­
determined window size. This is implemented using:
WinSiv
MovAvg = £  ^pumud (5-4)
ft - 1
The trip decision then simply compares the modulus of the final value of the moving 
average term with the trip level and a trip occurs if it exceeds this level. Trip if:
| MovAvg | > TripLevel (5-5)
5.1 The Theoretical Algorithm.
Before the results obtained from the laboratory system and field trials are addressed, some 
simulation results are presented for comparison purposes. These show the basic theoretical 
operation of the algorithm before any refinements are applied, along with comparison 
studies with some of the other passive forms of loss of grid detection techniques.
5.1.1 Loss of Grid Studies.
Case Study 1: The first set of results shown in figure 5.1 from the simulation tests 
show how the system reacts to a loss of grid which causes an increase in generator 
loading of 65% of its rating. In this case, the generator is supplying some of the utility 
system load following the opening of the 'loss of grid' circuit breaker in the system. The 
loss of grid therefore causes a step increase in the generator's loading and the terminal 
current (5.1a) and output power (5.1 e) rapidly increase to supply the islanded load, then 
decrease to a steady state value (Note that the effects of a speed governor or A. V.R. have 
not been included in the simulation studies). This sudden current increase causes the 
system voltage to decrease (5.1b) and with an under voltage element set to 6% (5970 
volts), a trip will occur 8 milliseconds following the event. This trip time does not allow 
for any time delay included in the under voltage element or any data acquisition delays.
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The prime mover governor cannot respond immediately so the input power remains 
constant and the increase in loading causes the machine to slow down releasing some of 
its inertia power to supply the load increase. This slowing of the machine can be observed 
in figure 5.1c which shows the islanded system frequency which is determined by the 
embedded generator alone once connection to the grid is lost. The under frequency 
element set to 1% of nominal will trip on 49.5 Hz after 36 milliseconds.
The fourth plot (5. Id) shows how the rate of change of frequency (R.O.C.O.F.) responds 
to the loss of grid. This relay element would be set to around 0.3 Hz/sec and would 
therefore see the loss of grid almost instantaneously. This study does not take into account 
the data acquisition or the calculation method required by the R.O.C.O.F. The frequency 
for these studies is determined directly from the machine speed.
To determine how the proposed change of power algorithm would react to this loss of 
grid, the instantaneous power must first be calculated using equation 5.1. The 
instantaneous power waveform shown in figure 5.1e shows how the output power of the 
machine reacts under the loss of grid and the sharp increase in output power due to the 
energy stored in the machine windings (sub-transient response as mentioned earlier) can 
be clearly seen. The subsequent decay of the output power occurs at a rate determined 
by the machine's inertia constant.
The derivative (or rate of change) of the power signal is shown in figure 5. If. This signal 
then requires amplitude limiting for the reasons mentioned in section 3.2.2 and the 
resulting clipped signal is shown in figure 5.1g. The final stage of the algorithm, the 
moving average filter, leads to the algorithm output shown in figure 5. lh and the trip 
level is included to show that a trip occurs after 28 milliseconds. A comparison of the 
various trip times can be seen in table 5.1.
C ase  S tudy  2: As well as looking at the loss of grid occurrence which results in an 
overloading of the embedded generator, the response of the system to a load decrease as 
a result of a loss of grid needs to be addressed. The system response to a 50% decrease 
in loading as a result of a loss of grid is shown in figure 5.2. In this event the generator 
loading suddenly drops resulting in a decrease in the generator’s output current (5.2a) and
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instantaneous power (5.2e) with a subsequent increase in the terminal voltage and 
armature speed (or local system frequency). Figure 5.2b shows the voltage increase as 
seen by the under/over voltage relay element and a trip occurs at 6732 volts (i.e. +6%) 
after 7 milliseconds. The over frequency element (5.2c) trips at 50.5 Hz after 42 
milliseconds and the R.O.C.O.F. (5.2d) again detects the loss almost immediately.
The response of the rate of change of power algorithm can be seen in figures 5.2e-h. 
Each stage of the algorithm is shown and a trip occurs after 23 milliseconds (5.2h). The 
algorithm therefore detects both load increases and decreases following a loss of grid.
Case Study 3: A loss of grid which results in only a small change in the generator's 
loading is of greatest interest. Should the power flow be low through the circuit breaker 
which opens to cause the loss of grid, then the change in generator loading may be very 
small. Consider the case where the loss of grid results in only a 2% increase in the 
loading of the generator as shown in figure 5.3. The resulting isolated system voltage 
again becomes depressed as the output current rises, but for this case, the voltage does 
not decrease below the under voltage relay setting of 5970 volts during the one second 
test period. This means that the under voltage element will not detect this loss of grid 
before the governor and A.V.R. respond to restore the system to within the prescribed 
limits. The same applies to the under frequency element (5.3c) which also fails to detect 
the loss of grid in sufficient time.
The R.O.C.O.F. relay however, if set to 0.3 Hz/sec should detect the event in a short time 
period as shown by figure 5.3d. The output of each stage of the rate of change of power 
algorithm can be seen in figure 5.3e-h. and under these conditions a trip occurs after 77 
milliseconds. (See Table 5.1)
The effectiveness of the under/over voltage and under/over frequency relay elements for 
detecting a loss of grid resulting in only a small change of loading can be seen to be 
suspect. The R.O.C.O.F. and the new change of power algorithm can both detect and 
clear the situation in a short period of time, but for the reasons highlighted in section
3.1.2 the new power based algorithm has some benefits over the R.O.C.O.F.
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5.1.2 Load Change Under Independent Operation.
Case Study 4: As previously discussed in section 3.2, the operation of the algorithm 
is unchanged under conditions when the generator operates independently from the utility 
grid. This situation is beneficial should a loss of grid occur undetected. Any subsequent 
change in the islanded load would lead to the algorithm detecting the lack of grid 
connection and removing the local site from the remaining islanded utility load allowing 
grid reconnection. The characteristics of the generator operating independently from the 
grid are the same as for the case when a loss of grid occurs since the generator 
characteristics determine the response in both cases. Therefore the algorithm simply 
detects the same characteristic output power waveform. The occurrence of a 2% local 
load increase with the generator operating independently can be seen in figure 5.4. The 
reaction of the algorithm can be seen to be almost identical to that for the similar loss of 
grid (figure 5.3) and an algorithm trip occurs after 64 milliseconds.
5.1.3 Load Change Under Parallel Operation.
Case Study 5: It is important in these studies to determine the response of the 
generator to local load changes which occur whilst operating in parallel with the grid 
since the protection algorithm should remain stable under these conditions.
The response of the embedded generator to a load increase equivalent to its rating is 
shown in figure 5.5. The simulated load increase causes a current rise (5.5a) and a 
corresponding voltage and frequency fall (5.5b & c), but these are insufficient to cause 
mal-operation of the under/over voltage and under/over frequency relays over the time 
frame analysed. The R.O.C.O.F. waveform (5.5d) however, falls below the trip setting of 
0.3 Hertz leading to a possible mal-operation due to this normal operating condition.
The reaction of the theoretical power based algorithm to this parallel load change is 
shown by figures 5.5e - h. The power signal (5.5e) oscillates leading to oscillations in the 
derivative waveform which in turn causes the amplitude to be limited equally in both the 
positive and negative sign. The resulting algorithm output (5.5h) shows the stability of 
the new algorithm under parallel operation load changes for the simulated system.
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5.1.4 System Fault Study.
Case Study 6: The occurrence of an unbalanced fault either on the local busbar or 
somewhere in the connected system should not cause mal-operation from the loss of grid 
protection function. In the case of the power based loss of grid algorithm, its response to 
a single phase to ground fault can be observed in figure 5.6. The high levels of unbalance 
due to this type of fault lead to a double system frequency (100 Hertz) term in the 
instantaneous power waveform (5.6a) for the duration of the fault. This unbalance term 
also appears in the derivative waveform and subsequently in the amplitude limited 
derivative waveform. However, the amplitude limiting function was included such that 
under extreme unbalanced conditions, its moving average over six cycles sums to zero. 
This effect can be seen in the algorithm output (5.6d) where the output becomes zero 
after twice the length of the moving average window. This example demonstrates the 
algorithm's stability under unbalanced faults which allows the dedicated protection 
functions to detect and clear the single phase fault in the required manner.
5.1.5 Conclusions.
A few of the results obtained from the simulation system have been presented to show 
the response of the simulated generator and the theoretical algorithm to a number of 
system disturbances including loss of grid. The operation of the algorithm for all the tests 
shown has been as desired with adequate trip times demonstrated for the loss of grid. The 
limitations of some of the current passive techniques have also been highlighted.
Case Study U/O Voltage U/O Frequency R.O.C.O.F Change of Power
1 8 msecs 36 msecs Instantaneous 28 msecs
2 7 msecs 42 msecs Instantaneous 23 msecs
3 No Trip No Trip 1 msec 77 msecs
Table 5.1 : Comparison of trip times for simulation case studies 1 to 3.
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5.2 Laboratory Tests.
The next stage in the algorithm development required a comprehensive set of 
experimental laboratory data to be accumulated from the test system. This is used to show 
the response of the algorithm to a number of system conditions. The provisional tests 
undertaken and used in this section are:
- Steady State Parallel Operation } To demonstrate the stability of the
- Steady State Independent Operation } algorithm under steady state conditions.
- Loss of Grid } To demonstrate the operation of the
- Independent Operation Load Change } algorithm in the required manner.
Parallel Operation Load Change 
System Fault Conditions
} To demonstrate the immunity of the 
} algorithm to these conditions.
A few examples from each of these tests are used in this section to show the need for the 
relevant algorithm refinements.
5.2.1 Steady State Parallel Operation.
Case Study 7: The first tests undertaken in the laboratory were with the generator 
operating in parallel with the laboratory supply under steady state conditions. These tests 
allow the resulting output power signal from the generator to be observed and the steady 
state stability of the algorithm proved.
The first set of results shown in figure 5.7 show the distorted waveforms that are obtained 
from the laboratory generator at low output power levels. These results are for nominal 
excitation at an output power of around 400 watts (i.e. 10% of rated). The distortion is 
highest in the current waveform (5.7c) and this leads to a distorted power waveform as 
shown in figure 5.7e. The theoretical instantaneous power should be a smooth straight line 
(i.e. a d.c. level) for a balanced situation as shown in appendix B. An harmonic analysis 
of these waveforms can be seen in figures 5.7b,d and f  and these reveal the presence of
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3rd, 5* and 7th harmonics in the current and voltage waveforms. The power waveform has 
harmonics at 50Hz, 200Hz and 300Hz in addition to the double frequency term (i.e. 
100Hz) which is due to unbalance in the connected system.
Case Study 8: At a higher output power level the harmonic content of the waveforms 
reduces. The resulting waveforms for a test carried out at rated power (i.e. 5 KVA at 0.8 
power factor) can be seen in figure 5.8. The shape of the distortions to the power 
waveform (5.8e) is different to that for the previous low power test (5.7e) due to the 
lower levels of harmonic content of the waveform. These results indicate the presence of 
harmonics and unbalance on the laboratory system which are particularly prevalent at low 
excitation and low output power levels.
Under steady state conditions the algorithm output should be around zero due to there 
being no noticeable change in the power measured. By applying the four stages of the 
algorithm to the output power obtained under steady state operation at nominal output 
power, the stability of the algorithm can be determined. The resulting waveforms after 
each stage of the process for an algorithm setting of 10% can be seen in figure 5.9.
The first thing to notice is that the output of the six cycle moving average window (i.e. 
the algorithm output figure 5.9d) is not zero. This indicates that the algorithm is not 
totally stable under normal conditions which is of fundamental importance. The trip 
setting is unity on the scales shown and therefore the algorithm cannot be assumed to be 
stable as the output approaches unity even under steady state conditions. The presence of 
the harmonics and unbalance in the system changes the response of the algorithm from 
that for the simulated system and under steady state conditions, the combination of third 
harmonic noise and imbalance results in an amplitude limited derivative signal (5.9c) 
which has a non-zero average value over the six cycle moving average window (5.9d).
To overcome the problems introduced by the unbalance and harmonics, a number of 
filtering processes were considered. Two types of filter are discussed in this section, each 
of which has properties which improves the algorithm's operation. The effect of both of 
these filters is shown for a number of different tests and the final decision on which filter 
to use is left until the end of the section.
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The removal of the harmonics alone can be achieved by applying a full cycle fourier filter 
to the measured sinewaves. A full analysis of the full cycle fourier filter can be seen in 
appendix D.l. With the harmonic content removed, the double frequency term present in 
the power waveform under unbalanced conditions and due to unbalanced faults is filtered 
out by the algorithm resulting in inherent stability. This is shown by figure 5.10 where 
a full cycle fourier filter is applied to the input sinusoidal quantities to remove the 
harmonics which then produces the power waveform shown in figure 5.10a. The 
unbalance is also present in the derivative term (5.10b), but the amplitude limiting 
function (5.10c) produces a waveform which has zero average output over the six cycle 
moving average filter period resulting in a zero output from the algorithm as shown in 
figure (5.10d). This result indicates the adverse effect of harmonics on the stability of the 
algorithm which was not detected during the theoretical simulation study.
An alternative method for reducing the effects of both the harmonics and the unbalance 
is to use a half cycle moving average filter applied to the power waveform. This simply 
involves taking the moving average of the power waveform over a window size which 
is half the number of samples taken per 50Hz cycle. The characteristics of this filter can 
be seen in appendix D.2. This filter is more easily implemented than the full cycle fourier 
filter and was therefore chosen in the early stages of the algorithm’s development to 
improve the stability of the algorithm under normal conditions. The result of using the 
half cycle moving average filter can be seen in figure 5.11 which shows the individual 
stages of the algorithm with this filter included. Stability under steady state conditions can 
therefore be obtained using the half cycle moving average filter, instead of the fourier 
filter. However, as figure 5.1 Id shows, the algorithm output is still non-zero for steady 
state conditions (algorithm trip level is ± 1 on the scales shown). The discussion on filter 
choice continues with further case studies and test results in the following sections.
5.2.2 Steady State Independent Operation.
Case Study 9: The source of the harmonics can be investigated by operating the 
generator independently from the supply with only local load attached. The output power 
waveform for the generator running with only independent resistive load and no parallel 
connection into the mains system can be seen in figure 5.12. The power level was set to
83
around 3000 Watts with the voltage and frequency maintained at 200 volts and 50 hertz 
respectively. The results show the lower distortion levels that occur when operating 
independently of the grid and this is confirmed by the harmonic analysis which shows 
reduced levels of harmonics compared to those for parallel operation. Obviously the 
amount of unbalance present depends upon the local load connected to the generator. This 
result shows that most of the harmonic effects occur due to the system to which the 
generator is connected and this cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty.
5.2.3 Loss of Grid.
Case S tudy  10: The basic operation of the algorithm and the waveforms produced can 
be shown using the practical system. The instantaneous power waveform obtained from 
a practical loss of grid test which results in a 65% increase in the generator’s loading after 
the loss can be seen in figure 5.13a. The waveform shows the characteristic shape that 
can be attributed to the occurrence of a loss of grid. This should be compared with the 
theoretical results obtained using the simulation program which were discussed in section
5.1 and are shown in figures 5.1 to 5.4.
The main difference between this result and that from the simulation arises from the 
presence of harmonics and unbalance whose effects were not included in the simulation 
studies. The effects of these factors will be discussed shortly. The application of the half­
cycle moving average filter (5.13b) reduces the level of these distortions and brings the 
resulting power waveform closer to that obtained by the simulation and this filtered signal 
is used in the algorithm calculation.
The need for the amplitude limitation of the derivative signal is shown by the results in 
figure 5.13c and 5.13d. Without the limitation of the derivative signal the algorithm 
output (5.13d) would produce a trip in only a few milliseconds which may lead to 
algorithm stability problems and doesn't take into account the relative inertias of the 
machine and system. By limiting the derivative signal spike, the effect of the sub-transient 
response is greatly reduced and the post-spike portion of the derivative waveform, which 
is related to machine inertia, provides the basis for the algorithm’s operation. The trip time 
is increased as a result to around 51 milliseconds. The amplitude limited derivative signal
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and the resulting algorithm output after the six cycle moving average window can be seen 
in figures 5.13e and 5.13f respectively.
Case Study 11: The loss of grid resulting in a 65% increase in generator loading 
provides a large power change which the algorithm has no difficulties in detecting in its 
current form. By using the half-cycle moving average filter on the power waveform, the 
similarity between the practical results and the simulation test results is demonstrated. 
However, the effectiveness of the algorithm in detecting a smaller change of around 10% 
increase in load is of greater interest particularly with respect to the effect of the two 
filters on the algorithm.
From the steady state results (section 5.2.1), the problems associated with the unbalance 
and harmonics would appear to be best solved simply by the use of the full-cycle fourier 
filter on the input sinusoidal quantities. However, the effect of this type of filter on the 
algorithm for a loss of grid resulting in a small load change must be addressed.
Consider the case of a loss of grid which results in a 10% increase in generator loading 
shown in figure 5.14. With no filtering present, the combination of the harmonics and 
unbalance mean that the loss of grid event is almost indistinguishable in the derivative 
waveform (5.14b). The amplitude limiting function (5.14c) results in an algorithm output 
(5.14d) which is actually zero when the loss of grid occurs.
By applying the full cycle fourier filter to the input waveforms, the harmonics in the 
power waveform (5.15a) are removed. However, the improvements in the derivative 
(5.15b) and final algorithm output (5.15d) waveforms are small. This also results in the 
loss of grid event passing undetected by the algorithm (trip level = ± 1).
If the half cycle moving average filter is applied to the power signal then the result is 
quite different as shown by figure 5.16. The derivative signal shows the occurrence of the 
loss of grid with a large positive spike and the algorithm output produces a trip decision 
after 110 milliseconds (5.16d).
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With reference to the amplitude limited derivative waveform (5.16c), the positive spike 
is clipped which results in only a small deviation in the algorithm output (ie the effect of 
the sub-transient response is reduced). The negative portion of the derivative, following 
the spike, is the portion on which the operation of the algorithm is based. Both figures 
5.15c and 5.16c show that the presence of the double frequency term in the derivative 
waveform reduces the duration for which the signal is actually set to the negative clip 
level. This in turn reduces the deviation in the algorithm output and in the case of figure 
5.15 where the fourier filter is used, the deviation is insufficient to cause trip. This 
indicates that the unbalance present in the system has a detrimental effect on the 
algorithm's ability to detect a loss of grid.
Despite removing the harmonic content very successfully the fourier filter does not 
improve the algorithm's operation under loss of grid. In contrast, the moving average filter 
does improve algorithm operation, but the presence of unbalance during the loss of grid 
is still detrimental to the algorithm.
5.2.4 Local System Fault.
The fault tests were carried out with the grid connected and present for the duration of 
the fault (i.e. the laboratory protection is disabled). Each fault type was tested in the 
laboratory with the generator star point either connected directly to the system neutral or 
left open circuit. Of particular interest in the current analysis is the unbalanced fault 
condition. During this type of fault the loss of grid protection algorithm should remain 
stable to allow the fault to be cleared by the dedicated protection scheme.
Case Study 12: Application of an A-phase-to-ground fault to the system results in the 
waveform shown in figure 5.17a. It has already been shown in section 5.2.1 that false 
tripping is liable to occur unless the level of harmonics in the power waveform is 
reduced. The effect of these harmonics on the algorithm can also be observed in figure 
5.17 where the unfiltered instantaneous power waveform is used in the algorithm resulting 
in a non-zero algorithm output even before the fault has been applied.
In section 5.1, where the effects of the simulation results on the algorithm were discussed,
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the power waveform had no unbalance or harmonics present and therefore no pre-filtering 
was required. The simulation results for the fault tests show immunity to tripping for 
single-phase-to-ground, phase-to-phase and double-phase-to-ground faults due to the high 
level of unbalance which is present in the power signal during these faults and the 
algorithm's inherent stability under extreme levels of unbalance.
The application of the half-cycle moving average filter to the power waveform for the 
practical tests reduces the high levels of unbalance and nearly causes a false trip to occur 
for this unbalanced fault. The effect of the half-cycle moving average filter can be seen 
in figure 5.18a which shows the removal of the 100Hz unbalance component. The 
resulting deviation of the algorithm output close to the trip level is still in agreement with 
the simulated results if the half-cycle moving average filter is applied to them.
As a result of removing the unbalance term with the half-cycle moving average filter, the 
algorithm’s inherent stability to unbalanced faults is reduced. This result can be further 
reinforced by applying the full-cycle fourier filter to the sinusoidal inputs and calculating 
the instantaneous power using these signals. The resulting power waveform still contains 
the 100Hz term due to unbalance (5.19a), but the harmonics are removed. In this situation 
the stability of the algorithm to the same unbalanced fault is total with only the fault-on 
and fault-off points being noticeable in the algorithm output (5.19d).
5.2.5 Load Change Under Independent Operation.
Case Study 13: The rate of change of power output from the isolated generator under 
load change conditions is dictated by the inertia constant of the generator (i.e. without the 
inertia of the grid). The response of the generator for load changes therefore results in 
very similar power fluctuations to those for a loss of grid as previously mentioned. To 
prevent repeating results already discussed, the independent load change waveforms have 
not been included in this section. The effect of the various filters was examined for this 
situation and the performance of the algorithm in detecting the load change assessed, but 
for the purposes of filter choice the results offer no further information to that from the 
loss of grid results.
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5.2.6 Load Change Under Parallel Operation.
Case Study 14: The algorithm must remain stable under all normal operating 
conditions which includes changes in local load whilst the generator is operating in 
parallel with the grid supply. Under these conditions the basic theoretical algorithm 
responds as shown by figure 5.20. This set of plots shows the response of the algorithm 
to a 100% load increase when the unfiltered instantaneous power is used as the input to 
the algorithm. Under these conditions, the algorithm remains stable during the load 
change, however some 200 milliseconds after the load change the algorithm output 
deviates from zero due to the harmonic and unbalance effects previously discussed.
Applying the fourier filter to the power waveform results in no change to the stability of 
the algorithm as shown in figure 5.21, but this stability is solely due to the presence of 
unbalance in the waveform, disguising the load change.
Reducing the unbalance and harmonics using the half-cycle moving average filter as 
shown in figure 5.22 causes the algorithm output to deviate from zero due to the load 
change. For the algorithm at this setting a false trip does not occur, but the output does 
come close to the trip level of ±1.
5.2.7 Effect of the Filters on the Algorithm.
The previous sections have shown the need for filtering of either the power waveform or 
its constituent sinewaves to obtain stable steady state operation of the algorithm. The 
problems for the algorithm in its original theoretical form can be summarized as follows:
- If the power signal is left unfiltered, the harmonics and unbalance combine to 
produce possible false tripping under steady state conditions. This is due to the non­
zero average value of the amplitude limited signal. The algorithm also fails to detect 
a loss of grid due to these distortions. However, the natural immunity of the 
algorithm to unbalanced faults is preserved due to the presence of very high levels 
of the double frequency unbalance term in the power waveform.
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- Using a half cycle moving average filter to suppress the harmonics and unbalance 
results in good steady state stability and loss of grid detection. However, the 
immunity to unbalanced faults is reduced as is the immunity to parallel load changes.
- If a full cycle fourier filter is used to remove the harmonics leaving the imbalance 
term unaffected, the immunity to unbalanced faults returns. However, the effect of 
only removing the higher order harmonics is to reduce the sensitivity of the 
algorithm to the loss of grid since the sharp derivative characteristics are removed. 
A failure to operate for a loss of grid occurs due to the unbalance in the system.
5.2.8 Proposed Methods to Improve the Theoretical Algorithm.
Two possible methods for overcoming these problems have been developed.
1) By using the intermediate derivative signal to determine, by a simple form of pattern 
recognition, whether the shape of the waveform corresponds to a fault condition, a 
loss of grid or a parallel load change. The result can be used to provide a permissive 
inter-trip with the algorithm output.
2) Using a similar pattern recognition technique to control the amplitude limiting 
function on the derivative signal.
Since both of the above methods are able to detect the occurrence of an unbalanced fault, 
the immunity of the algorithm to the fault-on and fault-off portions of the waveform is 
no longer required. This means that the unbalance term in the power waveform can be 
removed using the half cycle moving average filter to improve the sensitivity of the 
algorithm for a loss of grid despite the presence of unbalance. However, the fourier filter 
would also be beneficial to remove the unwanted harmonics.
Using both the fourier filter and the half-cycle filter results in a large group delay. To 
overcome this problem a new method for removing the unbalance has been developed. 
This method also reduces the required processing time to allow faster operation in a 
microprocessor based integrated generator protection package.
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By simply reducing the processing rate of the power calculation to 4 times per cycle the 
sinusoidal double frequency term in the power signal is converted into a triangular wave 
of the same frequency. Calculating the derivative term using a quadratic approximation 
method, the result is zero providing there is no underlying change in the power. To 
simplify the derivative calculation, rather than using the quadratic approximation, the 
derivative is calculated using the difference between the current value and the previous 
but one value. This results in a derivative term which follows the underlying changes in 
the power despite the presence of the unbalance (ie the effect of the unbalance is 
completely removed).
Thus by using:
AP = P -  P , (5.6)n n n-2
instead of:
AP = P - P  . (5.7)n n n -1
with a processing rate for the power of four times a cycle, the unbalance term in the 
derivative is removed.
The sampling rate of the sinusoidal input signals is still maintained at twelve samples per 
cycle to allow for accurate calculation for the full cycle Fourier filter, but the power term 
used in the algorithm is only calculated four times per cycle. The effectiveness of this 
technique of removing the unbalance by reducing the processing rate can be seen in 
figures 5.23-5.26.
Figure 5.23 shows the same loss of grid results as shown earlier (i.e. 10% load increase), 
but with the reduced processing rate and fourier filter applied. The derivative term (5.23b) 
can be seen to be free from the unbalance which is present in the power waveform, 
however it does follow the underlying changes in the power waveform. This result should 
be compared to that obtained previously shown in figure 5.15.
The effect of the technique on the unbalanced fault condition can be seen in figure 5.24.
Now that the unbalance term has been removed, the derivative signal shows up the
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change in the level of unbalance from before the fault to during the fault. The immunity 
of the algorithm to this type of fault is therefore lost by the removal of the unbalance 
term associated with the fault. The outcome is a near trip decision from the algorithm 
(5.24d) for both the fault-on and fault-off periods.
For the parallel load change (figure 5.25), the effect of removing the unbalance term 
using the reduced sampling rate gives a similar result to that obtained when the unbalance 
was removed using the half-cycle moving average filter (figure 5.22). The algorithm 
output approaches the trip level but stability is just maintained for a 10% setting.
To counteract the effect of removing the double frequency term from the unbalanced fault 
and parallel load change results, the amplitude limiting function is changed from the 
simple clipping function to one which makes the decision to clip on the basis of previous 
conditions as mentioned at the beginning of this section.
To show the effect of the improvement to the amplitude limiting function, the trip setting 
is firstly reduced to a more sensitive level such that it produces a trip decision when a 
loss of grid results in a 2.5% change in the generator's loading. The resulting algorithm 
response for the original basic clipping function is shown for comparison for each of the 
three possible events (ie loss of grid, unbalanced fault and parallel load change) in figures 
5.26a, 5.27a and 5.28a respectively. The output power and derivative waveforms are not 
shown since they are unchanged from those used with the 10% setting earlier (figures 
5.23 - 5.25). Only the last two stages (i.e. amplitude limiting and 6 cycle moving average 
filter) are shown to demonstrate the operation of the new adaptive clipping function.
With reference to the amplitude limited signal for the loss of grid condition (5.26a & b), 
the output from the algorithm can be seen to reach the trip level of one due to the first 
clipped derivative spike (point 'a'). This is due to a non-zero derivative signal before the 
loss of grid event causing the moving average term to deviate from zero.
For the unbalanced fault test (5.27a & b), a false trip occurs for the reduced trip setting 
as a result of the portion of the clipped derivative waveform indicated by the letter 'e', 
during the fault-on period.
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For the parallel load change results (5.28a & b) the third portion of the clipped signal, 
shown by the letter 'c', gives rise to the algorithm's false trip. In the case of the loss of 
grid condition the trip decision should have already been made before a third change of 
clip sign can occur. The portion of the amplitude limited derivative signal on which the 
algorithm's operation is based is shown by the letter V  in figure 5.26a.
This theory provides the basis for the new pattern recognition based amplitude limiting 
function. The basic operation of which can be described as:
- If the present derivative sample value does not exceed the clip level then that sample 
value is set to zero,
- If the value does exceed the clip level then the sample value is set to the clip level,
- If the sign of the clipped derivative signal changes three times in succession, then 
after the third change has been detected, the next sample value is set to zero until the 
derivative signal value settles to below the clip level for 10 consecutive samples.
With the addition of a few extra routines to overcome possible deviations from the 
normal, this is the basic operation of the refined amplitude limiting function. It has been 
designed to enhance the operation of the algorithm without affecting the basic theory 
upon which the whole algorithm is based.
The result of this change to the amplitude limiting function for the same three sets of test 
results can be seen in figures 5.26c & d to 5.28c & d.
For the case of the loss of grid (figure 5.26), the addition of the adaptive clipping 
algorithm removes the trip on the positive deviation of the algorithm output since the 
clipped signal is set to zero when it is below the clip level. A clear trip occurs after 100 
milliseconds and the effects of the distortions on the system are completely removed.
For the case of the unbalanced fault, the derivative signal changes from positive clip to
negative clip in successive samples. It can be seen in figure 5.27c that after the third
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change the clipped derivative output is written to zero (point f). This increases the 
stability of the algorithm in the presence of unbalanced faults.
With the parallel load change result shown in figures 5.28c & d, the third change in the 
sign of the derivative term is again detected (point d) and the false trip which occurred 
with the original clipping method (5.28a & b) is removed.
The pattern recognition based amplitude limiting function therefore improves the ability 
of the algorithm to detect a loss of grid or independent load change occurrence even in 
the presence of high levels of unbalance. It also improves the stability of the algorithm 
to unbalanced faults occurring on the system and for load changes which occur while the 
generator is connected in parallel with the utility supply. The technique does not change 
the basic operation of the algorithm which still relies upon the relative sizes of the inertia 
constants of the two interconnected systems.
5.2.9 Conclusions.
The problems of algorithm stability in the presence of noise and unbalance have been 
shown in this section. A method to overcome these problems has been introduced which 
has no great effect on the basic operation of the algorithm, but has numerous advantages.
These include:
- improved stability of the algorithm under all conditions of load unbalance 
and harmonic noise,
- greater sensitivity to loss of grid or independent load change,
- improved discrimination between unbalanced faults and loss of grid conditions,
- greater stability in the presence of large local load fluctuations whilst 
operating in parallel with the main source of supply.
The technique used requires little additional encoding in the present algorithm and the 
processing time required is actually reduced.
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5.3 Field Trials.
In order to demonstrate the response of the algorithm to actual loss of grid phenomena 
on an embedded generator, field trials have been carried out using a diesel driven 
industrial generator. Details of the system configuration can be found in section 4.7. Some 
of the results from these tests have been included in this section to show the requirements 
for further refinements to the algorithm.
As for the laboratory test results, a number of different tests are included starting with 
simple steady state operation, moving onto loss of grid studies and finally load changes 
both with and without the utility grid connected. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the 
industrial site to which the generator is connected, it was not practical to carry out system 
fault studies. Once again the results in this section are presented in a progressive manner, 
with the need for refinements indicated and conclusions drawn at the end.
5.3.1 Steady State Parallel Operation.
Case Study 15: The first set of results taken from the field trials show the operation 
of the generator under normal steady state conditions whilst connected to the grid supply. 
The resulting instantaneous output power waveform for a generator output of 50kW (i.e. 
10% of rating) calculated at 12 samples/cycle before any applied filtering is shown in 
figure 5.29a. It is clear from this waveform that there is a low frequency oscillation in the 
output power from the generator and the spectrum analysis (5.29b) shows that it oscillates 
at a frequency of 4 Hertz. The effect of this oscillation on the new loss of grid algorithm 
can be seen in figures 5.29c & d. The derivative of the filtered power waveform (5.29d) 
shows that this 4 Hertz oscillation propagates through to the pre-clipped derivative term 
and the amplitude of the oscillation means that a false trip may occur even under steady 
state conditions.
Case Study 16: A similar situation is found when the generator operates at a higher 
output power level as shown by figure 5.30, except that the amplitude of the oscillation 
as a percentage of the fundamental is lower and the frequency is 3.4 Hertz. Once again 
these low frequency oscillations in the output power result in similar oscillations in the
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calculated derivative term within the algorithm and the outcome of this may again be poor 
steady state stability of the algorithm in its present form. Before discussing a technique 
to overcome this phenomenon an interesting observation will be addressed.
5.3.2 Steady State Independent Operation.
Case Study 17: In order to test the possible reasons for this oscillation, tests were 
undertaken with the generator operating in isolation from the utility supply. The 
instantaneous output power from the diesel generator whilst it operates independently with 
only a 50kW matched local load is shown in figure 5.31a. In this waveform and in the 
spectrum analysis shown in figure 5.31b, there is no sign of the 4 Hertz oscillation 
present for the same loading under parallel operation. This indicates that the presence of 
the utility connection either causes or allows this low frequency oscillation to occur. The 
subsequent effect of the oscillation on the derivative term in the algorithm is also 
removed for this steady state operation. The same situation is found for steady state 
independent operation tests carried out at higher output power levels.
5.3.3 Loss of Grid.
Case Study 18: A simple but highly effective method for overcoming the undesirable 
effects on the algorithm of these low frequency oscillations is to introduce a starter 
element technique which makes use of a characteristic of the derivative waveform which 
is present in the event of a loss of grid (and independent load change). This characteristic 
can be clearly seen in the next set of results. Figure 5.32a shows the response of the 
diesel generator to a loss of grid which results in an increase in its loading of 20%. As 
with all the previous loss of grid and independent load change results, the output power 
rapidly changes at the point of the load change due to the stored electrical energy of the 
machine being released. This change in turn produces a large spike in the derivative 
waveform calculated by the algorithm. The starter element technique simply states that 
if a pre-determined level is exceeded by the derivative waveform then operation of the 
algorithm should continue for a preset period of time, sufficient for a loss of grid event 
to be detected, after which the starter unit is reset. Under normal steady state conditions, 
the amplitude of the derivative term will not approach this level and this therefore
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provides a method for screening the algorithm response from these low frequency 
oscillations.
An additional and very important outcome of using this technique is that during normal 
operating conditions the algorithm remains in a ’dormant’ mode, with minimal processor 
overhead, awaiting this starter unit level to be triggered. This greatly reduces the 
processing requirements of the algorithm which is an important consideration for its 
implementation in a multi-function microprocessor relay.
The response of the further refined algorithm for the loss of grid resulting in a 20% load 
increase is shown in the remaining waveforms in figure 5.32. The derivative of power 
waveform shows the spike which triggers the starter element (set to 1,000,000 on the 
scales used) and the subsequent algorithm response is to trip after 130 milliseconds.
5.3.4 Load Change Under Independent Operation.
Case Study 19: A similar situation occurs with the independent operation load change 
results shown by figure 5.33. The starter element level is again exceeded and algorithm 
operation initiated which produces a trip decision after 120 milliseconds. However, under 
independent operation the starter unit is superfluous since there is no low frequency 
oscillations in the generator output power before the load change.
5.3.5 Load Change Under Parallel Operation.
Case Study 20: The final set of results in this section (figure 5.34) show the response 
of the diesel generator and the new algorithm to a 50% load change under parallel 
operation. The load is applied at around 1 second and removed at about 4 seconds. The 
derivative waveform calculated by the algorithm (5.34b) shows that the starter element 
level of 1,000,000 is not exceeded during this test therefore the rest of the algorithm does 
not continue and the algorithm output remains at zero (5.34c & d).
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5.3.6 Conclusions
The field trial results have highlighted the need for a further refinement to the new loss 
of grid algorithm. This refinement is necessary to overcome the phenomenon of low 
frequency oscillations in the diesel generator's output power under parallel operating 
conditions. The use of a starter unit which initiates the remaining algorithm stages based 
upon the level of the derivative term also has the important benefit of cutting the 
processor requirements of the algorithm even further. Therefore under steady state 
conditions the algorithm runs extremely quickly. In the event of some disturbance it 
effectively ’switches on' and investigates the characteristics of the disturbance to determine 
if the generator site has become isolated from the main source of utility supply. The final 
operational form of the algorithm is demonstrated by the flow chart in figure 5.35. This 
shows the adaptive amplitude limiting function and the starter element included in the 
basic theoretical algorithm. Implementation of the final form of the algorithm in the 
microprocessor relay occurs in the form of a specific protection task as specified in 
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5. lh) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).
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5.5h) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).
Figure 5.5e-h : Algorithm Response to a 100% Load Increase under Parallel Operation.
(Simulation Result)
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5.6d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).
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5.14d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).
Figure 5.14: Algorithm Response to a Loss of Grid Resulting in a 10% Load Increase
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5.15d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).
Figure 5.15: Algorithm Response to a Loss of Grid Resulting in a 10% Load Increase
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Figure 5.16: Algorithm Response to a Loss of Grid Resulting in a 10% Load Increase
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5.17d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).
Figure 5.17 : Algorithm Response to an A-Phase to Ground Fault
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5.18d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).
Figure 5.18: Algorithm Response to an A-Phase to Ground Fault
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5.19d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).
Figure 5.19: Algorithm Response to an A-Phase to Ground Fault
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5.20d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).
Figure 5.20 : Algorithm Response to a 100% Load Increase under Parallel Operation
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5.2 Id) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).
Figure 5.21 : Algorithm Response to a 100% Load Increase under Parallel Operation
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Figure 5.22 : Algorithm Response to a 100% Load Increase under Parallel Operation
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5.23d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter)
Figure 5.23 : Algorithm Response to a Loss of Grid Resulting in a 10% Load Increase
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5.24d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).
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Figure 5.24 : Algorithm Response to an A-Phase to Ground Fault
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Figure 5.25 : Algorithm Response to a 100% Load Increase under Parallel Operation
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5.26d) Algorithm Output for 2.5% Setting with Pattern Recognitioa
Figure 5.26 : Algorithm Response to a Loss of Grid Resulting in a 10% Load Increase
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5.27d) Algorithm Output for 2.5% Setting with Pattern Recognition
Figure 5.27 : Algorithm Response to an A-Phase to Ground Fault
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5.28d) Algorithm Output for 2.5% Setting with Pattern Recognitioa
Figure 5.28 : Algorithm Response to a 100% Load Increase under Parallel Operation
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5.29d) Derivative of Filtered Power (Calculated by Algorithm).
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5.30d) Derivative of Filtered Power (Calculated by Algorithm).










































5.3 Id) Derivative of Filtered Power (Calculated by Algorithm).
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5.32d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).
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5.33d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).
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5.34d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).
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Figure 5.35 : Flow Chart of Final Loss of Grid Algorithm Operation.
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C h a p te r  6
Presentation and Analysis of Final Results
This chapter completes the analysis of the performance of the algorithm by showing its 
final operation under various system conditions using the three sources of test data 
available (i.e. simulation, laboratory and field trial). For completeness the results will 
include further cases of loss of grid connection as well as parallel and independent load 
change, system faults and out of step reclosure. The steady state stability of the algorithm 
has already been proved up to this point therefore no further results are necessary.
The results and analysis in this chapter will demonstrate slight variations in the observed 
responses from the different test systems for the same test type. These variations will be 
discussed with possible explanations put forward for the differences, but more 
importantly, the response of the algorithm will be shown to be essentially unaffected.
The format of the chapter will therefore be to introduce a particular test condition and 
present results from each of the test systems, where available, before discussing the 
responses. For the results shown in this chapter, the starter unit level is set to:
- 8,000 Watts/second for the 5kVA generator in the laboratory system,
- 1 Megawatt/second for the 625kVA generator in the field trial system,
- 6 Megawatts/second for the 3.75MVA generator in the simulation system.
This corresponds to a required change in the output power level of 1% of rated power in 
a quarter cycle period. These values were derived empirically from the studies undertaken.
6.1 Loss of Grid.
Since loss of grid is the most important condition for the algorithm to detect the first set 
of results show the final algorithm's response for a few different recorded loss of grid events.
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Case Study 1: The loss of grid results shown to date in chapter 5 have been for the 
generator operating at near rated output power. However, the response of the generator 
is essentially the same for loss of grid events which occur with the generator operating 
at very low output power levels. This situation may occur if the required contribution 
from the embedded generator is only small or if the generator is in the process of being 
run-up to meet the demand.
The responses of the laboratory generator and the diesel driven generator to a loss of grid 
event whilst operating at low output power are shown in figures 6.1 and 6.2 respectively. 
The result of the loss of grid is to increase the loading of the generators by 900%. For 
both the laboratory and field trial systems the loss of grid algorithm operates in the 
required manner which shows that the level of the output power from the generator prior 
to a loss of grid is irrelevant to the operation of the algorithm.
With reference to the output power waveforms for the two systems (figures 6.1a and 
6.2a), the differences in the power following the loss of grid can be attributed to the 
governor response on the diesel generator. The additional loading of the diesel generator 
is matched quite rapidly by an increase in the input power from the diesel engine due to 
the governor opening the throttle. This situation does not occur with the d.c. driven 
generator in the laboratory which has a fixed input motive power to the generator and no 
governor. As stated in chapter 3 the governor response time is too slow to effect the 
operation of the algorithm and this can be seen by the rest of figure 6.2 where a trip 
occurs for the loss of grid after 130 milliseconds. The response of the algorithm for the 
two tests shown can therefore be seen to be very similar with the initial fast change in 
power causing the starter unit to be triggered and the subsequent machine characteristics 
whilst it slows down leading to an algorithm trip.
Case Study 2: The similarity in response for the two practical test systems is equally 
apparent for a loss of grid which results in a reduction in the loading of the machines. In 
addition, their similarity with the simulated system will be shown. Figures 6.3 to 6.5 show 
the outcome of a loss of grid which causes a reduction in loading of around 50% at rated 
output power (70% in the case of the laboratory result). For each of the tests the 
algorithm responds as designed and except for the fact that the governor was not
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modelled in the simulation system and is not present in the laboratory system, the 
responses are almost identical.
The loss of grid results presented to date show that from all the data currently available 
from the three test systems, the fundamental principles on which the algorithm's operation 
is based appear to be sound.
6.2 Load Change under Independent Operation.
Case Study 3: Throughout this thesis it has been stated that the response of the 
generator, and therefore the algorithm, is the same for a load change which occurs whilst 
the generator operates in isolation from the grid as for that following a loss of grid itself. 
However for completeness, in this section, the response of each of the generators used 
in the performance assessment of the algorithm will be shown for load changes under 
independent operation. The results shown in figures 6.6 to 6.8 are for a load increase of 
around 25% under independent operation for each of the test systems available. They 
once again confirm the similarity between the results obtained from each of the test 
systems and show the way in which the algorithm reacts to the output power signals. The 
algorithm trips for each case in a time between 90 and 120 milliseconds. The only 
noticeable difference between the three results is again due to the effect of the governor 
responding to match the load change in the case of the diesel generator after about 250 
milliseconds.
Case Study 4: In order to demonstrate the sensitivity of the algorithm to small load 
changes as a result of a loss of grid or under independent operation, a 2.5% load increase 
whilst the laboratory generator operates in isolation is shown in figure 6.9. The output 
power waveform shown in figure 6.9a shows that the presence of the unbalance in the 
system is now of comparable amplitude to the load change itself, however the method 
used by the algorithm to remove the effect of this unbalance can clearly be seen to be 
working with the derivative (figure 6.9b) completely free from this double frequency 
term. The corresponding algorithm response is a trip after 85 milliseconds.
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6.3 Load Change under Parallel Operation.
Case S tudy  5: The next group of three results shown in figures 6.10 to 6.12 present 
the response of each of the generators used in the analysis to a load increase equal to 
their individual rating whilst they operate in parallel with the utility grid.
Under this situation, the theoretical response is for the generator electrically closest to the 
load change to 'see' the majority of the load change during the first few milliseconds, and 
the effect of the relative inertias of the generator and mains system to have an effect after 
this period.
The response of the laboratory system to the load increase (figure 6.10a) is an initial 
power increase, followed by a period where the power appears to 'swing back'. The 
duration of this period however, is insufficient to cause algorithm operation and the 
subsequent third change in sign of the derivative waveform causes the adaptive clipping 
function to zero the clipped output for the remaining period of the disturbance. In this 
situation the algorithm response is governed by the adaptive clipping function carrying 
out one of the tasks for which it was included in the algorithm.
A slightly different response is obtained from the field trials, where the load increase at 
0.1 seconds is almost indistinguishable within the oscillations of the output power from 
the diesel generator. In order to explain the observed differences in the characteristics 
from the two systems requires greater information about the mains system to which the 
embedded generator is connected. In the laboratory, the mains source is obtained via a 
500kVA transformer situated some 100 metres or so from the laboratory which results in 
a fairly high impedance source. Thus, the load change applied to the local busbar in the 
laboratory, which is effectively the terminals of the laboratory generator, results in a 
greater proportion of the load increase being 'taken up' by the local generator than would 
be the case if the mains was a lower impedance source (see appendix A for theory on 
distribution of load impacts). In the case of the field trial results, the mains has a much 
lower source impedance which results in a larger proportion of the local load change 
being 'taken up' by the mains system.
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It is interesting to note at this point that the new power based algorithm requires only 
limited knowledge about the mains system to which it is connected since it bases its 
decision on the characteristics of the local generator alone. However, even if the system 
to which the embedded generator is connected does not have the characteristics of an 
infinite bus system, the algorithm response is not to trip for load changes whilst operating 
in parallel as shown by the laboratory result. The field trial results (figure 6.11) clearly 
show the desired and more typical response of the embedded generator under load 
changes whilst operating in parallel with the mains.
The effect of the source impedance of the mains system was investigated further using 
the simulation system which provides an ideal method for testing the effect of the 
impedance between the local busbar and the inter-connected mains system. The results 
of this simple study further demonstrated that the source impedance dictates the 
proportions of the load distribution in the period immediately following a load change.
From the simulation system, a load increase applied to the local busbar with the generator 
operating in parallel with the utility grid produces the resulting output power plot shown 
in figure 6.12a. The output power waveform in turn produces oscillations in the derivative 
term which results in the adaptive clipping function zeroing the clipped output (figure 
6.12c). The response from the algorithm is once again not to trip.
6.4 System Fault Conditions.
The immunity of the new loss of grid algorithm to single phase to ground faults has 
already been demonstrated in section 5.2. This immunity arises from the double frequency 
(100 Hertz) oscillations present in the power waveform during the unbalanced fault. The 
effect of the unbalance term is actually filtered out by the method of processing the power 
term four times a cycle as previously discussed, but the fault-on and fault-off portions of 
the waveform are still present in the derivative waveform despite this filtering. This 
occurs because of the transient characteristics under fault conditions and the resulting 
oscillation in the derivative signal provides the adaptive clipping function with the 
information to cause it to zero the output after the third successive sign change.
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Case S tudy  6: A similar situation to that described for the single phase to ground fault 
occurs for a double phase to ground fault applied to the local busbar. In this situation the 
unbalanced fault once again produces a double frequency oscillation in the output power 
waveform. However, under these conditions, the generator frequency is slightly less 
’firmly’ fixed by the presence of the grid connection and it is therefore free to vary 
slightly from 50 Hertz. Any variation in the system frequency during the fault leads to 
a change in the amplitude in the power waveform when processed at four times per cycle 
and this can be seen in figure 6.13a.
The response from the algorithm is for the adaptive clipping function to zero the output 
due to the oscillations in the derivative waveform (figure 6.13b) as for single phase faults. 
The algorithm therefore remains stable for both the fault-on and fault-off portions as 
shown by figure 6.13c & d.
Case S tudy  7: A different situation occurs with a three phase to ground fault applied 
to the local busbar. This is a balanced fault condition and as a result there is no double 
frequency term present in the power waveform apart from that due to any unbalanced 
loads. The generator response to the three phase to ground fault is shown in figure 6.14a. 
Due to the need for resistance in the fault path to prevent laboratory fuse rupture, the 
response is less severe than for zero resistance faults. The output power from the 
generator has the characteristics of a load change under parallel operation, which is 
effectively what the three phase to ground fault with fault resistance produces.
The response of the algorithm is shown by the remaining plots of figure 6.14 and these 
show the algorithm restraining due to the adaptive clipping function zeroing the clipped 
derivative output.
It could be argued that the three phase fault either with or without ground is equivalent 
to a loss of connection between the two sides of the system involved with the fault and 
as such it constitutes a loss of grid connection for which the algorithm should operate. 
In the situation tested in the laboratory, the fault does not produce a large change in the 
loading of the machine following the transient period and the algorithm restrains. Despite 
the argument that the three phase fault is the same as a loss of grid connection, the fact
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that the algorithm restrains is of benefit since it allows the dedicated protection functions, 
which are included in the scheme to detect fault conditions, to clear the fault and indicate 
the cause of the trip. Loss of grid, as mentioned earlier, is not a fault condition but is 
highly undesirable and should the algorithm trip for a three phase fault before the 
dedicated protection function, then the presence of the fault would not be indicated and 
reconnection may occur onto a faulted feeder.
6.5 Out of Step Reclosure.
One of the requirements originally specified for the loss of grid protection algorithm was 
that in the event of an undetected loss of grid followed by a period of isolation without 
a load change, as a last resort, the algorithm should detect an out of step reclosure 
between the power island and the main utility grid. Although an out of step reclosure may 
lead to immediate damage to the generator shaft, prolonged exposure following 
reconnection should still be minimised. Therefore the algorithm should detect the 
reclosure and clear the embedded generator from the system as quickly as possible.
Case Study 8: The response of the laboratory generator to a reclosure when the two 
systems were 90 degrees out of step is shown in figure 6.15a. It can be seen that the 
output power from the generator immediately shifts from around 4kW generating to 20kW 
motoring as the two systems are reconnected. The response from the algorithm is a trip 
after 105 milliseconds.
The recording of a severe out of step reclosure in the field trials was impossible due to 
machine fatigue considerations. However, the point of resynchronizing the diesel 
generator onto the utility network was captured. The synchronizing event was supervised 
by a check-sync relay which provides a permissive scheme to prevent non-exact 
synchronizing attempts. With this scheme the two systems cannot be reconnected until 
they are within 5 degrees phase difference. The response of the diesel generator to a 
normal synchronization onto the mains is shown in figure 6.16a. Following connection 
the power oscillations take over 5 seconds to decay and had the phase difference been 
greater, the damage to the generator shaft could lead to a costly premature failure.
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For this situation the algorithm produces a trip decision to remove the generator after 85 
milliseconds. Obviously when synchronizing the generator onto the utility system the loss 
of grid algorithm would therefore require a blocking signal to prevent its operation, but 
the result does show that for more severe events the generator could be removed quickly.
6.6 Multiple Machine Loss of Grid.
Since many embedded generator schemes involve multiple generators on a single site, the 
effect of other generators on the characteristics obtained for a loss of grid requires 
analysis. This actually leads to the question of whether to apply the loss of grid protection 
function on a per-generator basis or a per-site basis with all the generators considered as 
a single large generator. For the work detailed in this thesis the algorithm has been 
designed for inclusion within an integrated generator protection package which will be 
applied on a per-generator basis and therefore the effect of the other generators in the site 
does become important.
Case Study 9: The effect of a second generator on the response of the test generator 
in the laboratory for a loss of grid which produces a power island in which both 
generators are present is shown in figure 6.17a. The response is not noticeably different 
from those obtained earlier with a single machine in the power island and the algorithm 
responds in a similar manner with a trip after 90 milliseconds.
For the diesel generator set used in the field trials, with another diesel generator brought 
in to share some of the total site load, when a loss of grid occurs the test generator 
responds as shown in figure 6.18a. It is interesting to see that the low frequency 
oscillations which were present in the output power from the single diesel generator under 
parallel operation with the utility are maintained after the loss of grid connection when 
the second machine is present. This does not agree with the steady state independent 
operation tests carried out with the single machine where the oscillations were not present. 
We can conclude from this result that the presence of the utility grid or another generator 
either causes or allows a low frequency oscillation to occur in the output power from the 
diesel generator. The presence of these oscillations after the loss of grid connection due
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to the presence of the other machine does not prevent the algorithm from tripping under 
these conditions and a trip occurs after 110 milliseconds.
6.7 Conclusions.
This final results chapter has shown the response of the refined algorithm to some 
additional test scenarios which were not shown in chapter 5. In addition it has compared 
the responses obtained from each of the test systems available to show the similarity of 
response from three very different test setups.
The algorithm in its final form has been shown to operate correctly when required to trip 
and restrain when not. In the particular case of the diesel driven generator set, it has 





0 0.1 OJ 0.4 0.S 0.6 0.7 0.8 09 1.0
Time (Seconds)















6. lc) Amplitude Limited Derivative. 
Moving Average
A
Trip Level \ /
0.2 03 0.4 0.5 0.6
Time (Seconds)
0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
6. Id) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).























0.6 0.7 0.90 0.8








0.1 03 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0






0.1 0.3 0.4 0 4
6.2d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).















—r1.0-nrai - r02 —r 03 —r0.4 —r 0.5
Time (Seconds)




•150,000 0.6 0.7 OJ 0.9 I jO030 0.1 0.3 0 A
Time (Seconds)






0.7 OJ 1.00.50 0.1 03 0.4
Time (Seconds)







■1 1.00.6 0.7 o jo 03 030.1
Time (Seconds) 
6.3d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).











0 0.1 0.2 0.3 04  OJ 0.4
Time (Seconds)



























0.7 0.0 1.00 02 02 0.4 OJ 0,«0.1
Time (Seconds) 
6.4d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).





0 0.1 03 OJ 0.7 OJ 1.0
Time (Seconds)





■100 0 0.1 0.3 OJ as 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 I jO
Time (Seconds)








-0.13 I I — ........  I I ■ I I I I " I I T
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 03  OJ 0.7 OJ OJ 1.0
Time (Seconds)






-1 0 03 OJ 0.7 1.00.1 0.4 0.1
Time (Seconds) 
6.5d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).







2.300 01 OJ 0.5
Time (Seconds)
0.7 OJ OJ 1.0





0.6 0.70.1 0.2 0.4














0.7 OJ 1.0O J OJ
6.6d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).











0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 OJ 0.«
Time (Seconds)









0.1 02  0.3 0.4 OS 0.6
Time (Seconds)














6.7d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).






U 0 OJ 0.70.4 OJ 1.0
Time (Seconds)




0 A OS 0.6
Time (Seconds)


















•4 0 0.7 1.00.1 OJ 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.1
Time (Seconds) 
6.8d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).















-2.000 0.1 0.3 0.4 OS
Time (Seconds)
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9







0.1 OJ OJ 0.5
Time (Seconds)
0.6 0.7 09 1.0






0.1 0.3 0.4 OJ
Time (Seconds)
0.6 0.7 OJ 0.9 1.0
6.9d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).









0 0.70.1 03 0.4 03 1.0
Time (Seconds)
6.10a) Fourier Filtered Power at 4 Samples/Cycle (Input to Algorithm).
Derivative
2 0 ,0 0 0
■1 0 ,0 0 0
-2 0 ,0 0 0
■30,000 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0
Time (Seconds)








- 1.500 0 0 .70.1 0.2 0 3 0.4 0 5 0.6 OJ 1.0
Time (Seconds)




0 0 .3 0 .70.1 0 .4 0 .5 0 .9 1.0
Time (Seconds) 
6. lOd) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).










0.1 0.2 0.3 0.70.5
Time (Seconds)
1.0










6.1 lb) Derivative of Filtered Power.
Clipped Derivative
0.5
Starter Unit Level Not Exceeded.
-0.5
0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5
Time (Seconds)
0.6 0.7 OJ 0.9 1.0






0.6 0.7 OJ 0.9 1.00.1 02
6.1 Id) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).









0 OJ 03  03 OA OS 0*  0.7 0.1 09  1.0
Time (Seconds)
6.12a) Fourier Filtered Power at 4 Samples/Cycle (Input to Algorithm).
Derivative
20
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0A OS OS 0.7 OJ 09  ID
Time (Seconds)




|  Zero Output from




0 0.1 OJ OJ 0.4 OJ OS 0.7 OS 02  1.0
Time (Seconds)
6.12c) Amplitude Limited Derivative.
Moving Average
03
•02 I I I1 I ' . I I ' I ......... . ' I '  .. " ■ I
0 0.1 03  0.3 0.4 OJ OS 0.7 OS 0.9 1.0
Time (Seconds)
6.12d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).
   ■ .......







..500  --------- ---------- ----------
1,000 - 
300
0.1 0.2 03 0.5 0.6 0.7 03
Time (Seconds)
1.0 13 1.3 1.4





0 3 0.5 0.7
Time (Seconds)
0.1 0.6 0 3 0.9 1.2 13




Zero Output from 
Adaptive Clipping
Zero Output from 
Adaptive Clipping
- 1,300
0.1 03 0.5 0.6 0.7 03
Time (Seconds)
i.i 1.2 13 IA 1.5
6.13c) Amplitude Limited Derivative.
Moving Average
i - 
03  - 
0.6 - 
0.4 - 




-0.6 L- 0 0.1 0.2 03 0.4 0 3 0.6 0.7
Time (Seconds)
12 1.303 1 1.1 13 1.4
6.13d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).








1.51.2 1.3 1.40.2 03 0.4 0.3 0.60.1









0.9 1.30.1 03 0.4 0.5 0.6
6.14b) Derivative of Filtered Power.
Clipped Derivative
l.JO O  -
1.000 - I
500 - 1
Zero Output from 
Adaptive Clipping




-1,500 I.S0.5 0.7 0J
Time (Seconds)
1.20.1 0.2 03







OJ 13 1.40.1 0.2 03 0.4 0.5
6.14d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).










-29.000 0 OJ 0.2 OJ 1.00.4 OJ
Time (Seconds)
6.15a) Fourier Filtered Power at 4 Samples/Cycle (Input to Algorithm).
Derivative
-2,000,000 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 03 0.7 0.8 0.90.4
Time (Seconds)




•1.900 0 0.1 OJ 0.9 0.4 0.7 OJ 1.0
Time (Seconds)







■10 OJ 0.9 0.4 0.7 OJ 1.0
Time (Seconds) 
6.15d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).










•400,000 U I S
Time (Seconds)
3.1 4.1 1.0
















3.1 4.1 1.00.1 1.1 2 S
Time (Seconds)
|  6.16c) Amplitude Limited Derivative.
Moving Average
Trip Level
4.1 3.00.1 1J 2.5
Time (Seconds)
3 J
6.16d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).








0 OJ 02  OJ 0.4 0.5 06  0.7 OJ OJ 1.0
Time (Seconds)




0 0.1 0.2 0 3 0.5 0.6 0.7 I jO0.4
Time (Seconds)






• 1,000 - ________________________
-1,500 *T—  ■ 11 | 11 11 I 1 1 1  I I 11 I.........................  I' ■■■ 1 —  — ■ r""  -  - — -■ I  ■ I
0 0.1 03  03 0.4 0.3 OJ 0.7 OJ OJ 1.0
Time (Seconds)






0 020.1 03 OJ 0.5 0.7 OJ OJ 1.0
6.17d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).






























6.18d) Algorithm Output (6 Cycle Moving Average Filter).




Conclusions and Requirements for 
Future Work.
Loss of grid protection is a vital part of the protection scheme for an embedded generator 
which operates in parallel with the utility supply. Since loss of grid is not a conventional 
fault condition and in itself does not cause any damage, it presents a major challenge to 
relay and embedded generation scheme designers.
The fundamental criterion for the development of a new loss of grid protection algorithm 
was that it should be suitable for inclusion in a microprocessor based integrated generator 
protection package with minimal additional processing or hardware requirements. The 
resulting protection package will therefore provide high levels of protection in a very cost 
effective and physically compact unit.
The approach chosen to fit the requirements was a power based algorithm which was 
conceived after extensive simulation studies. The adaptation of this theoretical algorithm 
to operate in a practical environment has been presented in this thesis. The final version 
of the change in power loss of grid algorithm has been shown to trip for both loss of grid 
and local load change during independent operation. The algorithm remains stable during 
large local load changes which occur while the utility grid remains connected and also 
during power system fault conditions.
Laboratory tests in conjunction with field trials have supported the earlier computer 
simulation results and have demonstrated that the algorithm operates satisfactorily despite 
the presence of high levels of harmonic interference and system unbalance. These 
practical test systems have provided the basis for the refinements to the theoretical 
algorithm which has lead to the implementation of the full algorithm in a microprocessor 
based protection relay. Throughout this work, the development of the practical algorithm 
was carried out with a view to its final implementation in an integrated generator
164
protection relay. This has resulted in an algorithm structure which can be simply included 
as a single protection task within the relay requiring only additional software.
The fundamental theory on which the algorithm has been based has been proved as far 
as possible in a research environment but further development is required before its 
inclusion in a commercially available relay. This development process would include 
extensive field trials to gain as much information as possible about the response of 
embedded generation to loss of grid conditions. The result of this would be an algorithm 
design which would not be scheme specific and could be connected into any configuration 
of embedded generation system.
The field trials carried out as part of the development process of the new algorithm have 
highlighted certain areas of future interest with respect to this work and embedded 
generation projects as a whole. The main area of interest is based around the phenomenon 
of the low frequency oscillations apparent in the output power of the diesel generator unit. 
The presence of these oscillations will require further research into their cause and their 
possible effects on system operation. In particular, a more detailed study of the interface 
between the generator and the utility is required to provide a better model of the 
embedded generator scheme and its interface into the utility supply network. The presence 
of these oscillations at the terminals of a single machine in an embedded generator 
scheme may not cause any problems, but with the ever-growing interest in embedded 
generation and the greater penetration of small generators in the utility distribution 
system, the effects of these oscillations may become more pronounced.
Analysis of the interface between the generator and the utility will provide for a greater 
understanding of the electrical consequences of increased levels of embedded generation 
in the network which is particularly pertinent when considering the wider variety of prime 
mover sources being employed. This further work should also include an investigation 
into loss of grid events with non-synchronous generators, in particular induction machines, 
fuel cells and photovoltaic arrays.
Another field for future research can be based around investigating a method for detecting 
loss of grid at any intertie in a power system network. This is not the same as detecting
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a loss of grid at the terminals of a generator which has been the subject of this thesis, but 
it may be possible to extend some of the theories and techniques devised from this work. 
Currently, the R.O.C.O.F. relay provides this capability but there is some interest in 
devising an alternative technique.
A final point about the use of a power based technique to detect a loss of grid is that it 
allows other protection requirements of a generator to be implemented within the same 
framework. Work is currently going on into the use of instantaneous power and reactive 
power to prevent pole slipping of an embedded generator and this technique has been 
extended to cover loss of excitation. The use of power based algorithms for protecting 
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A. 1 Definition of the Swing Equation.1461
The swing equation governs the motion of a machine's rotor relating the inertia torque to 
the resultant mechanical and electrical torques.
T = j £ f L  (A.l)
dt2
Where: J = Moment of Inertia (in Kgm2),
0 = Mechanical Shaft Angle with respect to a fixed reference (Rads),
Ta = Accelerating Torque acting on the shaft (Nm).
For a generator:
r .  = Tm - T ,  (A.2)
Where: Tm = Mechanical Driving Torque.
Te = Electrical Retarding Torque.
Choosing the angular reference relative to a synchronously rotating reference frame 
moving at constant angular velocity (Or gives:
0 = ( u>R t + a ) + 6 m (rads) (A.3)
Where: a  = a constant, 8m = mechanical torque angle,
cOr = shaft angular velocity (rad/sec).
Differentiating with respect to time leads to:
d2e = & K
dt2 dt2






d2bm dwm , K
T  = J  HL = J — 2. (A.5)
dt2 dt
However, the swing equation is best written in terms of an electrical angle that can be 
conveniently related to the position of the rotor. This is the torque angle 5 which is the 
angle between the field mmf and the resultant mmf in the air gap (i.e. the electrical angle 
between the generated E.M.F. and the resultant stator voltage phasor). The torque angle 
5 (equal to the electrical torque angle 5e ) is related to the mechanical angle 5m by:
& = be = ( P l 2 ) 6 m (A. 6)
Where: p = Number of Poles.
Returning to the torque equation (A.5) and replacing 5m with (2/p)5 leads to:
2J  d2bTa = ± L .O JL  (A.7)
P dt2
This equation can then also be normalised to a per unit torque by dividing by a base 
quantity equal to the rated torque at rated speed:




T  pT = _£ = JL «L_ (A.9)
Tb 60SB
2nnK
By substituting: p = 120fR/nR, fR = (Ogjln, J = 2Wk / co^  and = 27tnR gives:
= (A _10)
»*• St u K dt:
Where: Wk = Kinetic energy of rotating mass, 
SB = Common base quantity (MVA)
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At this stage an important quantity can be defined as:
WH = _ i  (M JI MVA) (A. 11)
s»
The swing equation may then be written in one of its most practical forms:
T = .4 * 1  (A.12)
** o , dt*
Where: H is in seconds, (Or is in rad/sec and T is in per unit.
Note that this form of the swing equation has been adapted for machines with any number 
of poles, since all machines on the same system synchronize to the same (Or. A modified 
and approximate form of the swing equation can be formulated by recognizing that the 
angular speed (0 is nearly constant, and the per unit accelerating power Pa is numerically 






The value of the inertia constant H, is usually given for a particular machine, normalized 
to the base VA rating for that machine. For system studies, the value must be converted 
to a system base VA such that:
= H
St
ays mack (secs) (A.14)
A.2 Model of a Single Machine on an Infinite Busbar.
A power system bus of large capacity with respect to the machine under consideration can 
be considered as an infinite bus since its frequency and voltage are essentially invariable 
both in magnitude and phase. Consider the classical model of one machine connected to 










E l d 0
Figure Al) A single machine connected to an infinite busbar through a transmission line: 
(a) One-line diagram, (b) Equivalent circuit.
Where: Vt = terminal voltage of the synchronous machine, 
x'd = direct axis transient reactance of the machine,
Zjb = series impedance of the transmission network,
Z, = equivalent shunt impedance at the machine terminal (includes local loads).
This model requires the following assumptions:
1) The mechanical power input remains constant during the period of transient.
2) Damping or asynchronous power is negligible.
3) The synchronous machine is represented (electrically) by a constant voltage source 
behind a transient reactance.
4) The mechanical angle of the synchronous machine rotor coincides with the electrical 
phase angle of the voltage behind the transient reactance.
5) If a local load is fed at the terminal voltage of the machine, it can be represented by 
a constant impedance (or admittance) to neutral.
Using a Y-A transformation, the node representing the terminal voltage Vt in figure A.1
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Figure A2) Equivalent circuit for a system of one machine against an infinite busbar.
Note that three admittance elements are obtained (yl2, ylO and y20), y20 is omitted since 
it is not required in the analysis. The two-port network can be described by the equation:
(A. 15)
^21 ^22 V
Where: Yn = y12 + y10 and Y ,2 = -y12
Network theory shows that power at node 1 is given by = 7£e ElJ which simplifies to:
A ' r n Yli ' E  '
h  . Y Y I
Now define:
Then:
Px = E 2Yn  c o s 6 n  + EVYXj  cos(0 12 -  6 )
Ga Yn  cosOjj
Y ■ 0 ,2 - T
P, = £ 2GU + EVYa  sin(5 -  y) 








P c +  P m
8
Figure A3) Power output o f a synchronous machine connected to an infinite bus.
Where Pc represents the power dissipated in the equivalent network and angle y is 
determined by the real component of the transfer admittance Y12.
A.3 Response to Small Disturbances.
When a power impact occurs at some bus in a network, an imbalance between the power 
input to the system and the power output occurs which results in a transient. After this 
transient subsides and a steady state condition is reached, the power impact is distributed 
between the various machines on the system according to the steady state droop 
characteristics of their governors. However, during the transient period, the power impact 
is shared according to a different criteria.
A.3.1 The Unregulated Synchronous Machine.
Using the simple model of a voltage behind a transient reactance, from earlier equations
(A. 13) and (A.18):
2H  d 2 6 (A. 19)
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Pt = Pc + PM sin (6 -  y) (A.20)
Letting 8  = 8 0 + 8A; P. = P,o + PaJ Pm = Pmo and using the relationship:
sin (6 -  y) = sin (60 -  y + 6A) “ s*1 (®o '  Y) + « »  (60 -  y) M a -21)
the linearized version becomes:
0 (A.22)
dt1
where P8 = PMcos(S0 - y) = Synchronizing Power Coefficient.
A.3.2 Modes of Oscillation of an Unregulated Multimachine System.
The electrical power output of the i* machine in an n-machine system is obtained from 
equations A. 16 and A. 17:




Pgi ~ + y !  Ej (By sm^y + Gy cos 5^) (A.24)
J+i
Where: 8 y = 5j - 8j,
Ej = constant voltage behind transient reactance for i* machine,
Yji = Gjj + jBu a diagonal element of the network short circuit admittance matrix, 
Yy = Gy + jBy an off-diagonal element of the admittance matrix.
Using the incremental model so that 8 y = 8 ij0 + 8 ijA gives:
sindp = sin5 0^ cosS^ + cos6 ^  sin5^  -  sin6 ^  + S^cos5 ^
(A.25)
cos5^ * cos5^ -  6tfAsin5^ 
and leads to a final form for PeiA,
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^*/a £  Ej (By cos6 yQ  Gy suidpg) 6 (A.26)
J « 1
J * i
For a given initial condition sin 5ij0 and cos 8^  are known and the term in parentheses 
in equation (A.26) is a constant. Thus:
*
r^/A = Z  ^ 0A (A.27)
/ - I  
J * i
Psij is the change in the electrical power of the i* machine due to a change in the angle 
between machines i and j, with all the other angles held constant. It is a synchronizing 
power coefficient between nodes i and j and the concept of synchronizing power 
coefficients can be extended to mean "the change in the electrical power of a given 
machine due to the change in the angle between its internal E.M.F. and any bus, with all 
other bus angles held constant.
A.3.3 Distribution of Power Impacts.
The sudden application of a small load PM at some point in a network creates an 
unbalance between generation and load and an oscillatory transient occurs before the 
system settles to a new steady-state condition.
(n+l)-port network
P i + j Q i
Vk
Figure A4: Network with Power Impact at node k.
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Referring to the (n+l)-port network in figure A.4, the power into node i is obtained from 
equation A.24 by adding node k.
P, -  EfijPisin5„ ♦ G fc s l j  * E ^ B ^ m  8 * ♦ Gftcos6 ^  (A28>
For the case of nearly zero conductance (i.e. the network has a very high X/R ratio):
the magnitude of its voltage is unchanged (i.e. VkZ5k0 becomes VkZ5k0+ 5 ^ .  The 
internal angles of the other machines cannot change instantly due to the inertia of the 
rotating mass.
These equations are non-linear but since we are only concerned with a small impact Pla 
we linearize the equations to find:





and the power into node k (i.e. the load bus) is:
Pk = T ,V k Ej By smbq
7-1
(A.30)
The immediate effect of the application of is that the angle of bus k is changed while
(A.31)
and determine only the variables Pu and PkA*
These equations are linearized by the relations:
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fA ^  ( E y i P u F ^ ^ i k o l ^ i k A  £  P jiiP ikiL
>1 >1 (
j+Uk j*ijc '
*^A "E “E ^ akftkjti
> 1  > 1
These equations are valid for any time t following the application of the impact. 
Immediately following the load impact (t = 0*).
Immediately following the load impact it would be of interest to know exactly how much 
of the impact is supplied by each generator in the system. At the instant t = 0+ we
know that 8 ^ = 0 for all generators because of the rotor inertias. Thus
**A = 0
■ 8 *  -  8 t i  = - 8 *4 (0 *) (A.34)
^VA *^A &/A = ^*a(0*)
Including these relationships in equations A.33 leads to:
**a(0+) = E V > * a<0+) (A35)
> 1
^ a (0 +) = - ^ * a ( 0 +) (A*36)
Comparing the above two equations at t = 0+, note at node k:
*u«>*) ■ - E (A-37>
i- 1
The change in power at node k is equal to all the power changes of the i machines. At 
node i, depends upon B^cosS^ (equation A.33). In other words, the higher the 
transfer susceptance B* and the lower the initial angle 5^ , the greater the share of the 
impact "picked up" by machine i. Note also that PkA L^A so the previous equations can 
be written in terms of the load impact as:
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From equations A.37 and A.38 we conclude that:
(A.39)
^ ( 0 *) = n Pia(< 0  < = 1. 2 ........ n (A.40)
At the instant of the load impact (t = 0+) the source of the energy supplied by the 
generators is the energy stored in their magnetic fields and is distributed according to the
synchronizing power coefficients between i and k. As the generator rotor angles cannot 
change instantly, the energy supplied by the generators cannot come instantly from the 
energy stored in the rotating masses. depends upon or B* which depends upon the 
reactance between generator i and node k.
Equations A.37 and A.38 show that the load impact P ^  at network bus k is immediately 
shared by the synchronous generators according to their synchronizing power coefficients 
with respect to bus k. Thus the machines electrically close (i.e. low reactance line) to the 
point of impact will pick up the greater share of the load regardless o f their size.
Consider the deceleration of machine i due to sudden increase in its output power P^. The 
equation governing the motion of the machine is given by:
(A.41)
Using equation A.40 and rearranging gives:
The per unit deceleration of machine i is given by equation A.42 and is dependent on the 
synchronizing power coefficient P8ik and the inertia Hj. This deceleration will be constant 
until governor action begins.
Behaviour prior to governor action (t £ t^ )
Consider the system behaviour at time t, during the period 0 < t < tg, where tg is the time 
at which governor action begins. Looking at the system as a whole, there will be an 
overall deceleration of the machines during this period. To obtain a mean deceleration, 
define an "inertial centre" that has angle § and angular velocity q , where by definition:
£  =
I E * ,
*  =
1
I E * ,
E “ /»« (A.43)
Summing the set (A.42) for all values of i, gives:










Equation A.45 gives the mean acceleration of all the machines in the system defined as 
the acceleration of a fictitious inertial centre. Each machine in the system follows an 
oscillatory motion governed by its swing equation. However synchronizing forces tend 
to pull them towards the mean system retardation and after a transient period they will 
acquire the same retardation given by equation A.45. When the transient decays, dco^/dt 




^ ( O 4) (A.46)
Thus at the end of the brief transient (t = 0+) the various machines share the load increase 
as a function of their inertia constants alone.
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In summary, the two modes of operation following a load increase are described by the 
following equations:
and
p t i m  =
y-1
= -A- P ut° +)
(A.47)
» '  (A.48)
E * y
y-i
We note that immediately following the impact, the machines share the impact according 
to their electrical proximity to the point of the impact as expressed by the synchronizing 
power coefficients. After this brief transient period, the same machines share the same 
impact according to an entirely different criteria (i.e. their relative inertias).
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Appendix B
Power in Polyphase Systems
Instantaneous Power is defined as the product of instantaneous voltage and instantaneous 
current:
p  = v * i
To prove that under balanced conditions:
(B.l)
v«*i« + v b*‘b + Vc*ic = 3 K /  cos <}> (B.2)
Where V and I are the RMS voltage and current and <|> is the phase angle.
Let:
vtf = V coso>f ia = /  cos (cdt + <|>) (B°3)
vt = V cos (<of + 240°) it  = /c o s  (uf + 240° + *) (B-4)
vc = P  cos (o>t + 120°) ic = /  cos ( a t  + 120° + *) (B.5)
The instantaneous power in the A-phase can be found as:
Pa = Kcoscof * 7 cos(of + <|)) = VI cosof cos(of + <J>) (B°6)
Using the identity: 2 CosA CosB = Cos (A+B) + Cos (A-B) gives:
A A
Pt  = —  [ cos(2wt + *) + cos* ] (B.7)
2
Similarly for Pb and Pc gives:
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Pb = —  [ cos(2(o)f + 240°) + <M + cos<J>]
2
A A
= —  [ cos(2(uf + 120°) + 4») + cos<H
In terms of R.M.S. quantities these can be simplified to:
Pa = VI cos(2o)f + <j>) + KT cos<t>
= W cos(2((i>( + 240°) + <|>) + VI cos<|>
Pc = VI cos(2(cor + 120°) + 4>) + VI cos<J)
Since PXotal = P, + Pb + Pc then:
PTotal = 3 P7 cos4> + P7 [ cos(2 cof + <W + cos(2 (<of + 240°) +
+ cos(2 (<of + 1 2 0°) + $) ]
The term in the square bracket is equal to zero giving the final result:
PTo*l = 3 VI COS <J>











The Design of the Anti-Aliasing Filters
With a sampling frequency of 1200 Hertz (24 samples per cycle), the anti-aliasing filters 
must have a cut-off frequency less than 600 Hertz according to Nyquist's theory. For this 
application, a fourth order Bessel filter was chosen, with the cut-off frequency set to 
around 550 Hertz. To obtain the fourth order Bessel filter, two VCVS low pass filters 
were cascaded together. This results in the circuit as shown in figure 4.5. The values of 
the various components of the first stage were calculated as follows1531:
R. C. = ----- 1----- (C.l)
‘ '  2 * / , / e
Where fc = 3dB cut-off frequency and f, = 1.432.
This results in:
R. C. = ---------1--------- = 2.021*10'* secs (C.2 )
1 1 2**1.432*550
Choosing: C1 = 3300 pF gives R, = 62kQ
The values of the two feedback resistors can be found by choosing R3 (k, - 1) = lOkft 
where: k, = 1.084 leading to R3= 120k£2.
The values for the second stage are found in the same way with f, replaced by f2 in 
equation (C.l) and k, by k2 where: f2= 1.606 and k2= 1.759.
This leads to the component values: C2 = 2200pF and R2 = 82kQ and




D .l The Full-cycle Fourier Filter.[54,55]
The general Fourier series formula for a periodic function y(t) is:-
a  m
y{t) = — + 52 [fl. cos (/to>0 + b sin (/to?)] ^
2  »-i
Where co is the fundamental angular frequency. The period of the fundamental component 
is 2tc/co = T and
T
an = — f  y(t) cos (nu>t) dt (D*2)T J
b = — f  y(t) sin (nwt) dt (D-3)T J
These are the cosine and sine components at the n* harmonic. For the fundamental 
frequency they are expressed as:
T
2
ai = — /  cos(wd & ^
r 0
r
= -  /  y(t) sin(iof) dt (D-5)
T o
Let y(t) = Y sin (cot + <(>) then:
ax = Y sin <J> (D.6)
bx = Y cos <|> (D 7)
Thus, if a, and can be derived from the sampled data, y(t) can be properly defined in 
its polar form.
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The fiill-cycle Fourier filter algorithm is based upon the above principle to extract the 
fundamental voltage or current from distorted input data by correlating one cycle of data 
samples with the stored samples of reference fundamental sine and cosine waves. The 










2 E  <*-
s-1
. ,271/lv
N., SU1 i - j f ) (D.9)
Where N is the number of samples taken per fundamental cycle. These may be converted 
to polar form using:
1 /—35------------- *
(D.10)
/.I = tan' 1 (ic y (DU)
However, for this work only the cosine term (equation D.8) is required as this can be 
used to extract the in-phase fundamental component from the distorted input data. The 
frequency response of the resulting One-cycle Cosine filter can be seen in figure D.l 
together with the half-cycle and two-cycle cosine filters for comparison. This figure 
shows that the full-cycle cosine filter frequency response has zero's at d.c. and at each 
harmonic of the fundamental frequency.
1.0
Solid: Two-Cycle Cosine 







Figure D.l) Frequency Response of Cosine Fourier Filters.
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D.2 The Half-cycle Moving Average Filter.
The moving average filter can expressed mathematically as:
yin)
i s  
■ n  £  viV r-0
(D.l 2)
Where y(n) and x<n) are the n* output and input respectively, and N is the window size.
For the half-cycle moving average filter the window size, N, is equal to half the number 
of samples taken per fundamental cycle. The resulting impulse response and frequency 











Figure D.2) Impulse Response and Frequency Response of Half-cycle Moving Average Filters.
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A LABORATORY FACILITY FOR RESEARCH INTO DIGITAL PROTECTION ALGORITHMS USED FOR THE PROTECTION OF SMALL AND MEDIUM 
SIZED SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS.
M A Redfern, J BarretC, D Hevings and 0 Usta.
S c h o o l  o f  E l e c t r o n i c  and  E l e c t r i c a l  E n g in e e r in g ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  B a th , UK.
INTRODUCTION.
The great: potential for the installation of small and 
medium sized generation operating1 in parallel with 
the local utility supply network has led to 
considerable interest in new digital relaying schemes 
for protecting embedded generation.
Research into new digital relaying algorithms to be 
used for protecting embedded generation2 has led to 
the development of a laboratory facility for assessing 
new protection techniques. The facility has been built 
around a small synchronous machine which is connected 
to a model power system network containing another 
machine and inter-ties into the three phase system. 
The digital relaying environment is provided by either 
a programmable microprocessor based, general purpose 
protection relay system or a desk-top computer fitted 
with the required input and output units to execute 
real-time protection software.
This facility was initially designed as a teaching 
system to demonstrate the operation and limitations of 
differential protection when applied to a three phase 
generator. The inherent flexibility of the system has 
made it a powerful teaching aid and invaluable for 
research into new protection techniques suitable for 
the integrated generation protection.
The facility provides an intermediate step between 
the software simulation of new protection algorithms 
and field trials using relay hardware. It also 
compliments other evaluation facilities available in 
the laboratory.
GENERATOR PROTECTION RESEARCH FACILITY.
Power Sy?tem_No<tel.
The facility uses a 5 kVA synchronous machine, coupled 
to a dc machine and connected to a model power system 
network containing a similar machine set and 
inter-ties into a 200 volt three phase system. 
Although these machines are intended for generation, 
they can be used as loads.
The schematic diagram for this model power system is 
shown in figure 1. The system contains a double bus 
system similar to that used in a medium range 
generating station and includes the power system 
switching systems associated with such an 
installation. A comprehensive array of current and 
voltage transformers are installed around the 
synchronous machine to provide Inputs into the 
protection systems. Other machines and plant can be 
connected to the system as required for special tests.
To facilitate protection system testing, the machines 
and breakers are generously rated and the stator 
windings of the synchronous machines are fitted with 
accessible taps. Faults can be applied without causing 
permanent damage.
Digital Generator Protection Relay Research System.
The digital relaying environment is provided by both 
the desk-top computer system and a programmable 
microprocessor research relay system. They monitor the 
behaviour of the synchronous machine using eight
primary current transformers and four primary voltage 
transformers. The laboratory protection systems and 
their inter-connection to the power system instrument 
transformers are shown in figure 2.
The desk-top computer based research system uses a 
COMPAQ 286 microcomputer, containing a third party 
interface board fitted with 16 analogue inputs and 32 
channels of digital input and output, I/O.
The primary transducers are interfaced to the 
microcomputer using a purpose designed input system. 
This Includes interposing transformers to provide an 
additional level of isolation for the microelectronic 
systems from the primary system. The input system also 
contains the anti-aliasing filters, the sample and 
hold circuits and the phase-locked loop control 
circuit to provide the sampling clock frequency 
generator. The standard generator protection 
algorithms use twelve samples per 50 Hz cycle, 
corresponding to 600 samples/sec.
To ensure that there were the least difficulties with 
the timing between the different input circuit 
functions, the sample and hold circuits were triggered 
using the falling edges of the square wave triggering 
waveform from the phase locked loop and the analogue 
to digital converters were triggered using the rising 
edges. The phase locked loop circuit locks onto the 
power system frequency and outputs a square wave 
exactly twelve times its frequency.
The trip output from the protection algorithm is 
provided via the digital I/O port, which with the aid 
of a driver circuit operates an auxiliary relay, which 
in turn trips the circuit breaker connecting the 
synchronous machine to the model power system. The 
trip circuit includes a ten second delay to enable 
current and voltage readings to be taken during the 
fault condition.
The block diagram of the desk-top computer based 
research system is shown in figure 3.
The programmable microprocessor research relay system 
uses the INTEL 80186 microprocessor together with the 
input circuits required to monitor current and voltage 
transducer secondary signals and output circuits 
containing the trip and alarm relays. The 80186 is of 
the same family as the 80286s used in the Compaq and 
with minor modifications programmes developed on this 
desk-top computer can be used in the programmable 
relay system.
The relay's input modules contain eight current 
transformers, four voltage transformers, the input 
filters, the sampling circuitry and the digital to 
analogue converters. A RS232 serial communications 
channel enables the microprocessor relay system to 
communicate directly to the desk-top computer enabling 
the operator to measure the currents and voltages 
monitored by the relay together with trip and flag 
status information. This communications link has 
enabled several teaching projects to be automated, 
dramatically reducing the student's effort in 
performing the experiments.
Software for the desk-top relaying environment and the 
microcomputer relay can be developed in either 'C' or 
Assembly. The close similarity between the two systems
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enables research to start on the desk-top computer and 
then the protection algorithms to be moved to the 
microprocessor relay for in depth testing. The 
microprocessor relay is a stand alone system and can 




The generator protection scheme3'* is required to 
protect the machine from both internal and external 
faults. A typical protection scheme for a small or 
medium sized synchronous generator is shown in figure
4. The actual scheme used for a generator depends on 
the machine being protected and some features shown 
may be omitted while others may be included.
The IDMT relays, 51V and 51N, provide protection 
against high current faults on either the generator or 
the system to which it is connected. The negative 
sequence relay, 46N, provides protection against 
unbalanced loads damaging the machine or the loss of a 
phase connection. The reverse power relay, 32, 
prevents machine motoring should the prime mover fail.
The over and under voltage relays, 27 and 59, and the 
over and under frequency relays, 810 and 81U, ensure 
that the consumer's supply is maintained within 
defined voltage and frequency limits. Should the 
supply move outside these for greater than the time 
period set, the embedded generator is disconnected 
from the load. The Loss of Mains relay, LOM, detects 
when the site becomes isolated from the utility's 
source of generation for whatever cause and opens the 
inter-tie breaker to the utility resulting in stand 
alone operation of the site system.
The synchronisation checking relay, 25, ensures that 
the generator is only connected to the site busbar 
when the voltages on both sides of the connecting 
breaker are within tolerable limits of each other and 
in phase. The operation of the synchronisation 
checking relay can be inhibited when the generator is 
being connected to a de-energised busbar.
The main protection for internal faults within the 
generator's stator winding is provided by the 
differential protection, 87. Since this is a unit 
protection, it does not require time grading with 
other protection systems and can therefore be 
'instantaneous'.
Biased Differential Protection.
Arguably, the simplest method of protecting a 
generator's stator against Internal faults is to use 
current differential protection across the stator 
windings. Based on the Merz and Price circulating 
current principles3, the scheme is enhanced using 
automatic through-current biasing.
The relay monitors the currents on both sides of the 
stator winding and determines the differential current 
which is used as the protection operate measurand. To 
avoid mal-operation due to current transformer 
mismatch and high through-currents, the currents 
measured are used to provide a bias measurand which 
restrains relay operation. The relay's ideal 
characteristic curve is shown in figure 5.
For each phase of the generator, the biased 
differential protection algorithm uses the following 
trip criterion:-








1^ is the relay's nominal current,
IA ' and Ig' are the secondary currents measured at 
the generator's neutral and line ends.
The values of the constants and K2 are the zero 
current trip setting and the bias setting for the 
characteristic respectively.
To reduce the effects of noise on the algorithm, a 
moving window equivalent to one cycle of samples is 
used to provide inherent filtering. Equation 1 has 
therefore been modified to provide a running total of 
the present sample value together with the previous 
n-1 sample values. The protection algorithm therefore 
causes trip when:-
V I W - W l  > Ki IN + K,V | W + I - M  (2)
Z -  n Z _  2n
m-(n-1) m-(n-1)
Differential Setting Mean through
current current current
For the differential scheme, after sampling the 
appropriate two input channels, the values obtained 
are processed and the results added to a running total 
for both the operate values and the restraint values 
as shown below. The operate values are made up of the 
sum of the differences between the two sample values, 
and the restraint values, the average of the two 
sample values. This can be expressed by the following 
equations:
Operate value - Ib™' - Iaib' (3a)
Restraint value - (1/^ ' + Ibhi' ) (3b)
2
The moving window functions of n samples are obtained 
by first subtracting the (m-n) samples from the 
appropriate running total and then adding the value of 
the new (m) samples. The (m) samples are read into 
the array in place of the (m-n) samples, i.e. they 
overwrite the original values. The summation of the 
stored samples therefore gives a running total of the 
n samples which are available for use in the trip 
calculation.
When the protection algorithm is first energised, i.e. 
before any samples are taken, it is necessary to 
restrain the trip function for the first cycle period 
in order to prevent mal-operation. The values in the 
array elements are first zeroed and then during this 
restraint period operational data is collected. Once 
the program has collected n service samples after 
energisation, the array has been filled and the 
restraint is lifted.
To provide three phase protection, the program samples 
the six input channels corresponding to the six CT's 
connected on either side of the stator windings. 
Similar protection algorithms are used on each phase 
of the machine. The three trip-algorithms provide a 
common trip output such that whenever a fault is 
detected on any of the windings, the circuit breaker 
is tripped, thus disconnecting the machine from the 
system.
DIFFERENTIAL RELAY PROTECTION PERFORMANCE,
The relay's trip characteristic was determined by 
applying phase to phase faults between corresponding 
red and yellow phase taps on the machine. The 
resulting curve is shown in figure 5 which compares 
well with the ideal curve. Tripping times were 
typically 30 msecs, including the delays incurred by 
the output hinged armature relays.
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Further investigations to examine the limitations of 
the differential protection scheme when an earthing 
resistor was connected to the machine's star point, 
produced the relationship shown in figure 6. This 
shows the percentage of the winding protected by the 
relay against the maximum fault current that could 
flow for an internal fault, as a percentage of the 
rated load current. These results demonstrate an 
inherent limitation of stator winding differential 
protection caused by the relay's inability to operate 
when the fault current Is below Its trip value.
RESEARCH INTO ENHANCED PROTECTION ALGORITHMS.
This facility provides an environment for further work 
into new and enhanced protection algorithms for small 
synchronous motors and generators. Current work Is 
concentrating on both the refinement of new techniques 
for detecting loss of mains, and new differential 
protection algorithms to overcome the one cycle dead 
period following energisation and to extend the 
percentage of the stator winding protected without the 
use of injection systems. Several techniques exist for 
enhanced stator winding protection including 
monitoring the third harmonic content7 and monitoring 
the harmonic content In the machine's rotor8. These 
and other work on generator protection highlight the 
need for further work in this area.
CONCLUSIONS.
This facility was Initially designed as a teaching 
system to demonstrate the operation and limitations of 
biased differential protection when applied to a three 
phase generator.
The inherent flexibility of the system has led to Its 
use for research Into new protection techniques 
suitable for the integrated protection of embedded 
generation.
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The operation of small or medium sized generation 
running in parallel with the local utility supply, 
creates several difficulties for the reliable and 
safe operation of the power supply system. These 
difficulties arise from the generator's capacity to 
supply power to the network and because it operates 
independently of the network control system.
The protection scheme required by the embedded 
generator must include functions which provide 
protection for faults directly affecting the site's 
generator, protection for the utility from faults on 
the generator's site, and protection for the 
generator's site from faults or disturbances on the 
utility network. An important element in the latter 
requirement is the need to protect against the 
accidental isolation of the generator's site from the 
main source of utility power. In such a situation, 
the generator's site could be left connected to part 
of the utility load and operate as an independent 
power island.
This situation is illustrated in figure 1. Following 
the opening of the 'loss of grid' circuit breaker, 
the generator's site is left connected to part of the 
network load. Ideally the loss of grid protection 
would trip the inter-tie breaker disconnecting the 
generator's site from the utility and thereby 
facilitate the orderly restoration of the utility 
supply to the network. Unfortunately for the 
operation of the network, the 'loss of grid' circuit 
breaker need not be a specific circuit breaker but 
may potentially be any breaker, switch, or isolator 
connecting the utility's main source of supply to the 
generator's site.
Protection designed to detect loss of grid supply is 
a relatively new area for relaying and is commonly 
referred to as either loss of grid protection or loss 
of mains protection. Occasionally it is referred to 
as islanding protection.
Before a utility will agree to the connection of an 
embedded generator to its network, they will need to 
be satisfied that the presence of the embedded 
generator will not detract from the quality of supply 
provided to its customers. In the UK, the technical 
requirements for connecting an embedded generator to 
a Regional Distribution Company's system are defined 
in the Electricity Council Engineering Recommendation 
G591. The protection requirements include the need to 
provide loss of grid protection as part of the 
generator's site protection scheme.
LOSS OF GRID PROTECTION.
Several techniques have already been developed for 
detecting loss of grid2-3'*-5-6. The difficulties with 
this type of relaying have led to considerable 
interest in exploring new concepts for this function. 
Quoting from a recent IEEE paper," Providing 
protection against islanding probably is the single 
most challenging aspect of designing the electrical 
system involving cogeneration.7". These difficulties 
arise because loss of grid is not a clearly defined 
fault condition but is an undesirable and unsafe 
operating state. For most systems, scenarios exist
and G Fielding
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where the different protection techniques may fail to 
detect the loss of grid.
The techniques being examined to detect loss of grid 
are based on monitoring the behaviour of the power 
system to disturbances and the differences in system 
characteristics between those experienced when the 
main utility supply is connected to the embedded 
generator and those when the embedded generator is 
operating in isolation. The algorithm uses changes in 
the power output from the embedded generator to 
provide an insight into the transfer function of the 
generating plant feeding the power system. Under 
normal conditions with the utility supply connected, 
the transfer function reflects the combination of the 
main source and the embedded generation. Following 
loss of grid, or while the embedded generator is 
operating in isolation, it reflects the 
characteristics of the embedded generator alone.
Returning to the simplified representation of a power 
system shown in figure 1, the embedded generator and 
the main utility supply can be represented by 
idealised generators of capacity Gg and Go, with 
inertia constants H, and H, respectively. While the 
utility's source of supply is connected to the 
network, a change in the system load of DP, produces 
a change in the distributed generator's loading of 
DP, defined by:-
H. G,
DP, - DP, ____________________
H, G, + Ha G„
However if the distributed generator operates 
independently from the utility supply, for example 
following loss of grid, any change of system load 
will result in the distributed generator's loading of 
DP, defined by:-
DP, - DP,
Accepting that the utility has a greater capacity 
than the embedded generator and that its inertia 
constant will also be greater, the differences in 
response to a disturbance provides an immediate basis 
for determining whether or not the utility supply is 
connected to the portion of the network containing 
the embedded generation.
An additional advantage of using the power as the 
relaying measurement is that it is readily obtained 
from instantaneous measurements of the generator's 
terminal voltages and output currents. Providing that 
the samples are taken at the same instant, they also 
do not have to be synchronised to the power system 
frequency. The generator's three phase power output 
is derived from:-
P, - v,i, + vbib + vcic
where;




i«> ib, ic are the sampled values of Its 
output currents.
In a typical protection scheme associated with an 
embedded generator, these measurements are also 
required for other relaying functions required to 
protect the machine. The loss of grid protection Is 
therefore suitable for Including into an Integrated 
protection package for a small or medium sized 
embedded generator without dramatically Increasing 
the hardware requirements.
In addition to reliably detecting the occurrence of a 
loss of grid, the protection algorithm must remain 
stable during conditions of extreme load unbalance, 
loss of phase and during load flicker. These 
conditions have been accommodated by amplitude 
limiting measurements of changes in power output from 
the embedded generator and integrating samples over a 
moving window period. The protection's trip criteria 
is defined by:-
n - 0
( DPg )n > k.
n - -tx
where;
n is the sampling instant of ( DPg )n,
k, is the trip setting,
and,
tx is the length of the sampling window.
POWER SYSTEM STUDIES.
Extensive simulation studies have been undertaken to 
study both the effects of loss of grid and of other 
disturbances to a power system containing an embedded 
generator. These studies were conducted using both 
the alternative transients version of the EMTP 
programme, ATP8, and programmes developed in-house. 
Unfortunately, limitations were found in the 
generation model used in the ATP and hence detailed 
new models had to be developed.
To illustrate the capabilities of the protection 
algorithm, an 11 kV network containing a 3.75 MVA 
embedded generator was modelled. The embedded 
generator had an inertia constant of 0.91 MW.sec/MVA 
and the site load was 3 MW. The utility supply was 
set at 250 MVA with an inertia constant of 10 
MW.sec/MVA. The test period considered used a one 
second window commencing 100 ms before the 
disturbance.
The length of the sampling window used in the 
protection algorithm was chosen to give a maximum 
operating time of six cycles and the amplitude 
limiting was chosen to provide a minimum tripping 
time of one cycle. The trip setting was selected such 
that a one percent load change following loss of grid 
produced tripping.
The response to a loss of grid producing a 5% 
increase in generator load is shown in figure 2. For 
this disturbance, the protection algorithm trips 
after 26 ms. The traces for the a-phase voltage shows 
that it dips after the disturbance whereas the a- 
phase current increases.
The response to a 5% increase in generator load while 
the generator is operating independently of the 
utility supply is shown in figure 3. These curves are 
virtually identical to those of figure 2 and tripping 
also occurs 26 ms after the disturbance. In a
practical situation the loss of grid trip would open 
the inter-tie breaker if it were closed ensuring that 
the utility supply could be safely restored to the 
utility without disturbing the embedded generator. 
Satisfactory restoration of supply to the adjacent 
network bus could be followed by a controlled 
reclosure of the inter-tie breaker. Naturally 
operation of the loss of grid protection while the 
inter-tie breaker was open would have no effect.
The restraint of the algorithm to violent load 
changes while the distributed generator is operating 
in parallel with the utility supply is shown in 
figure 4. This shows the response to a 100% change in 
the local load and the non-operation of the 
protection algorithm. The auto-scaling feature of the 
plotting package masks the lack of disturbance to the 
embedded generator.
Arguably the worst case scenario following a failure 
to detect loss of grid is an out-of-synchronism 
reclosure of the loss of grid breaker. An example of 
this is shown in figure 5 where the phase angle 
between the two systems is thirty degrees before 
reclosure. Tripping results 234 ms after the 
reclosure, disconnecting the embedded generator from 
the utility before serious damage can result. 
Although in an ideal world such a reclosure would be 
unthinkable, in the real world where an embedded 
generator is connected to an established power 
network, the distribution switchgear will rarely be 
equipped with check synchronism or live line/dead 
bus, dead line/live bus supervision.
In addition to the algorithm's response to switching 
disturbances, its response to fault conditions is 
also of interest. A solid three phase fault on the 
local busbar would produce a condition similar to 
that for a loss of grid. The fault effectively splits 
the system into two and would in effect be fed 
independently by the generation on either side. This 
type of fault would therefore cause the algorithm to 
trip the inter-tie breaker. The response to a three 
phase fault is shown in figure 6, and tripping occurs 
340 ms after the fault. The initial violent changes 
in power output from the distributed generation unit 
are attenuated by the signal limiting action of the 
algorithm and hence operation is delayed. Naturally 
this fault would be seen by other protection 
functions which would also isolate it from the 
system. The operating times of the loss of grid 
protection are suitable to allow proper grading.
A single phase fault on the same busbar, however, 
need not result in three phase tripping of the inter­
tie breaker and hence should be left to other 
protection relays to clear. The algorithm does not 
result in tripping for a single phase to ground fault 
as shown in figure 7. Since in this case, only one 
phase is effectively lost, the power output 
oscillates at twice the power system frequency and 
the integrating nature of the algorithm prevents 
tripping.
CONCLUSIONS.
The loss of grid protection described in this paper 
provides an effective technique for detecting this 
condition and enabling the utility supply to be 
reconnected in a controlled manner. The algorithm has 
been shown to remain stable under extreme load 
fluctuations while the utility supply remains 
connected to the generator's site, but to operate 
quickly for small fluctuations when the generator's 
site is disconnected from the main utility supply.
The algorithm also trips for an out-of-synchronism 
reclosure of the utility supply onto the generator's 
site protecting the embedded generator from possible 
damage. Extreme fault conditions effectively spliting 
the power system result in tripping, but if the 
interconnection remains intact, it remains stable.
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FIGURE 2. RESPONSE TO A LOSS OF GRID PRODUCING 
A 5% INCREASE IN THE GENERATOR LOADING.


















FIGURE 1. NETWORK CONFIGURATION CONTAINING 
A DISTRIBUTED GENERATION UNIT.
2 0 0
FIGURE 3. RESPONSE TO A DISTURBANCE PRODUCING 
A 5% INCREASE IN THE GENERATOR LOADING WHILE IT 
IS OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY OF THE UTILITY SUPPLY.
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FIGURE 4. RESPONSE TO A DISTURBANCE PRODUCING 
A 100% INCREASE IN THE LOCAL LOAD WHILE 
OPERATING IN PARALLEL WITH THE UTILITY SUPPLY.
FIGURE 6. RESPONSE TO A THREE PHASE FAULT 
ON THE LOCAL BUSBAR.
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"Providing protection against islanding probably is 
the single most challenging aspect of designing the 
electrical system involved in cogeneration.1" For 
small or medium sized cogenerators, also referred to 
as embedded generators, operating in parallel with a 
utility power supply, islanding generally occurs 
following utility switching operations which leave 
the generator connected to part of the utility's load 
but disconnected from the utility's main source of 
power. The condition is also referred to as loss of 
mains or more recently as loss of grid.
Considering the simplified system shown in figure 1, 
the power island is produced by opening the loss of 
grid breaker. Unfortunately the circuit breaker 
causing loss of grid could be any of several breakers 
providing the link between the utility's main source 
of power and the embedded generator. In itself loss 
of grid should not damage the power system. However 
since it produces two separate power networks, it 
complicates the orderly reconnection of the power 
supply network. For those utility customers left 
connected to the embedded generator, it could result 
in their power supply deviating from required 
standards. There is also a potential safety hazard to 
personnel, since following loss of grid part of the 
utility system remains energised which would normally 
be expected to be de-energised.
In the UK, Electricity Council Recommendations G592 
and Engineering Technical Report ET 1133 describe the 
requirements of the protection systems which need to 
be satisfied before the connection of an embedded 
generator to the utility system can be authorised. 
These requirements include the need to provide loss 
of grid protection. Most major utilities in other 
countries who allow non utility generation to be 
connected to their system have similar 
guide-lines*'5-6.
The requirements of the loss of grid protection as 
defined by G592 are that it should automatically 
disconnect the generator from the Electricity Board's 
system in the event of loss of the Board's supply to 
that installation. The tripping time should be such 
that the two systems have been successfully separated 
before automatic reclosing equipment could attempt to 
reconnect the two systems. On a distribution system 
the time setting of the recloser could be one second. 
The protection system is also required to ensure that 
the embedded generator is properly earthed following 
loss of grid.
TECHNIQUES FOR DETECTING LOSS OF GRID.
The most direct method for detecting loss of grid is 
to take advantage of a SCADA system and monitor 
auxiliary contacts on all circuit breakers on the 
utility system between the embedded generator and the 
utility supply1. Detection of a loss of grid would be 
followed by a transfer trip instruction to open the 
inter-tie breaker connecting the embedded generator 
to the utility. Although this is the most effective 
technique available, most distribution systems and 
the circuit breakers they employ have not been fitted 
with a suitable supervisory system and the expense 




Several techniques have been developed for detecting 
loss of grid using local power system measurements 
made on the embedded generator's site7. These can be 
divided into active techniques, which have a direct 
influence on the operation of the power system, and 
passive techniques, which rely on passive
measurements of system parameters. Active techniques 
include the Reactive Power Export Error Detector8 and 
the System Fault Level Monitor8. The passive
techniques include Under/Over frequency, Under/Over 
Voltage, Reverse Power, Rate of Change of Frequency8 
and Phase Displacement Monitoring10. All of these
techniques have limitations and there is considerable 
interest in investigating new possibilities.
THE NEW LOSS OF GRID PROTECTION ALGORITHM.
The commercial attraction of a loss of grid 
protection which can be included in an integrated
digital protection scheme for an embedded generator 
led to the formulation of this new algorithm. Unlike 
previous techniques the algorithm is based on
monitoring fluctuations in the generator's power 
output. The operation of the algorithm depends on the
characteristics of these disturbances and the
different responses which result when the embedded 
generator is operating while connected to the utility 
supply and while it is operating independently.
Considering the simplified system shown in figure 1, 
both the embedded generator and the utility supply 
can be modelled by idealised generators of capacity 
G, and G„, with inertia constants H, and < Ha 
respectively. While the utility source of generation 
remains connected to the utility source of supply, a 
change in the network loading, AP,, will produce a 
change in the generator's power output, AP,, defined 
by:-
H.G*
AP, - AP, ________________
H,G, + HbqGi,
Since the capacity and inertia constant of the 
utility source is greater than that of the embedded 
generator, the changes to the generator's power 
output will be small when compared to the change in 
the load. However, when the embedded generator is 
operating independently from the main source of 
utility supply, a change in the network loading, AP,, 
will have a direct effect on the generator's power 
output, AP,, such that:-
AP, - AP,
The measurement of the generator's power output is 
based on the instantaneous power, Pn, measured in a 
three phase system:-
Pn - v.i, + Vb ib  + vcic
where v,, vb, vc, i,, ib, and i0 represent the sampled 
values of phase voltages and currents measured at the
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generator's terminals at sampling instant n. If the 
three phase system is balanced, this measurement is 
divorced from the point-on-wave of the input samples 
and the system need not be locked onto the power 
system frequency. A low sampling rate can also be 
used.
The protection algorithm monitors fluctuations in the 
power output over a defined sampling window. 
Fluctuations in the generator's power output are 
amplitude limited by the function, fn. This signal is 
integrated over the sampling window and tripping is 
initiated when the absolute value of the integrated 








n is the sampling instant of APg 
tx is the length of the sampling window.
Both the use of the sampling window and the amplitude 
limiting function provide an inherent filtering 
capability for noise and unbalance. The length of the 
sampling window is chosen to give a maximum nominal 
operating time of six cycles of the power system 
frequency, and provides inherent immunity to 
mal-operation due to extreme conditions of load 
unbalance or when an input transducer is lost. This 
could for example be caused by the loss of one of the 
voltage transformers. The nominal minimum operating 
time is defined by the level used for the amplitude 
limiting function. For the tests illustrated below 
this has been chosen to be equivalent to one cycle of 
the power system frequency. The trip setting is 
chosen such that the relay would just trip whenever a 
loss of grid or a load disturbance during independent 
operation produced a pre-defined percentage change in 
the generator's power output. The choice of setting 
depends on the application and local conditions. For 
the algorithm the setting is defined by the sampling 
interval, the length of the sampling window, the 
generator's inertia constant and its rated capacity.
MICROPROCESSOR BASED RELAY IMPLEMENTATION.
To complement computer studies of the performance of 
the loss of grid protection algorithm, initial 
practical trials have been conducted using a 
laboratory 200 V, three phase, model power system11. 
The model is based on a double bus generating station 
and includes two small synchronous generators driven 
by dc machines. One of these generators has been 
fitted with a microprocessor protection relay which 
is supported by a personal computer. This computer is 
also equipped with input transducers to monitor an 
array of system voltages and currents, and provides a 
convenient platform for research into new digital 
algorithms for generator protection which can be 
transferred to the relay hardware at a later stage.
The loss of grid protection algorithm was programmed 
into the personal computer to run in real time 
alongside other protection functions. Advantage was 
taken of existing data acquisition and data recording 
systems. The system used 12 bit A/D converters with a 
200% dynamic range for the voltage inputs and a 
switched range of dynamic ranges for the current 
inputs. For the following tests a 200% dynamic range 
was used for the current Inputs and the system was 
run at 16 samples per power system frequency cycle. 
The personal computer used a 12 MHz 80286 processor 
together with a 80287 co-processor. The algorithm was 
coded in assembler using approximately fifty 
instructions.
PROTECTION PERFORMANCE STUDIES.
The computer studies modelled an 11 kV system similar 
to that shown in figure 1. The embedded generator was 
rated at 3.75 MVA with an inertia constant of 0.91 
Mtf-sec/MVA and the utility supply was rated at 250 MW 
with an inertia constant of 10 MW-sec/MVA. A one 
second test period was used commencing 100 msec 
before the switching disturbance. The algorithm's 
trip setting was set such that it would trip 
following a loss of grid producing a one percent 
change in the generator's output loading. A sampling 
rate of 20 samples per power system frequency cycle 
was used by the algorithm.
The practical tests used the 5 kVA test machine with 
a measured inertia constant of 0.35 kW-sec/kVA. The 
mains supply was rated at 500 KVA with a nominal 
inertia constant of 10 kW-sec/kVA. To avoid spurious 
tripping, the relay's trip setting was set such that 
it would just trip following a loss of grid producing 
a two and a half percentage change in the generator's 
output loading. The test system suffered from very 
high levels of waveform distortion and harmonic 
interference, particularly in the current waveform 
which was not fully filtered by the algorithm. The 
tests and results presented below also demonstrate 
that the system was sinking noise and harmonics 
generated by other users of the supply. The filtering 
capabilities of the algorithm were reinforced by a 
half cycle digital filter applied to the measured 
power Pg used by the algorithm.
The responses to a loss of grid producing a 50 
percent change in the generator's loading are shown 
in figure 2. The responses from the computer model, 
figure 2(a), and test machine, figure 2(b), are very 
similar apart from the noise and the lower inertia 
constant seen in the response of the laboratory 
system. The computer simulation model tripped 28 msec 
after loss of grid and the microcomputer relay 
tripped after 50 msec. Fart of the difference in 
these results is the additional filtering used by the 
laboratory algorithm.
The responses to a loss of grid producing a 5 percent 
change in the generator's, output loading are shown in 
figure 3. Again the responses from the different 
tests are similar apart from the noise and lower 
inertia constant of the laboratory machine. In this 
case the computer simulation model trips after 30 
msec and the microcomputer relay trips after 67.5 
msec. This difference is a direct result of the 
different trip settings used by the two algorithms.
The responses to a 5 percent load change while the 
generator is operating independently from the utility 
system are shown in figure 4. The microprocessor 
relay responses are again similar to those obtained 
from the computer simulation, with tripping occurring 
after 87.5 msec and 28 msec respectively. There are 
many similarities between these responses and those 
shown in figure 3. The curves from the microcomputer 
relay reveal a higher level of waveform distortion 
present while the generator is running in parallel 
with the mains than when it is operating alone.
The response to a 100 percent load change while the 
generator is operating in parallel with the utility 
supply is shown in figure 5. In both cases the 
algorithms remain stable and do not trip. Although 
there is a small oscillatory disturbance with the 
computer simulation this is not apparent with the 
laboratory test. The laboratory test again 
demonstrated the effects of waveform distortion and 
harmonics. The fluctuations in the output of the 
algorithm's integration however do not cause tripping 
with the setting chosen.
The response to an out-of-step reclosure is shown in 
figure 6. For both tests, the phase difference 
between the two power systems prior to reclosure was 
45 degrees. From the computer simulation, the
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oscillatory nature of the machine's response and the 
inherent filtering included in the algorithm slow the 
protection. Tripping occurred 222 msec after 
reclosure. The low inertia of the laboratory machine 
and the capacity of the mains supply produce a more 
direct response without the subsequent oscillations 
and tripping occurs after 47.5 msec.
CONCLUSIONS,
A new digital protection algorithm for detecting loss 
of grid for a small or medium sized embedded 
generator operating in parallel with a utility supply 
has been shown to operate correctly for loss of grid 
conditions, during independent operation, and after 
an out—of—synchronism reclosure with the utility. It 
also remains stable during severe load fluctuations 
while operating in parallel with the utility.
The algorithm has been formulated to be suitable for 
an integrated digital protection for an embedded 
generator. The test platform used to demonstrate the 
practical algorithm's operation was similar to that 
used by commercially available protection relays.
Laboratory tests have supported results from computer 
simulation. These tests also demonstrated the 
successful operation of the algorithm in the presence 
of high levels of current and voltage waveform 
distortion and harmonic interference.
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FIGURE 1. TYPICAL NETWORK CONFIGURATION ILLUSTRATING 
LOSS OF GRID FOR AN EMBEDDED GENERATOR.
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(11) LOSS OF GRID FUNCTION OUTPUT.
LOSS OF GRID TRIP 28 KSEC AFTER DISTURBANCE.
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(b) LABORATORY TEST MACHINE.
FIGURE 2. RESPONSE OF LOSS OF GRID ALGORITHM TO A 50% 
INCREASE IN THE EMBEDDED GENERATOR'S LOAD 
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(1) EMBEDDED CENERATOR OUTPUT.
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(11) LOSS OF CRID FUNCTION OUTPUT.
LOSS OF CRID TRIP 30 MSEC AFTER DISTURBANCE, 
(a) COMPUTER SIMULATION MODEL.




(11) LOSS OF GRID FUNCTION OUTPUT.
LOSS OF CRID TRIP 67.5 MSEC AFTER DISTURBANCE.
(b) LABORATORY TEST MACHINE.
FIGURE 3. RESPONSE OF LOSS OF GRID ALGORITHM TO A 5% 
INCREASE IN THE EMBEDDED GENERATOR'S LOAD 
FOLLOWING LOSS OF GRID.






(11) LOSS OF GRID FUNCTION OUTPUT.
LOSS OF GRID DOES NOT TRIP AFTER THE DISTURBANCE.
(a) COMPUTER SIMULATION MODEL.












(11) LOSS OF GRID FUNCTION OUTPUT.
LOSS OF GRID DOES NOT TRIP AFTER THE DISTURBANCE.
(b) LABORATORY TEST MACHINE.
FIGURE 5. RESPONSE OF LOSS OF GRID ALGORITHM TO A 
100% INCREASE IN THE EMBEDDED GENERATOR'S LOAD 
WHILE OPERATING IN PARALLEL WITH THE UTILITY.
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(b) LABORATORY TEST MACHINE.
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(a) COMPUTER SIMULATION MODEL.
(1) EMBEDDED GENERATOR OUTPUT.
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LOSS OF GRID TRIP 47.5 MSEC AFTER DISTURBANCE.
(b) LABORATORY TEST MACHINE.
FIGURE 4. RESPONSE OF LOSS OF GRID ALGORITHM TO A 5% FIGURE 6. RESPONSE OF LOSS OF GRID ALGORITHM TO A
INCREASE IN THE EMBEDDED GENERATOR’S LOAD OUT-OF-SYNCHRONISATION RECLOSURE
WHILE OPERATING INDEPENDENTLY FROM THE UTILITY. WITH A PHASE DISPLACEMENT OF 45 DEGREES.
IEE Colloquium on The Effective Response o f  a Public Electricity Network to Independent Generators, April 1993, Chester.
LOSS OF GRID PROTECTION FOR AN EMBEDDED GENERATOR.
M A Redfern, O Usta and J I Barrett.
The operation o f small or medium sized generation in parallel with the local utility supply creates 
several difficulties for the reliable and safe operation of the power system. These difficulties arise 
from the generator’s ability to supply power to the network and since it operates independently of 
the utility’s control system.
The protection scheme required by the embedded generator must include functions to provide 
protection for faults directly affecting the site’s generator, protection for the utility against faults 
on the generator’s site, and protection for the generator’s site from faults or disturbances on the 
utility network. One important element in the latter is the need to protect against the accidental 
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FIGURE 1. A POWER SYSTEM DISTRIBUTION NETWORK CONTAINING AN
EMBEDDED GENERATOR.
The loss o f grid scenario is illustrated in figure 1. Following the opening o f the Toss o f grid’ 
circuit breaker, the generator’s site is left connected to part of the network load. Ideally the loss 
of grid protection would trip the inter-tie breaker disconnecting the generator’s site from the utility 
and thereby facilitating the orderly restoration of the utility supply to the network.
Dr M A Redfern, O Usta and J I Barrett are with the School o f Electronic and Electrical 
Engineering, University o f Bath, BATH, BA2 7AY, UK.
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Unfortunately, the loss of grid situation is complicated since the circuit breaker which causes the 
loss of grid need not be a specific circuit breaker in the system, but could be any breaker, switch, 
or isolator connecting the utility’s main source of supply to the generator’s site.
Protection designed to detect loss of grid supply is a relatively new area for relaying and is also 
commonly referred to as loss of mains protection, or islanding protection.
Before a utility will agree to the connection of an embedded generator to its network, they will 
need to be satisfied that the presence of the embedded generator will not detract from the quality 
of supply provided to its customers. In the UK, the technical requirements for connecting an 
embedded generator to a Regional Distribution Company’s system are defined in the Electricity 
Council Engineering Recommendation G591. The protection requirements include the need to 
provide loss of grid protection in the generator’s site protection scheme.
TECHNIQUES FOR DETECTING LOSS OF GRID.
Quoting from a recent IEEE paper, "Providing protection against islanding probably is the single 
most challenging aspect of designing the electrical system involving cogeneration."2. These 
difficulties arise because loss of grid is not a clearly defined fault condition but is an undesirable 
and unsafe operating state. For most systems, scenarios exist where the different protection 
techniques may fail to detect the loss of grid.
The difficulties associated with loss of grid protection have led to considerable interest in exploring 
new concepts for this function and several techniques have been developed for detecting loss of 
grid3,4,5,6. Work at the University of Bath has concentrated on an alternative technique which 
monitors fluctuations in the power output of the embedded generator to determine whether or not 
the connection to the utility’s main source of power is intact6.
Reactive Export Error Detector3.
The reactive export error detector directly controls the embedded generators excitation current so 
that it generates a level of reactive current in the utility to generator site inter—tie which cannot 
be supported unless the utility source is connected. The relay trips when the level of reactive 
current is not maintained at the required level for greater than a preset period. This time delay 
prevents maloperation for short lived supply fluctuations. An immediate advantage of this relay is 
that it can detect loss of grid where the disconnection does not change the generator load.
The time delay is typically set between 2 and 5 seconds and the relay is therefore inherently slow. 
The approach is also limited when the power factor compensation capacitors remain connected to 
the island and hence the reactive currents can be maintained. The relay requires both voltage and 
current inputs, as well as connections to the voltage regulator.
This technique is one of the few techniques suitable for small power supply systems where other 
relays fail to differentiate between loss of grid and abnormal system fluctuations. It is also used 
to provide back—up protection to other faster schemes.
207
Fault Level Monitor4.
The fault level monitor repeatedly measures the system fault level by monitoring the current flow 
through a shunt inductor controlled by a point on wave switch triggering an anti—parallel 
connected thyristor pair together with the resulting changes in the system voltage. Triggering the 
thyristors just before voltage zero, produces a short pulse of current which reduces system 
voltage. Measurements enable the source impedance and hence the system fault level to be 
calculated . The system does not need to be particularly accurate since there is a dramatic change 
in fault capacity between the embedded generator and the utility supply.
The advantage of this approach is that it responds quickly to loss of grid by measuring the fault 
level every half cycle. This method has been developed from equipment used to improve static 
voltage compensator performance, however a commercial unit has not yet been produced.
Rate of Change of Frequency3.
This protection operates when the rate of change of frequency exceeds a preset limit. The 
frequency is monitored either at the generator terminals or on the utility to customer inter—tie 
using a voltage transformer. The relay setting is chosen such that it will operate for the embedded 
generator load changes associated with the loss of grid, but it will not operate for fluctuations 
governed by utility time constants. The setting is critical since if it is too sensitive, unnecessary 
tripping during system disturbances could result and if too high, it could cause failure to detect loss 
of grid.
Under loss of grid, any changes in the load connected to the embedded generator will result in a 
dF/dt governed by the inertia constant and rated capacity of the embedded generator. For small and 
medium sized embedded generation, a trip setting of 0.3 Hz/sec has been found to be optimum. 
The relay algorithm is designed to ignore slow changes in frequency which could be caused by load 
changes on the utility network but to respond quickly to rapid changes in frequency when 
embedded generation becomes isolated. The rate of change of frequency relay is able to operate 
in from 0.3 to 0.7 seconds, and trips in 80 msecs with large load changes following dramatic 
disconnections.
An inherent advantage of rate of change of frequency relay, is that when loss of grid does not 
result in a significant change in the generator loading and the relay initially fails to operate, it will 
trip when a subsequent load change produces the required dF/dt.
Phase Displacement Monitor5.
The phase displacement monitor operates when there are sudden changes in the phase displacement 
in the system voltage waveform. These phase displacements are a direct result of changes in the 
generator load and its operating frequency. The relay can respond in 50 msec when at the instant 
of loss of grid, the generator’s output power changes by greater than 5% of its rating.
As with the rate of change of frequency relay, the phase displacement monitor will also operate 
for any subsequent load change which produces the required change in phase displacement, should 
the loss of grid fail to cause tripping.
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Generator Output Power Fluctuations Monitor6.
This technique detects the loss of grid by monitoring the behaviour of the power system to 
disturbances to the system and observing the differences in response between those experienced 
when the main utility supply is connected to the embedded generator and those when the embedded 
generator is operating in isolation. The algorithm uses changes in the power output from the 
embedded generator to provide an insight into the transfer function of the generating plant feeding 
the power system. Under normal conditions with the utility supply connected, the transfer function 
reflects the combination of the main source and the embedded generation. Following loss of grid, 
or while the embedded generator is operating in isolation, it reflects the characteristics of the 
embedded generator alone.
Returning to the simplified representation of a power system shown in figure 1, the embedded 
generator and the main utility supply can be represented by idealised generators of capacity Gg and 
Gm with inertia constants Hg and Hm respectively. While the utility’s source of supply is connected 
to the network, a change in the system load of DPS produces a change in the distributed generator’s 
loading of DPg defined by:-
h * g8
DP, =  DP, ---------------------------
Hg Gg + Hm Gm
However if the distributed generator operates independently from the utility supply, for example 
following loss of grid, any change of system load will result in the distributed generator’s loading 
of DPg defined by
DPg = DPS
Accepting that the utility has a greater capacity than the embedded generator and that its inertia 
constant will also be greater, the differences in response to a disturbance provides an immediate 
basis for determining whether or not the utility supply is connected to the portion of the network 
containing the embedded generation.
An additional advantage of using the power as the relaying measurement is that the power 
measurement is readily obtained from instantaneous measurements of the generator’s terminal 
voltages and output currents. Providing that the samples are taken at the same instant, they also 
do not have to be synchronised to the power system frequency.
In a typical protection scheme associated with an embedded generator, these measurements are also 
required for other relaying functions required to protect the machine. This loss of grid protection 
is therefore suitable for including into an integrated protection package for a small or medium sized 
embedded generator without dramatically increasing the hardware requirements.
In addition to reliably detecting the occurrence of a loss of grid, the protection algorithm must 
remain stable during conditions of extreme load unbalance, loss of phase and during load flicker.
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These conditions have been accommodated by amplitude limiting measurements of changes in 
power output from the embedded generator and integrating samples over a moving window period. 
The protection’s trip criteria is defined by:-
n = 0




fn is the amplitude limiting function
n is the sampling instant of ( DPg )n,
kg is the trip setting,
and,
t* is the length of the sampling window.
Extensive simulation studies have been undertaken to study both the effects of loss of grid and of 
other disturbances to a power system containing an embedded generator. These studies were 
conducted using both the alternative transients version of the EMTP programme, ATP7, and 
programmes developed in-house.
The amplitude limiting function is used to control the minimum operating time of the protection 
and the length of the sampling window controls the nominal maximum operating time. For initial 
studies these were chosen to give a minimum operating time of one cycle and a maximum of six 
cycles. Simulation studies have shown that the algorithm can reliably trip for loss of grid conditions 
resulting in a load change at the generator’s terminals of greater than one percent of the generator’s 
rating, and that the operating times are as designed.
An attractive feature of this approach is that it responds to out-of-synchronism reclosures of the 
main source of supply to the embedded generator and can therefore trip the inter-tie breaker to 
minimise subsequent damage.
Further work on this technique is continuing and the algorithm has been implemented in a 
laboratory microprocessor based demonstration relay. Opportunities for field trials are being 
explored.
CONCLUSIONS.
Loss of grid protection is a necessary part of the protection of an embedded generator which 
operates in parallel'with the utility supply. Several techniques have been developed for detecting 
loss of grid and work is continuing to develop new techniques. Since loss of grid is not a 
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A NEW MICROPROCESSOR BASED LOSS OF GRID PROTECTION 
FOR EMBEDDED GENERATION.
M A Redfern, J I Barrett, O Usta and T Yip.
University of Bath, GEC Alsthom Protection and Control, Stafford,
ENGLAND. ENGLAND.
ABSTRACT.
The installation o f  small or medium sized embedded generation units 
operating in parallel with the main utility supply presents several 
technical com plications. This paper describes a new technique for 
detecting a loss o f  grid condition by measuring the embedded 
generator’s power output. It also details the implementation o f  the 
technique in a m icroprocessor based multi-function protection relay.
1.0. INTRODUCTION.
Since the early 1980‘s there have been increased econom ic, political 
and environmental pressures on producers o f  electricity which have 
greatly increased interest in incorporating embedded generation into 
public utility networks. Unfortunately, the operation o f  small or 
m edium sized generation in parallel with the local utility network 
creates several difficulties for the reliable and safe operation o f  the 
pow er system . These difficulties arise from the embedded generators 
ability to supply power to the network from a source that is not 
under the utility's direct control. Special precautions are therefore 
required to protect the utility against faults on the generator site and 
to protect the generator from faults or disturbances on the utility 
network.
One particularly dem anding protection requirement is the need to 
guard against the accidental isolation o f  the generator’s site from the 
main source o f  utility power. In such a situation, the generator's site 
could be left connected to part o f  the utility's customer load and 
operate as an independent pow er island.
This situation, known as loss o f  grid, is illustrated in figure 1. 
Follow ing the opening o f  the 'loss o f  grid' circuit breaker, the 
embedded generator is left connected to its own site load and part o f  
the network load. This produces two separate power networks which 
com plicates the orderly reconnection o f  the power supply network 
and presents a potential safety hazard to the public and utility 
personnel. For those utility customers left connected to the embedded 
generator, it could result in their power supply deviating from the 
required quality standards.
In response to the grow ing interest in the use o f  embedded 
generation, several guidelines have been introduced to ensure that the 
presence o f  the em bedded generator w ill not detract from the quality 
o f  supply to all customers connected to the system. In the U.K., these 
technical requirements are described in the Electricity Council 
Recom mendations G59f*l and the Engineering Technical Report 
ET113.12) These include the need to provide loss o f  grid protection. 
Most major utilities in other countries who allow  non-utility 
generation to be connected to their system  have similar 
guidelines.!3’4-5!
2.0. REQUIREM ENTS FOR LOSS OF GRID PROTECTION.
The principal objective o f  loss o f  grid protection is to detect the 
condition where the em bedded generation unit is left connected to a 
portion o f  the utility's load network, but disconnected from the main 
source o f  utility power fo llow ing a switching operation.
There are several possible causes o f  this condition including; 
switching operations to clear a fault, load shedding, maintenance 
outages and equipment failures.
Ideally the loss o f  grid protection should trip the inter-tie breaker 
between the generator’s site and the utility imm ediately fo llow ing the 
disturbance and hence not impede the orderly restoration o f  the 
utility supply to the network. The tripping time should be such that 
the two system s have been successfu lly  separated before any  
automatic reclosing equipment can attempt to reconnect the main 
supply to the power island. This could have potentially disastrous 
results for the embedded generator should reclosure occur when the 
two networks are out-of-synchronism .
Unfortunately, the loss o f  grid situation is further com plicated since 
the circuit breaker that causes the loss o f  grid need not be a specific  
breaker in the system, but could be any breaker, switch or isolator 
which connects the main source o f  supply to the generator’s site. 
A lso, with an established power system , it is unlikely that the status 
o f  the circuit breaker is supervised or that it is fitted with 
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Figure 1: A  Typical Distribution Network Containing an Embedded 
Generator.
The econom ics o f  small em bedded generator schem es is such that 
once the desired level o f  protection is defined, the cost to protect the 
interconnection does not vary with the generator's capacity.!6! There 
is a widespread complaint from potential operators o f  em bedded  
generation that utility grade relays are too expensive for a sm all 
embedded generation schem e. In som e schem es the protection costs 
can be comparable to the cost o f  the generator itself. To make any 
relatively small embedded generation schem e econom ically  viable, 
there is obviously a need for low  cost, high quality protection 
packages for the complete protection o f  the em bedded generator 
system . The use o f  a single m icroprocessor based relay with  
integrated protection functions, including loss o f  grid, is one solution  
to this requirement. Such a schem e is shown in figure 2.
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3.0. TECHNIQUES FOR DETECTING LOSS OF GRID.
Difficulties arise because loss of grid is not a clearly defined fault 
condition, but is an undesirable and unsafe operating state. Several 
techniques!7’8’9*10) have been developed for detecting loss of grid, but 
as yet an ideal solution has not been found.
The most direct and effective method is to take advantage of a 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System (SCADA) to 
monitor auxiliary contacts on all the circuit breakers, switches and 
isolators in the system between the embedded generator and the main 
utility supply.!11’12’13"M1 A transfer trip signal could then be provided 
to open the inter-tie circuit breaker. However, most distribution 
systems, and the circuit breakers they employ, have not been fitted 
with a suitable supervisory system and the expense involved with a 
retrofit is difficult to justify.
TO T H E  UTILITY SYSTEM
IN T ER -TIE
BREA K ER
GENERATOR
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LOG LOSS OF GRID PROTECTION.
A Typical Microprocessor Based Integrated Generator 
Protection Scheme.
Unlike previous techniques the algorithm is based on measurements 
of the generator's power output The instantaneous three phase power 
output from the generator is derived from:
f. + v* <* ♦ v« a)
where va , im, vt , it , ve and ie represent the simultaneously sampled 
values of phase voltages and line currents measured at the machine's 
terminals. If the three phase system is balanced, this measurement is 
divorced from the point on wave of the input samples and the 
sampling system does not need to be locked onto the power system 
frequency.
An advantage of using the output power is that these measurements 
are required for other relaying functions and therefore algorithms can 
be added without increasing hardware requirements.
Loss of grid is detected by monitoring the behaviour of the power 
system to disturbances and observing the differences in response 
between those experienced when the main utility supply is connected 
to the embedded generator site and those when the generator site is 
operating in isolation, which includes the situation following a loss 
of grid.
Considering the simplified representation of a power system shown 
in figure 1, the embedded generator and main utility supply can be 
represented by idealised generators of capacity Gg and Gm with 
inertia constants Hg and Hm respectively. While the utility source of 
supply is connected to the network, a change in system load A 
produces a change in the embedded generator's loading of APg 
defined by:
A P . -  A P.
Hg Gg «■ Hm
(2)
Accepting that the utility has a greater inertia than the embedded 
generator, changes in the generator’s power output will only be a 
small fraction of the change in system load as long as the grid is 
connected.
Several techniques have been devised for detecting loss of grid using 
local power system measurements made on the embedded generator's 
site. These can be divided into two categories; active techniques 
which have a direct influence on the power system, and passive 
techniques which rely solely on measurement of system parameters.
The most widely used active technique is the Reactive Export Error 
Detector!7) which forces the generator to generate a level of reactive 
power flow in the inter-tie that can only be maintained when the 
main source of utility generation is connected. Another method is the 
system fault level monitor!8) which measures the power system's 
source impedance and hence can differentiate between the condition 
when the grid is connected and when it is not
The main passive techniques include Under/Over Frequency and 
Under/Over Voltage relays, Rate of Change of Frequency!7) and 
Phase Displacement Monitoring !10)
4.0. THE NEW LOSS OF GRID PROTECTION ALGORITHM.!15)
The commercial attraction of a loss o f grid protection technique that 
can be included in a microprocessor based integrated protection 
scheme for an embedded generator led to the formulation of this new 
algorithm.
However, if the embedded generator operates independently from the 
utility supply, any change of system loading APL will result in a 
change in the embedded generator's output power APg given by:
A Pg -  A PL (3)
Since a loss of grid generally produces a system load change, 
monitoring changes in the power output of the generator provides a 
direct method for detecting a loss of grid event
The basic operation of the algorithm therefore depends upon the fact 
that, in the time frame analysed by the algorithm, following a load 
impact, the various machines on the system share the impact as a 
function of their inertia constants and capacity. This is a feature of 
the system's dynamic response.
In the transient time periods, immediately following a disturbance, 
the rotor angle of the individual machines cannot change due to the 
rotor's inertia, so the energy to supply the load change comes from 
the magnetic field of the generator and is distributed according to the 
synchronizing power coefficients. These depend upon the reactances 
from the generator to the load impact point
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For the first few milliseconds after the disturbance the machines 
'electrically closest' to the point of load impact will pick up the 
gre ater share of the load regardless of size.!16! In the algorithm this 
phenomenon is overcome by amplitude limiting the change in power 
APg by the function The level of the amplitude limiting function, 
together with the overall integrating feature also defines the 
minimum trip time of the algorithm.
The measured fluctuations in the generator's power output APg are 
therefore amplitude limited by the function f m. This signal is then 
integrated over a moving window of length tx and tripping is initiated 
when the absolute value of the integrated signal exceeds the trip 
setting Kt . The trip criterion for the protection algorithm is defined 
by:
i E / . (A*y, i * <4>
The size of the moving average window tx allows the nominal 
maximum trip time of the algorithm to be set. For the studies shown 
in this paper the moving average window is set to six cycles.
The trip setting Kt is chosen such that the relay will just trip 
whenever a loss of grid, or a load disturbance during independent 
operation, produces a predefined percentage change in the generator's 
loading. The setting, K r  is defined by the sampling interval, the size 
of the moving average window, the generator's inertia constant and 
its rated capacity.
5.0. POWER SYSTEM STUDIES.
The operation of the basic algorithm has been demonstrated using a 
simulated system containing an embedded generator rated at 3.75 
MVA with inertia constant 0.91 MW.sec/MVA connected into an 
1 lkV network.!15! The utility supply was set at 250 MVA with an 
inertia constant of 10 MW.sec/MVA. The length of the moving 
average filter window was set to six cycles and the amplitude 
limiting function was set to give a minimum trip time of one cycle. 
A sampling rate of 1kHz was used and the setting of the trip level 
was chosen such that a one percent change in generator loading 
produced a trip.
To complement computer simulation studies, practical trials have 
been conducted using a laboratory 200 volt, three phase model power 
system. The model is based on a double bus generating station and 
includes two small synchronous generators driven by d.c. machines. 
One of the generators has been fitted with a microprocessor 
protection relay which is supported by a personal computer. This 
computer is also equipped with the necessary input transducers to 
monitor an array of system voltages and currents and provides a 
convenient platform for research into new digital algorithms for 
generator protection which can be transferred to the relay hardware 
at a later stage.!17! A schematic diagram of the laboratory research 
facility can be seen in figure 3.
The loss of grid protection algorithm was programmed into the 
personal computer to run in real time using an existing data 
acquisition system. The system uses a 12 bit A to D converter with 
a 200% dynamic range for the voltage inputs and a switch selectable 
dynamic range for the current inputs. The processing of the algorithm 
was modified from the above to reduce the computing time required 
such that several protection algorithms can be operated in a multi­
tasking environment The input data was sampled at 24 samples/cycle 
and the algorithm was evaluated at four samples per cycle.
The practical laboratory tests used the 5kVA test machines with a 
measured inertia constant of 0.35 kW.sec/kVA. The mains supply 
was rated at 500 kVA with a nominal inertia constant of 10 
kW.sec/kVA. The settings for the practical tests were similar to those 
used for the simulation results.
Due to the variety of loads drawn from the laboratory system, the 
test system was found to suffer from very high levels of waveform 
distortion and harmonic interference. The effect of these was greatly 
reduced by using a full-cycle Fourier filter on the sampled values of 
voltages and currents. This filter however did not remove the double 
frequency sinusoidal component in the instantaneous power 
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Figure 3: Schematic Diagram of the Laboratory Research Facility.
Unbalance in the power waveform is removed by the algorithm using 
the effective sampling rate of four samples per cycle with the change 
in power output APg calculated using the formula:
- Pn ~ Pn-2 ®
instead of that used in the earlier algorithm !,51;
*Pt “ Pn - *Vt ®
(i.e. Using the current power value and the previous but one value).
Using four samples per 50 Hertz cycle has the effect of converting 
the sinusoidal unbalance term into a triangular waveform. Then by 
using equation (5), the change in power term APg consists of only 
the underlying power changes with the unbalance term removed.
The stability of the algorithm was further improved for the practical 
test results by adapting the amplitude limiting function f H from the 
simple clipping function first used for the simulation results to a 
function which relies on a simple pattern recognition technique.
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T he basic operation o f  the amplitude limiting function is that the 
change o f  power A/*g is set to zero i f  the absolute value does not 
ex ceed  the clip level. I f  the clip level is e x c e e d e d , i s  written 
to  that level. H owever, i f  the sign o f  the amplitude limited signal 
changes three tim es in succession  the value o f / , ( A P g) is set to zero. 
T his continues until the value o f  A Pg reduces below  the clip level 
for  five  consecutive sam ples at which point the control flag is reset
The response o f  the enhanced algorithm to a simulated 10% increase 
in the generator's loading as a result o f  a loss o f  grid can be seen in 
figure 4.
The effect o f  the enhancements to the algorithm can be greater 
appreciated using results from the practical laboratory tests. Figure 
5(i) show s the instantaneous power waveform  measured at the 
terminals o f  the generator for a loss o f  grid connection which results 
in a 10% increase in the loading o f  the embedded generator. The 
sampling rate for this result was 24  sam ples/cycle and the effect o f  
the harmonics and unbalance can be clearly seen. The signal shown 
by figure 5(ii) is from the same test but with the Fourier filter 
applied to the sampled quantities and the sampling rate reduced to 
four sam ples/cycle. The corresponding change in power A Pg 
calculated by the algorithm is, however, free from the effects o f  the 
unbalance present in the original signal.
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Figure 4: Response o f  the L oss o f  Grid Algorithm to a 10% 
Increase in the Embedded Generator's Load Following a 
L oss o f  Grid. (Sim ulation Results)
Figure 4(i) show s the instantaneous power output from the simulated 
embedded generator fo llow ing the 10% load increase. At the instant 
o f  the load impact, t=0.1 seconds, the source o f  energy supplied by  
the generator is the energy stored in its magnetic field!16!. Following  
this period the characteristics o f  the generator’s power output are 
governed by the inertia constant o f  the embedded generation unit 
alone. The response o f  the algorithm is a trip after 80 milliseconds.
Figure 5: Response o f  the Loss o f  Grid Algorithm to a 10% 
Increase in the Embedded Generator's Load Follow ing a 
Loss o f  Grid. (Laboratory Test Results)
After the application o f  the amplitude limiting function f H the 
resulting waveform /„ (A P g) is as shown in figure 5(iv). The 
algorithm output produces a trip decision after 80 m illiseconds. This 
result can be compared to that obtained for the simulated system  
shown in Figure 4. The dramatic reduction o f  the noise in the 
waveform allows a low  trip setting to be used without the risk o f  
nuisance tripping.
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T he operation o f  the algorithm when the generator operates in 
isolation from the main supply is also important should the loss o f  
grid fail to produce the disturbance required to cause relay operation. 
Although this was initially considered to be an academic scenario, 
recent experiences have shown that it is not as rare as anticipated. 
Such a situation is show n in figure 6 which considers a 10% change 
in local load with the generator operating in isolation from the utility 
system . The results are almost identical to those obtained for the loss 
o f  grid condition because the characteristics o f  the embedded 
generator dictates the response in both cases. The algorithm again 
produces a trip decision after 80 m illiseconds.
third successive change o f  sign. The algorithm output, figure 7(v), 
does not produce a trip decision. Further tests have show n that there 
is no indication that a trip would occur even  for larger local load  
changes.
Finally, the stability o f  the algorithm in the presence o f  short circuit 
fault conditions has also been tested. The result o f  a single phase to  
ground fault on the local busbar can be seen in figure 8. The high  
levels o f  unbalance due to this type o f  fault leads to a large double  
frequency term present in the instantaneous power waveform . This 
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Figure 6: Response o f  the Loss o f  Grid Algorithm to a 10% 
Increase in the Embedded Generator’s Load W hile 
Operating Independently from the Utility System.
Figure 7: Response o f  the Loss o f  Grid Algorithm to a 100%  
Change in the Local Load W hile the Generator Operates 
in Parallel with the Utility Supply.
The stability o f  the algorithm to severe load changes which occur 
while the em bedded generator is operating in parallel with the main 
source o f  supply is also o f  very great importance. The algorithm  
must not trip under these conditions and figure 7  shows the response 
o f  the algorithm to a local load change o f  100% o f  the generator's 
rating. The operation o f  the amplitude limiting function f m can be 
seen in figure 7 (iv ) where the output f m(APg) is set to zero after the
term due to the filtering introduced by the 4 times per cycle  
processing rate. The A Pg waveform  includes the fault-on and fault- 
o f f  sections o f  the waveform , but since the amplitude lim iting  
function f H produces a zero output signal after the third su ccessive  
change in the sign o f  the A Pg signal, m al-operation does not resu lt
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protection reduces the complication o f  installing embedded 
generation.
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The new  digital protection algorithm for detecting loss o f  grid has 
been show n to trip for both loss o f  grid and local load changes 
during independent operation. The algorithm remains stable during 
large local load changes w hile the utility grid remains connected and 
also during local power system  fault conditions.
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Figure 8: Response o f  the Loss o f  Grid Algorithm to a Single  
Phase to Ground Fault on the Local Busbar.
Laboratory tests have supported earlier computer simulation results 
and have demonstrated the satisfactory operation o f  the algorithm 
despite the presence o f  high levels o f  harmonic interference and 
system  unbalance.
The technique has been specially formulated to be suitable for 
inclusion in an integrated generator protection package for embedded 
generation requiring additional software only. This enables an 
econom ically attractive protection package to be produced.
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